

# IISS 7 INTERNATIONAL ILEM SUMMER SCHOOL

## MUSLIM IDENTITY IN THE MODERN WORLD: FACTS, THREATS, AND PROSPECTS

### PROGRAM & PROPOSALS






# IISS 7 INTERNATIONAL ILEM SUMMER SCHOOL

Scientific Studies Association (ILEM) organizes International ILEM Summer Schools to exchange intellectual experience within academicians, researchers, and intellectuals from different geographies worldwide. The International ILEM Summer School (IISS), which addresses major themes and issues of the Islamic World in every year.

The 7th IISS will occur in the Summer of 2021 and its major theme is “Muslim Identity in the Modern World”. The trajectories of Muslim Identity are an exceedingly important intellectual resource for making sense of the Muslim question in the present world. The IISS 7 is geared towards earnestly comprehending these trajectories alongside, in the light of both historical and contemporary developments, attending to the range of challenges that the Muslim identity confronts in the modern world. Core issues/concerns related to significant inquiries, it is hoped, could be looked into within the subthemes Theoretical and Historical Frameworks and Contemporary Debates and Future Prospects.

In this summer school, Muslim identity in the modern world will be discussed with special emphases on its Facts, Threats, and Prospects.

Researchers around the world will share their ideas and great intellectual experience during this annual event, which will be held on 5-9 July 2021, online. IISS would like to thank supporters; Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), Istanbul University, Islamic Cooperation Youth Forum (ICYF), International League Academicians (ILM) who collectively have worked to organize the program.



## **ILEM – Scientific Studies Association**

Scientific Studies Association was founded in 2002 with a view to train and support scientists and intellectuals who are expected to suggest encompassing solutions for those problems that have been taking place over two centuries. Studies within ILEM are planned with a comparative and multi-dimensional interdisciplinary approach to assist the training of sapient and sagacious scholars who understand zeitgeist and main dynamics of their own civilization. With this regard, one of the main objectives of ILEM is conducting scientific research to suggest solutions for the questions of humanity by laying a ground for training scientists who preserve our tradition of science. ILEM hopes its scientific studies to inspire varied groups in Turkey and abroad.



## **YTB**

Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) is established as a public institution under the Prime Ministry of Turkey. After its establishment, Turkey's relations with its citizens living in different parts of the world, as well as with kin communities with whom Turkish people share a common cultural and historic heritage, have been firmly restructured on a more institutional foundation. Of its various responsibilities, the Presidency's coordination responsibilities include defining strategies to meet the needs of related communities and Turkish citizens living abroad and implementing steps in accordance with the planned strategies.



## Istanbul University

Istanbul University, founded in 1453 and reorganized in its present form in 1933, includes faculties of letters, science, law, medicine, and forestry and has facilities in Beyazıt, Avclar, Çapa, Cerrahpaşa, Bahçeköy, Kadıköy, and Şişli.

Today it has 70.000 students and 22 faculties as well as three departments, eight schools, twelve campuses, application and research centers – including a technology transfer center – and the state conservatory.

Istanbul University is associated with 2 Nobel laureates, Aziz Sançar (in Chemistry) and Orhan Pamuk (in Literature).



## ICYF

Islamic Cooperation Youth Forum (hereinafter referred to as “Forum”) is an international, non-commercial, non-partisan organization uniting leading umbrella youth organizations from the Member-States of the Organization of Islamic-Cooperation (hereinafter referred to as the OIC) as well as international youth organizations, operating in the OIC region and youth organizations representing significant Muslim minorities worldwide. The Forum was established at its Founding General Assembly held in Baku, Azerbaijan on 1 – 3 December 2004. This current Charter and the Host Country Agreement constitute the legal framework for the Forum. The activities of the Forum are stemming from this Charter, relevant decisions of the Forum’s governing bodies and conducted in line with the relevant decisions of the OIC Council of Foreign Ministers and Islamic Conference of Youth and Sports Ministers.



## ILM ACADEMICIANS

ILM ACADEMICIANS was established by Muslim academics from Europe in 2017. The association has taken it to their task to give people the opportunity to broaden their cultural and religious education within their immediate social environment.

ILM e.V. is an international umbrella organization which supports and improves education, teaching and research. They are holding information and counselling sessions to improve the education opportunities of pupils and university students. They organise symposia and conferences to promote scholarly exchange and knowledge production. Within the framework of our tasks, they cooperate with national and international universities, institutions, foundations and similar organisations.

# IISS 7 PROGRAM

### July 5, 2021 Monday

10:30 – 11:00 Opening Speeches

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11:00 – 12:00 Keynote Conference – Syed Farid al Attas – Religion and Decoloniality of Knowledge: Prospect and Challenges to Muslims Modern Identities

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12:00 – 13:00 Break

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Zoom Webinar

13:00 – 14:00 Acquaintance Meeting

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14:30 – 15:30 YTB Presentation

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15:50 – 17:00 Workshop 1

### July 6, 2021 Tuesday

09:30 – 12:30 Lecture 1 – Imtiyaz Yusuf – Muslim Identities in Non-Muslim Countries: Southeast Asian Case

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12:30 – 13:30 Break

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13:30 – 14:30 IISS Talks 1 - Azyumardi Azra - Challenges of Globalism: With a Special Reference to Indonesian Islam

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Zoom Webinar

15:00 – 16:10 Workshop 2

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16:30 – 17:40 Workshop 3

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# IISS 7 PROGRAM

## July 7, 2021 Wednesday

09:30 – 12:30	Lecture 1 – Imtiyaz Yusuf – Muslim Identities in Non-Muslim Countries: Southeast Asian Case	
12:30 – 13:30	Break	
13:30 – 14:20	IISS Talks 2 - Fikret Karcic - Muslim Identity of the Bosniaks: Historical Challenges and Threats	Zoom Webinar
14:40 – 15:50	Workshop 4	
16:00 – 19:00	Lecture 2 - Basma Abdelgafar - Re-Orienting Muslim Identity: Quranic Wisdom, Governance and the Teachings of Prophet Muhammad	

## July 8, 2021 Thursday

09:30 – 10:20	IISS Talks 3 - Nassef Manabilang Adiong - Identities of Muslim Minorities in the pre-dominant Christian Philippines	
10:30 – 11:40	Workshop 5	
11:50 – 13:00	Workshop 6	
13:00 – 14:00	Break	Zoom Webinar
14:00 – 17:00	Lecture 3 - Dalia Fahmy - Islamophobic Casting of Muslim Identity: A Critical Reading of Media Narratives/Depictions	
17:30 – 19:00	Lecture 2 - Basma Abdelgafar - Re-Orienting Muslim Identity: Quranic Wisdom, Governance and the Teachings of Prophet Muhammad	

# IISS 7 PROGRAM

July 9, 2021 Friday

10:50 – 12:00 Workshop 7

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12:00 – 14:00 Break

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14:00 – 17:00 Lecture 3 - Dalia Fahmy - Islamophobic Casting of Muslim Identity:  
A Critical Reading of Media Narratives/Depictions

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Zoom Webinar

17:20 – 18:00 Closing Session

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## Syed Farid al-Attas

National University of Singapore

Keynote Speaker



Syed Farid Alatas is Professor of Sociology at the National University of Singapore. He also headed the Department of Malay Studies at NUS from 2007 till 2013. He lectured at the University of Malaya in the Department of Southeast Asian Studies prior to joining NUS. In the early 1990s, he was a Research Associate at the Women and Human Resource Studies Unit, Universiti Sains Malaysia. Prof. Alatas has authored numerous books and articles, including *Ibn Khaldun* (Oxford University Press, 2013); *Applying Ibn Khaldun: The Recovery of a Lost Tradition in Sociology* (Routledge, 2014), and (with Vineeta Sinha) *Sociological Theory Beyond the Canon* (Palgrave, 2017) and “The State of Feminist Theory in Malaysia” in Maznah Mohamad & Wong Soak Koon, eds., *Feminism: Malaysian Reflections and Experience* (special issue of *Kajian Malaysia: Journal of Malaysian Studies*), 12, 1-2 (1994): 25-46. His areas of interest are the sociology of Islam, social theory, religion and reform, intra- and inter-religious dialogue, and the study of Eurocentrism.

## Imtiyaz Yusuf

International Islamic University Malaysia

Lecturer



Dr. Imtiyaz Yusuf is Associate Professor and Deputy Dean for Students Development and Community Engagement and also Coordinator, Islam and Buddhism Programme at The International Institute of Islamic Civilisation and Malay World (ISTAC-IIUM), Malaysia. Dr. Yusuf former Senior Fellow at the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, (ACMCU) Georgetown University, Washington D.C., USA. He is also the former Director of the Center for Buddhist-Muslim Understanding in the College of Religious Studies at Mahidol University in Thailand.

## Azyumardi Azra

Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) of Jakarta

Speaker



Azyumardi Azra is Professor of History & Culture; and Special Staff to Vice-President Jusuf Kalla (January 2017-October 2019). He was Director of Graduate School, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta, Indonesia (January 2007-March 2015); and was also Deputy for Social Welfare at the Office of Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia (April 2007-October 20, 2009). He was also rector of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University for two terms (1998-2002 and 2002-2006). He earned his MA in Middle Eastern Studies, MPhil and PhD degrees in history all from Columbia University in the City of New York (1992) with the dissertation “The Transmission of Islamic Reformism to Indonesia: Networks of Middle Eastern and Malay-Indonesian ‘Ulama’ in the 17th and 18th Centuries”. In May 2005 he was awarded Doctoral Degree Honoris Causa in Humane Letters from Carroll College, Montana, USA. He has published 44 books; numerous chapters in internationally edited books.

## Fikret Karčić

University of Sarajevo

Speaker



Fikret Karčić is a Professor of Comparative Legal History at the Faculty of Law, University of Sarajevo. He taught at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo, Marmara University in Istanbul, International Islamic University Malaysia, University of Oslo and Boise State University (USA). Fikret Karčić received his secondary education at the Gazi Husrev Beg Madrasa in Sarajevo. In 1978 he graduated from the Faculty of Law, University of Sarajevo. He obtained his M.A. and Ph.D. from the Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade, in 1985 and 1989 respectively. His main academic interest is history of Islamic law and institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the post-Ottoman period, reformist movements in Islam, Balkan Muslims and comparative legal cultures.

## Basma Abdelgafar

Carleton University

Lecturer



Basma Abdelgafar is an avid reader and reflector on the meanings of the Quran and Sunnah. She is also Vice President of Maqasid Institute and Professor of Public Policy. She consults and provides training internationally on policy, governance and Muslim affairs. Dr. Abdelgafar has worked in the Canadian federal government, academia and the third sector. She has contributed to the development of graduate studies in public policy at the American University in Cairo, Qatar Foundation and the International Peace College of South Africa. She was founding head of the Public Policy in Islam Masters Program at the Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies, Hamad Bin Khalifa University. She has a keen interest in research and teaching in public policy and governance in Islam as well as in Muslim history, thought, institutions and communities. She obtained her Ph.D. in Public Policy from Carleton University, Ottawa, in 2003. Her publications, some of which have been translated into several languages.

## Nassef Manabilang Adiong

University of the Philippines-Diliman

Speaker



Dr Nassef Manabilang Adiong is the founder of Co-IRIS (International Relations and Islamic Studies Research Cohort), PHISO (Philippine International Studies Organization), and DSRN (Decolonial Studies Research Network). He works on interdisciplinary research between Islam and International Relations (particularly, comparing Muslim governance with the nation-state system), and explores Muslim polities in Southeast Asia. Presently, the Officer-in-Charge of the Bangsamoro Parliament's Policy Research and Legal Services and ranked as Associate Professor at the Institute of Islamic Studies of the University of the Philippines Diliman where his decolonial ideas led him in the creation of the CIDS Decolonial Studies Program. He embarked on creating the following publication platforms of which he serves as the founding editor-in-chief: International Journal of Islam in Asia (Brill Publishers), Islam and Global Studies series (Palgrave Macmillan), International Relations in Southeast Asia series (Routledge), Islam in Southeast Asia series (Palgrave Macmillan), and Islam in the Philippines series (IIUM Press).

## Dalia Fahmy

Long Island University



Lecturer

Dr. Dalia Fahmy is an Associate Professor of Political Science and the Project Director of International Relations and Diplomacy at Long Island University where she teaches courses on US Foreign Policy, World Politics, International Relations, Military and Defense Policy, Causes of War, Politics of the Middle East and Islam and Democracy. Dr. Fahmy was previously a Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Policy in Washington DC, and is currently a visiting scholar at the Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights at Rutgers University. She has given several DC briefings on the future of democracy in the Middle East. She has been interviewed by and written editorials in various media outlets including ABC, BBC, CBS, CBC, CNBC, CNN, MSNBC, NPR, PBS, TRT, The Huffington Post, the Washington Post, and appears often on Aljazeera. Dr. Fahmy has won several academic awards and fellowships for her research. In 2014, Dr. Fahmy was one of the recipients of the prestigious Kleigman Prize in Political Science, was the 2016 recipient of the Newton Prize for Excellence in Teaching, and in 2017 was named NPR's 'Source if the Week.'

# Workshop I

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5 July 2021 – Monday / 15:50 – 17:00

Zoom Webinar

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**Moderator: Latif Karagöz, Istanbul Medeniyet University**

**Abdullah Al Mahmud**

Decolonizing ELT in Postcolonial Muslim Countries: A Generic Framework of Good Practices for Upholding Muslim Cultural Identity

**Rahmat Hidayat Muhammad Zakaria**

The Tradition of Knowledge Between Islam Civilization and The West

**Muhammad Shahid Habib**

Challenges of Defining and Revitalizing/Reawakening of Islamic Civilization in Contemporary Era

**Sana Khan**

Religious and Sexual Identities Among Young Muslims: A Sociological Study

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# Decolonizing ELT in Postcolonial Muslim Countries: A Generic Framework of Good Practices for Upholding Muslim Cultural Identity

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*ABDULLAH AL MAHMUD*

*SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES MONASH UNIVERSITY MALAYSIA*

**Keywords:** Postcolonial Education; Critical Pedagogy; English Language Teaching; Muslim Cultural Identity; Malaysia; Bangladesh.

The political withdrawal of Great Britain from its colonized territories has not lessened the influence of the English language. Instead, it has entered a new stage of its all-pervasive authority in postcolonial countries as a result of globalization (Peter, 2006) and neocolonial power relations (Adejumobi, 2004), about which a prediction had been made during the nineteenth century: “English language is traveling fast towards the fulfillment of its destiny ... running forward towards its ultimate mission of eating up, like Aaron’s rod, all other languages.” (De Quincey, 1862, p.14)

By depicting the history of the aforementioned status of the English language, Alastair Pennycook (1998) emphasizes the importance of ELT enterprise as the core element of yesterday’s colonialism and today’s neo-

colonial hegemony. He shows how the ‘colonial cultural constructs’[1] (p.31) in the English language and its teaching-learning has been reinforcing the language’s supremacy. In Phillipson’s (1992) words,

“The English language and English language teaching are hegemonic if they uphold the values of dominant groups, and if the pre-eminence of English is legitimated as being a ‘common sense’ social fact, thus concealing whose interests are being served by the dominant ideology and dominant professional practice.” (p.76)

Phillipson defines this treatment of English as linguistic imperialism or ‘linguicism’, which is a kind of racism that asserts the dominance of the West through retention of

structural, functional and cultural inequalities between English and other languages. The power of English language is maintained in all sectors including its pedagogy at the structural level through gatekeeping policies ('sticks'), at the functional level through extending its scope or ('carrots'), and the cultural level through the 'normalized' attitudes and social practices relating the language ('ideas'). These three i.e. sticks, carrots and ideas, as Phillipson explains referring to Galtung (1980), are used respectively to impose, bargain and persuade the superior status of the powerful.

While highlighting the examples of power relations inherent in the use of the English language is important as a primary step towards decolonizing it from linguistic imperialism, equally imperative is also the next step of undoing these instances. With this view in mind, I focus on education, specifically the teaching of the English language, in order to address the matter of 'linguistic decolonization', which comprises, among other things, an intervention into the way a dominant language like English is taught and treated in the overall educational policy of once colonized nation-states. For instance, Canagarajah (1999) proposes various creative strategies (e.g. modality splitting in language classroom (p.131), content focus in teaching writing (p.151) that have been, or can be, employed to not only suit these communities' needs, but also avoid the possibility of an unconscious neo-colonialist situation. However, this task has to also address the issues around English language teaching along with those directly related to the English language classroom.

Considering two postcolonial Muslim majority countries, Malaysia and Bangladesh, I intend to derive recommendable good practices or 'quality standards and characteristics' for teaching English in a way that learners are able to disassociate the matter of learning the language from the attitudes and assumptions extrapolated from the neo-colonial 'power nexus' as stated above. I name it Post-colonial Critical Pedagogy of English Language (PCPEL) to refer to the pedagogical principles that do not contribute to producing "confused deshis (natives) [and Westernized citizens] living in Bangladesh

[and Malaysia]" (Al Quaderi & Al Mahmud, 2010, p.126). As Horkheimer (1976) points out, critical theory in the Neo-Marxist tradition defends the primacy of neither matter (materialism) nor consciousness (idealism), arguing that both epistemologies distort reality to the benefit, eventually, of some interest groups. I choose the two countries because of their similar history of colonization and arguably ongoing neo-colonization that is most all affecting their Muslim heritage and the corresponding cultural identity of their Muslims through cutting off their pre-colonial Muslim history on one side and assimilating to the late capitalistic and Eurocentric worldview in education (Robinson, 1998; Shamsul, 2005).

The formulation of PCPEL is carried out by using 'Constructive Grounded Theory' method (Charmaz, 2008) under the methodological framework of 'Generic Benchmarking' for an eclectic selection of quality statements suitable for multiple postcolonial settings. These quality aspects are accumulated from the relevant literature in a cross-matching and iterative[2] or constant-comparative manner through 'coding, conceptualizing and categorizing'. To find the quality statements for PCPEL, I turn to the critical applied linguists (Pennycook, 2001) who have addressed the power relations in English language teaching using a critical approach. Three of them are particularly helpful: first is Robert Phillipson who set the grounds of linguistic imperialism of English language; second is Alastair Pennycook whose work discusses colonialist discourses maintained in ELT industry. The third one, Suresh Canagarajah, sketches a map of critical English language classroom.

On the whole, this study intends to critically interrogate the 'perceptions' about English language and subvert the 'norms' associated with its teaching-learning. It provides a set of quality standards and characteristics for a neo-colonially informed teaching of the English language in countries like Bangladesh and Malaysia for whose people cultural identity still carries a significant value. It goes ahead to uphold the linguistic human rights of the speakers of languages other than English in a world where:

"...English has also become a lingua franca to the point that any literate educated person is in a very real sense deprived if he does not know English. Poverty, famine, and disease are instantly recognized as the cruelest and least excusable forms of deprivation. Linguistic deprivation is a less easily noticed condition, but one nevertheless of great significance." (Burchfield, 1985, p.160)

[1] It refers to the dichotomizing notions like civilized-un-civilized, concrete-abstract, rational-emotional, precise-vague etc. that perpetuate the superior position of the colonizer and inferiority of the colonized.

[2] Like that in computing, iteration means executing the same set of instructions a given number of times or until a specified result is obtained, hence taken as similar to constant comparison in this study.

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# The Tradition of Knowledge Between Islam Civilization and the West

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*RAHMAT HIDAYAT MUHAMMAD ZAKARIA*  
*UNIVERSITY OF RADEN FATAH*

**Keywords:** Tradition, Knowledge, Islamic civilization, Western civilization.

This paper attempts to compare the two knowledge traditions between Islam and the West. The tradition of Islamic knowledge is closely related to Islamic civilization and the dimension of Mecca and Medina Revelations. The revelation of Mecca emphasizes more on the faith aspects, while Medina has an applicable form in social-community life, including the concept of its knowledge. Western knowledge tradition also is closely related to Western civilization that coming from the European countries traditions: German, Roman and Seltic, so that influence their knowledges, religion, laws, and state administration. With the descriptive-comparative method, this paper results: 1) Islam and the West recognize that knowledge can be achieved through five senses and reason. However, in the West there is a positivism genre that recognizes senses as a media in understanding everything. 2) In Islam, the authenticity of true

report from authoritatif people in the past and absolute information based on revelation can be accepted. Where both are different from secular rationalism, philosophical empiricism and modern knowledge. 3) In Islam there is a hierarchy of knowledge: knowledge of farḍu 'ain which deals with individual aspect and the knowledge of farḍu kifāyah which is useful for human interest. 4) Islam does not recognize dualism, because it creates a dichotomy of knowledge; humanism that focus more on material, individual and group interests; and the tragedy because of the emptiness of the heart and favors of faith.

There are people who think that what is needed now is not knowledge, but faith and religious practice; others say economic strength; unity, national spirit, morals, and so on. Of course, such matters are very important to consider. However, there is something more funda-

mental than all of that, namely knowledge. The decline of the economy, the deterioration of morals, the lack of a national spirit and a rigid attitude in religious matters are all the result or the result of errors and misappropriations of knowledge. Mistakes and mistakes in knowledge result in the loss of ethics among mankind which in turn will create leaders who are incompetent in leadership, immoral, intellectually and without high spirituality. Faith and religious practices that are not based on broad and established knowledge as emphasized by Wan Mohn nor are only like buildings on the sand, even though they are towering, their foundations are not solid and strong. On the other hand, faith and religious practices which are based on knowledge will strengthen personality and can provide welfare for mankind. The economy of a nation that has no knowledge, will await the mercy of the rich and dependent nation. The same spirit of unity and nationality, if not based on knowledge, will be a tool for leaders to divert power and authority. That is why Allah said which means: only those who are knowledgeable ('ulamā') are afraid and try to obey Allah as well as possible. The Prophet also said, a thousand people who worship without knowledge are not comparable to someone who is knowledgeable in religion in opposing Satan. Likewise, Muaz bin Jabal, a friend of the Prophet, also emphasized the importance of knowledge. This is reflected in his words, "knowledge is the leader for charity and charity is its follower". Without correct knowledge, good deeds are impossible. With correct knowledge, good deeds become a certainty. A healthy tradition of knowledge will make people wise and try to think critically about everything. The existence of wisdom and critical attitude can finally be practiced in everyday life, both for individuals, families, communities, countries and the outside world. Understanding Islamic and Western knowledge traditions is very important. This is because the biggest challenges faced by Muslims today are challenges that come from the West. The aspect of knowledge greatly contributes to influencing human activities, be it thought, intellectual, reason, culture, methods, religious teachings and lifestyle. There are only two choices: right knowledge or wrong knowledge. Therefore, it is neces-

sary to have a respectful and critical attitude towards other civilizations, especially in the field of knowledge, in order to achieve ultimate truth and justice. There are several similarities and differences in knowledge traditions between Islamic and Western civilizations: knowledge in the Islamic tradition and the West, the same can be achieved through the senses (five senses) experienced through empirical data. But the difference is that in the West there is one extreme flow in understanding the empirical world, namely positivism initiated by Auguste Comte, who is a scientist. The empirical world for a positivist is the only means as a source of knowledge. To complement the weaknesses that exist in the five senses, reason is needed. Islam and the West both make reason as a source of knowledge. The problem is if reason is used as the only means of attaining knowledge so that it rejects sensory things. Here Islam is not the same as the West. The correct information (khabar ṣādiq) comes from a trusted former person and the absolute information based on the Revelation (Al-Qur'an and Al-Hadith) can be accepted as authentic. Previous people who were followed by their morals and actions could not possibly cooperate to spread lies, falsehoods and heresies. The existence and centrality of Revelation is the same. These two pieces of information fundamentally differentiate Islamic understanding from secular rationalism, philosophical empiricism and modern knowledge. In Islam there is a hierarchy of knowledge, namely the knowledge of farḍu 'ain and the knowledge of farḍu kifāyah. Knowledge farḍu 'ain is the knowledge that is individualized. This knowledge is related to matters of religion and divinity, information that comes from the Prophet peace be upon him, explaining the relationship between man and God and with the ultimate goal of life. While the knowledge of farḍu kifāyah is useful for the benefit and benefit of mankind, such as social knowledge, biology, technology, anthropology, economics, politics, and others. From here understood that knowledge farḍu 'ain and counselors should be instructions on knowledge. obligatory kifāyah. Since knowledge and human age are limited, it is necessary to separate knowledge, which ones are primary and which are not, which ones are the basis of all knowledge

and which are always based on the basic knowledges. Islam does not recognize dualism of knowledge as experienced by the West. The dualism of knowledge can create a dichotomy of knowledge so as to make world knowledge and religion, worship and social-society, nature and humans, knowledge and faith, the physical and spiritual sides, and morals and law separate. Humanism is not known in Islam because it only emphasizes worldly affairs (hedonism), material and individual and group interests. Even so, the understanding of tragedy is not in line with the spirit of Islamic teachings, because this understanding aims to filling the empty heart due to empty favors of faith. This understanding makes the man in assessing the nature of the universe and the origin of man is infinite(unlimited)and without a clear purpose. Because of that they always put forward new theories as an antidote to the empty soul. Although we do know that the modern West is very creative in making knowledge theories, this creativity is actually a reflection of the concept of tragedy that is in line with Western religious experience and civilization, because it is caused by their distrust of beliefs.

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## Challenges of Defining and Revitalizing/ Reawakening of Islamic Civilization in Contemporary Era

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*MUHAMMAD SHAHID HABIB*

*KHWAJA FAREED UNIVERSITY OF ENGINEERING AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY*

**Keywords:** Civilizational studies, Islamic Civilization, Reawakening, Muslim Society and Contemporary.

Islamic Civilization is acknowledged for its distinguished characteristics in civilizational studies and it secures these unique dynamics due to its fundamental principles. Although it has been area of interest among the eminent intellects of the East and the West, but most often it is evaluated in the opposition to the Western Civilization under 'us versus them' framework. This approach must lead to selective perception of the 'Other'. Essentially, Islamic Civilization possess its own unpretentious aspects which are obtained from its foundations; Quran and Sunnah. With reference to modern era, there is an utmost need to rejuvenate Islamic Civilizational studies from its own standpoint without considering the Western 'Other' as Islamic Ummah is undergoing from crisis of distortion of knowledge and misleading inpetretation of tradition by both external and internal conflict narratives. So this era is calling for revitalization and reawakening of Islamic

Civilization to make it in conformity with its basics. Thus it would be in a position to regain its glory and honor that it has lost. This paper aims to highlight, in comparative analytical approach, the need to evaluate Islamic Civilization according to its own principles set by Quran and Sunnah to reawaken Muslim Society. Islamic Civilization is acknowledged for its distinguished characteristics in civilizational studies and it secures these unique dynamics due to its fundamental principles. Although it has been area of interest among the eminent intellects of the East and the West, but most often it is evaluated in the opposition to the Western Civilization under 'us versus them' framework. This approach must lead to selective perception of the 'Other'. Essentially, Islamic Civilization possess its own unpretentious aspects which are obtained from its foundations; Quran and Sunnah. With reference to modern era, there is an utmost need to rejuvenate Is-

Islamic Civilizational studies from its own standpoint without considering the Western 'Other' as Islamic Ummah is undergoing from crisis of distortion of knowledge and misleading interpretation of tradition by both external and internal conflict narratives. So this era is calling for revitalization and reawakening of Islamic Civilization to make it in conformity with its basics. Thus it would be in a position to regain its glory and honor that it has lost. This paper aims to highlight, in comparative analytical approach, the need to evaluate Islamic Civilization according to its own principles set by Quran and Sunnah to reawaken Muslim Society. Islamic Civilization is acknowledged for its distinguished characteristics in civilizational studies and it secures these unique dynamics due to its fundamental principles. Although it has been area of interest among the eminent intellects of the East and the West, but most often it is evaluated in the opposition to the Western Civilization under 'us versus them' framework. Thus it would be in a position to regain its glory and honor that it has lost. This paper aims to highlight, in comparative analytical approach, the need to evaluate Islamic Civilization according to its own principles set by Quran and Sunnah to reawaken Muslim Society.

Predominantly, one of the most challenging endeavors is to address the problems in its totality. Civilizational studies, indisputably, stand at the top ranks of these difficulties. Among world civilizations, study of Islamic Civilization is one the most significant and interesting research areas of the intellects of East and the West. Here, an attempt has been made to refresh the need to evaluate Islamic Civilization on its own axis.

### **Problem of Defining Islamic Civilization**

To begin with the study of Islamic civilization, its foundation and reawakening its features in contemporary era, the most significant question among writers on Islam is to define Islamic Civilization. In modern, postcolonial era, there are different frameworks to discuss civilizational studies.

One of these approaches is 'us versus them' framework. It represents conflict of narratives, an outcome of clash

and confrontation of the civilizations. Images have been built keeping in view of the 'other'. Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said (2004) have remarked that in this manner Islam and West have been defining their civilizations in opposition and conflict of the other. Both have images of themselves only in order to highlight their own glory, significance and autonomy. This leads to the idea of superior 'self' and inferior 'other' as it is based on selective observation in which negative encounters are kept in consideration and the positive images are not remembered. For instance, Western Christian societies have developed their identity in rivalry of the idea of Islamic Others named Saracen, Moorish, Turks or Muslims. East or Orient is defined to discover their own distinctive characteristics. West is defined when she came to know about East. Similarly, Muslims of Middle East in particular and the beyond in general have viewed their own identity, with great support system of values, through competition with European Christian Others. Hence self-versus-other narrative has been promoted in civilizational studies (Funk & Said, 2004, pp. 4-5).

Likewise, Carl W. Ernst (2003), an eminent scholar of the contemporary era, is of the opinion that, since last two centuries, Islam has been studied in the context of confrontation between East and West. Image of Islam has been drawn without dialogue. Muslims are defined as uncivilized and non-western. Orientalist culture has been compared with Euro-American other. Muslims have also been discussing the Western other on the same pattern. Marxism, revolution, democracy, nationalism, human rights and globalization have been the significant areas of interest among Muslim intellectuals (Ernst, 2003, p. 208). He further argues that it was French Revolution which originated the words of 'terrorism' and 'fanaticism'. Most recent innovation of American postmodernism is 'fundamentalism'. Thus new terms are most often used for the humiliation of the 'Other'. He believes that these outcomes of colonialism would engage upcoming generations to great extent also (Ernst, 2003, p. 209).

Moreover, as far as the question of relationship with other existing civilizations are concerned, God has created

mankind, according to the Quran (49:13), with assortment so that these diverse groups would know each other mutually. This mutual understanding about each other would pave the way for some type of relationship which should be based on collective assistance and positive evolution, but not on the motives of extinguishing values and cultures of other civilizations (Kayadibi, 2012, p. 489).

### **Concluding Remarks**

Revitalization of foundations of Islamic civilization and removing faults from Muslim society is the most challenging factor for the Muslims of modern era. Despite the fact that the structure and fundamentals of Islam have been well defined in the Divine Revelation Quran and Sunnah of Holy Prophet (SAW), the real identity of Islamic Civilization has been distorted by Western discourses in particular and misinterpretation of religious leadership who lacks deep insight in the sources of Islam.

There is an urgent need to revive characteristics of Muslim society following the guidelines of Quran and Sunnah with support system of technology and advances of modern era. Thus Muslim Ummah would be able to regain its glory and honor that have been lost.

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# Religious and Sexual Identities Among Young Muslims: A Sociological Study

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*SANA KHAN*  
*DELHI UNIVERSITY*

**Keywords:** Religious and Sexual Identities, Islam and Homosexuality.

This paper explores the relationship between religious and sexual identities among young Muslims. Through the voices of young Muslim adults I seek to understand what it means and how it feels, to negotiate and navigate the exhilarations and exhaustions of converging and conflicting identities within overarching dominant social codes. The paper intends to explore the religious and sexual identities, the significant factors that inform the construction of these identities and the strategies they develop to manage the intersection of these identities in living them out in everyday life. Studying the intersection of religion and sexuality, this paper takes religion as its point of departure. It maps the lived experience of a few young Muslim adults in relation to their sexuality and gender. Sexuality is not only about personal choices, emotions, troubles and decisions but is also about culture and politics, where the personal

and the social intertwine or at times collide. For example one could look at the constraining potential of religion on sexuality, notably on the issue of same sex marriages or gay priests (a mosque in Washington D.C. has a gay Imam, Daaiyee Abdullah and this has generated a huge raucous discourse over religion and sexuality).

A few religious voices have dominated the debate, reinforcing the sex negative view of religion. It appears then that religious young adults are occupying a rather contradictory space. This paper then looks at the multiple meaning these religious young adults construct of religion and sexuality.

Sexuality has assumed great significance as it is considered to be one of the main terrains upon which religions as well as secular value systems deeply depend. By holding that religion is an intolerant space, dominant

discourses position secular spaces as having an exclusive claim to progressive ethics, which is highly contentious and of course debatable.

By using some religious adult's experiences and voices I try to understand the complex ways in which these people negotiate and interweave diverse cultural scripts, personal religious faith and practice to construct their own relationships with the world. Everyday/lived religion prioritises these complexities and fluidities. Foucault (1990) has persuasively argued that different sexualities are discursively constituted in different times and spaces. For example, one could argue that it was at a particular juncture in history 'the homosexual' came into being. Similarly, dividing human beings as either men or women is a construct that essentialises these gender categories, and it negates a possibility of broader range of other gender categories such as trans or intersex. In addition, one could then argue that what it means to be a woman, man, gay, heterosexual, bisexual and so on is culturally, spatially and temporally contingent.

In a discussion of this kind, where one is looking at religious and sexual identities, it becomes important to look at the issue of how the body is socially constituted. It is not just a physical body that desires another body; Jackson and Scott (2010) locate the body as interacting with its surroundings, for 'a body can never be just a body abstracted from mind, self and social context' (2010: 146). They argue that meaning itself is generated not through the body but through 'social contexts, which profoundly affect how we experience our own and other bodies' (2010: 149). In addition, one must look how Foucault theorised body. According to Foucault (1990) body is to be seen as a product of social knowledge, subject to various discourses. Therefore, it could be said that bodies are situated in a complex interplay between agency and structure, with individuals managing their bodies in relation to various knowledge circulating about them.

In the realm of sexuality, bodies frame our sexual encounters, and those encounters have profound social and political meanings. Hence one can say that the body

does not exist as an independent 'object' but comes into existence through cultural understandings and the meanings we attach to our experiences.

Keeping all these above concerns in mind my paper will explore the relationship between religious and sexual identities among young Muslims. To give a brief methodological account, my study will include interviews taken from Muslim adults (mostly university students) and it will look at other narratives of young Muslims and literature on the topic of religion and sexuality and on Islam and Homosexuality.

The focus is more on the religious faith, the multiple meanings of religion and the social connection they foster. The present society is characterised by pluralisation of life worlds and diversification as well as fragmentation of meanings and values (Bauman 2011). It is in this setting that the meanings of Islam and certain aspects of living out of religious faith are explored.

The religious place becomes a community of faith and it functions as a 'moral community' that provides ways and values for individual behaviour, mostly reinforcing one's personal religious beliefs and principles. At one level, this 'moral community' could play a significant role in strengthening a person's private religious practices. The importance of religious community to a religious believer is undeniable. Many scholars like Smith and Denton (2005) have argued that participation in the religious community develops moral directives such as values like that of discipline. Nonetheless, while a community (of faith) offers a sense of belonging through conformity to common values, practices and ways of living, those who are not able to conform for whatever reason, would also experience implicit or explicit exclusion due to their difference. A very good example is seen in the narrative of the gay Muslim, who doesn't embrace Islam because Islam doesn't accept homosexuality. It becomes difficult for people of different sexual orientation than heterosexuality who inhabit religious spaces to gain acceptance from the community. One could look at the case of Daaiyee Abdullah, who is the first ever Gay Imam of a Mosque, An-Nur-Al Isslaah at Washington

D.C ( Besides him there is Muhsin Hendricks of South Africa and Ludovic Muhammad Zahed of France, openly gay and Imams). His sexuality and he being an Imam had generated furious debates among various Islamic scholars. He is someone who is gay yet inhabits the heteronormative religious space. Many scholars argue that his prayers would not be accepted and so of the people praying behind him. Daaiyee Abdullah, himself believes that everyone is free to worship and his sexuality does not put him in contradiction with Islam, he can be gay and be a practising Muslim. According to him, "Quran permits same sex marriage and a healthy sexual relationship" ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daaiyee\\_Abdullah](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daaiyee_Abdullah) ). This compels one to look at how people manage their experiences of religious faith and sexuality, with all its enabling and constraining potentials and effects.

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# Workshop II

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6 July 2021 – Tuesday / 15:00 – 16:10

Zoom Webinar

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**Moderator: Irfanullah Faruqi**, *South Asian University*

**M Musa Al Hasyim Hasyim**

Pesantren and Movie: When Muslim Identities of NU and Muhammadiyah Understand Each Other

**Mohammad Ghitreef**

Tracing The Formation of Muslims Identity in China Through The Mosque Architecture

**Shafey Anwarul Haque**

Media Manipulation and Muslims in India: A Study of the Representation of Muslims by Select Media Outlets

**Motahareh Nabavi**

Resisting Dichotomous Narratives and Finding Unity in Multiplicity: Young Muslims' Identity Development in the West

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## Pesantren and Movie: When Muslim Identities of NU and Muhammadiyah Understand Each Other

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*M MUSA AL HASYIM HASYIM*  
*UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA*

**Keywords:** Tebuireng Production House (Maksi), Movie, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Pesantren, Art and Culture.

### Introduction

The role of pesantren (Indonesian Islamic boarding school) in every development in Indonesia cannot be separated. Since Indonesia was not yet independent, pesantren through Kiai (ulama or the leader of pesantren) and Santri (student in pesantren) together against colonialists. After Indonesia's independence, pesantren as a social and educational institution struggles to develop the country, keep the good character, and create an excellent generation.

Pesantren in Indonesia is divided into two categories which are modern and traditional (salaf). Modern pesantren is institutions that not only learn Islamic studies but also join the national curriculum (formal education) and integrate it with modern aspects. Meanwhile, traditional pesantren usually has own curriculum and only

focus on Islamic studies (Sakai & Isbah, 2014). In the 4.0 era, traditional pesantren is increasingly difficult to find because they have also started to open formal education and use advanced information technology like Pesantren Lirboyo in Kediri, East Java.

Even so, the two categories of pesantren have distinctive identities. The most widely known to the public is the identity of Muhammadiyah (established 1912) and Nahdlatul Ulama (established 1926). Both are the largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia. Both are very close to daily socio-religious life in Indonesia. Both were established by great scholars in Indonesia, KH Ahmad Dahlan (Muhammadiyah) and KH Hasyim Asyari (NU). Both of them have studied with the same teacher, namely KH Shaleh Darat. Even though there are differences in religious practices and setting up different organizations, both of them

are two friends who become role models for Muslims all around Indonesia (Najmuddin, 2019).

In the development of the two organizations, there were sometimes disputes between both of partisans because they had differences of opinion, for example Muhammadiyah partisans did not send dua to those who had died while NU partisans always practiced traditional teachings by sending dua to those who had died (ziarah) and several other kinds of differences.

The difference strongly becomes walls that separate. Each of them felt the most right so there was often hostile to each other. Most of jamaah of NU do not want to pray at the Muhammadiyah mosque and vice versa because of different practices of ibadah (khilafiyah). NU fanaticism and Muhammadiyah fanaticism still exist in Indonesia. NU partisans proudly call themselves the Islam of the Archipelago (Islam Nusantara) while Muhammadiyah calls them the Progressive Islam (Islam Berkemajuan). Even though both of them are Muslim, Indonesia nationality, and Sunni (Qurtuby, 2018).

Fanaticism of NU and Muhammadiyah is not as well as the founder. KH Ahmad Dahlan and KH Hasyim Asyari always practice tolerance even though they often had different opinions. Pesantren Tebuireng, the pesantren that KH Hasyim Asyari founded in 1899, made innovation by establishing a Tebuireng Production House (Maksi). Maksi recently made a film entitled *The Story of Two Ulama* (Jejak Langkah Dua Ulama), which tells the story of the friendship between KH Ahmad Dahlan and KH Hasyim Asyari.

Maksi collaborates with the Institute for Cultural Art and Sports (LSBO) belonging to the Muhammadiyah. Previously, the life story of KH Ahmad Dahlan had been filmed under the title *Sang Pencerah*. Likewise, the story of KH Hasyim Asyari's struggle has been filmed under the title *Sang Kiai*. But there is no film that tells the closeness of the two of them.

### Research Question

The author tries to explain how pesantren and movie are

able to form unity in diversity between the Muslim identities of NU and Muhammadiyah?

### Methodology

The author uses a qualitative methodology. Several academic sources, both journals and news, are used to understand the meaning in individuals or groups. Previously, the author had also researched the development of the creative industry in pesantren, especially Pesantren Tebuireng, where I studied there during high school. Previous research will be developed by the author by taking a different point of view, especially in relation to the latest film produced by Pesantren Tebuireng, *Jejak Langkah Dua Ulama* in 2020.

### A Brief of Maksi

Tebuireng Production House (Maksi) is an independent business entity under the institute of Pesantren Tebuireng which is specialized in making films, including feature films, short films, and documentaries. Maksi was established on July 1, 2018, previously known as Baguss Production. Maksi was born from the creative members of the Tebuireng Photography Community (Kopi Ireng). The students who join Kopi Ireng often win film competitions held by the government. KH Salahuddin Wahid, the leader Pesantren Tebuireng at that time took this situation seriously. He formed a forum for santri to introduce their Islamic identity which was polite and tolerant through the production house. Moreover, KH Salahuddin Wahid's son, Ipang Wahid is a national film entrepreneur as well as chairman of the Indonesia's Creative Industry Working Group (KEIN). Maksi has made several feature films, including *Binar*, *Sakinah* (Hasyim, 2019, pp. 412-416), and *Jejak Langkah Dua Ulama*.

### Jejak Langkah Dua Ulama Movie

*Jejak Langkah Dua Ulama* Movie is an effort to improve mutual understanding between Muhammadiyah and NU with the theme "Understanding Differences, Upholding the Equality" instead of creating blind fanaticism. In essence, both identities have the same goal to spread the Islam *Rahmatan Lil Alamin* (A Mercy to All Creations) (Diko, 2020).

The Movie tells the story of the friendship between KH Hasyim Asyari and KH Ahmad Dahlan, who both struggle to spread truly Islam and against the colonialist. The movie-making process was directly chaired by KH Salahuddin Wahid, the grandson of KH Hasyim Asyari, and KH Haedar Nashir (chairman of the Muhammadiyah). Both of them hope that the movie can reach all corners of the country. The screening of Jejak Langkah Dua Ulama was carried out door to door. The main targets are schools, pesantren, and university (Hida, 2020).

### Conclusion

Jejak Langkah Dua Ulama is a bright example that pesantren and movies are able to unite Indonesian Muslim diversity, either Muhammadiyah or NU identity. In the process of filming, the two of them came together to produce inspirational act for future generations. This is to remind together that NU and Muhammadiyah are like houses protecting each other from the latent dangers of intolerance, radicalism, and extremism. When the film is finished production, partisans of NU or Muhammadiyah can sit together to watch and appreciate the friendship of the founder. Before die on February 2, 2020, KH Salahuddin Wahid hoped that movie can present pesantren as local wisdom of Indonesia and united body of Islam identity.

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## A Critical Reading of Media Narratives (With Especial Reference to Indian Muslims)

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*MOHAMMAD GHITREEF GHITREEF*

*CEPECAMI AMU ALIGARH CENTRE FOR PROMOTION OF EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL ADVANCEMENT OF INDIAN MUSLIMS*

**Keywords:** Islam, India, Media, Muslim minority.

In this paper the current situation of Indian Muslims and its depiction by Indian national media will be discussed in detail.

### **Why this topic?**

India is a country inhabited by the largest Muslim population in the world after Indonesia, with a proportion of twenty crores in numbers. Although great in number, Muslims live as a minority community in the country, and have always been conscious and worried, especially in recent times, about their religious and political identity. Media in its broader sense is the most powerful means to influence the masses precisely in an age where anyone irrespective of his/her economic status, has access to the internet. Unfortunately, the national media (news channels) have been used in the last decade to distort the image of Muslims and their history in India which led to the

occurrence of several unfortunate events in the country. There are several pieces of evidence that suggest that the Hindu nationalist organizations, for example, RSS and its affiliated outfits, have been manipulating the mainstream Indian media for years. Since the RSS is the patron organization of the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), the national media has reduced to its propaganda machinery, bolstering the Hindutva or Hindu nationalist propaganda which itself poses an existentialist threat to the Indian Muslims in the country. The media twists any narrative against Muslims as is evident in the case of protests against CAA (2019-2020) or during the pandemic, Covid19, to vilify and dehumanize Muslims. Therefore, it becomes imperative to highlight and talk about the vilification and dehumanization of Muslims in the current scenario and critically examine the role of Indian media in this context.

## Research Question

What are the major challenges facing Indian Muslims regarding their existence and how national media is deepening their identity crisis with its vilifying narration?

**Method of the study:** The research will be carried out by analysing and conceptualizing the primary and secondary sources, such as debates and media reports of issues linked to Muslims etc.

## Areas of Research

The paper shall cover the following topics:

**Social conditions:** Muslims have been marginalized on social and cultural levels since the independence of India. Around every big city, like, Delhi, Mumbai, etc. there have emerged several ghettos, where a concentrated Muslim population live in highly congested settlements with poor facilities. The division between posh colony inhabitants (Non-Muslims, i.e., Hindu, Sikh, Jain, etc.) and the Muslim ghettos demonstrate the social and economic degradation of the Indian Muslims. This gap is widened due to thousand communal riots and pogroms occurred in the past decades. Because of the profiling of Muslims as terrorists and Jihadists, Muslims are seen with suspicion by their fellow citizens and, therefore, are not allowed and welcomed in posh colonies. Such conceptions also affect the work environment around Muslims.

**Political Issues:** Indian Muslims are facing a very difficult political situation since the Hindu nationalists have assumed power in the centre with an overwhelming majority. There are around 110 demographic pockets in the country where Muslims have a sizable presence in numbers and can influence elections if they use their votes intelligently. However, in the elections of 2014 and 2019, the BJP successfully neutralized their votes turning them ineffective. The role of media here as well had been a corroborative one with the ruling party.

**Intolerance:** India is known for its tolerant and cosmopolitan ethos coexisting with several religions, cultures, and ethnicities. After the rise of Hindu nationalists, this ethos is greatly damaged by the evident hatred against the

Indian Muslims. Hundreds of cases of lynching of Muslims had been reported during last 6 years. On the mere suspicion of cow slaughter, Cow vigilant youth brigades have killed many Muslims in cold blood. Their criminal activities are emboldened by the ruling party and the media's indifference towards these heinous crimes. Especially, the Indian media's lack of interest in reporting and condemning such acts left Muslims helpless.

**Culture:** to the entertainment industry, the Bollywood, contributions of Muslims are renowned. Several Muslim celebrities, for example, Salman Khan, Qadir Khan, Dileep Kumar (Yusuf Khan) Aamir Khan, etc. have worked in the industry. However, this industry has become another means to tarnish the image of Muslims in the country. Especially after the nineties, Muslims have been targeted in numerous national and state-level films. Their portrait is biased and production of cliché. Muslims are seen as villains in general tagged with titles like Mullah, Khan, Miyan Bhai, etc., carrying bad connotations. In most cases, they are cast as mafia, smugglers, traffickers, child abusers, and most of all, terrorists.

**Distortion of history:** Muslim history of India is also being targeted by the Hindu nationalist forces. Muslims ruled this country for around 800 years. During this time they patronized a religious and cultural plurality in the country and supported a culture which is known as, Ganga-Jamuni tahriz, signifying a composite culture of Muslim-Hindu or Indo-Persianate tradition. This culture is manifested in one of the most beautiful monuments, the Taj Mahal, Lal Qila, Jama Masjid, Qutub Minar and Humayun tomb etc. These monuments are not only considered as world heritage they are also world-renowned as the Muslim contribution in India. After the notorious case of the demolition of Babri Masjid, there is a number of claims and lawsuits filed in several state courts against the Muslim claim on that heritage. Hindu nationalists assert that numerous mosques built in Muslim era including the Taj Mahal and Jama Masjid, are actually built on the ruins of Hindu temples, therefore, they should be converted into temples or worshipping places. Even though several historians have rejected such claims, these claims are discussed on the

national channels in order to make the claim of Muslims on these monuments debatable.

Inspired by this false propaganda, many BJP ruled state governments now have the drive to rename the cities, roads, and public places which had previously been named after Muslim rulers and dignitaries, such as Hyderabad, Allahabad, Faizabad, etc. So Allahabad is renamed as Paryagraj, Faizabad as Ayodhia, and so on. A campaign has been launched to rename the South Indian city of Hyderabad as Bhagya Nagar.

Moreover the Hindu nationalists claim that people living in the Hindu Rashtra, or Hindu State, whether they are Muslims or Christians, must be recognized as Hindu. And to strengthen their ties with the Hindu nation, they should follow Hindu culture and civilizational values. However, they are also free to practice their own religious rituals as well.

### **Conclusion**

The Indian media, as often claimed, has been working with destructive forces and more so during the current ruling party, BJP, by targeting Muslims, as well as Christians, their history, culture and creating a narrative that vilifies them. So it is imperative to investigate and question media's role and highlighting its negative repercussions discursively, which will be attempted in this paper.

### **References**

References will be sent with the paper which is being written now and when it will be completed the foot notes and all the references will be attached to this paper. Because it is not a full paper, it is only an abstract, when it will be approved then the full paper will be submitted.

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# Media Manipulation and Muslims in India: A Study of the Representation of Muslims by Select Media Outlets

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*SHAFAY ANWARUL HAQUE*

*ADVANCED CENTRE FOR WOMEN'S STUDIES ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY*

**Keywords:** Media, Muslims, Representation, Hatred, Islamophobia.

## **Introduction**

When COVID-19 pandemic's fright had reached almost every corner of the globe, and people were suffering because of unprecedented lockdown in various parts of the country; while everyone was restlessly awaiting a prompt solution to the grave health catastrophe, and a legal as well as moral obligation fell on men and women to dwell inside their homes to stay safe and let others stay safe, and media's responsibility too increased manifold to educate people and serve as an intermediary between the state machineries and the public to put an end to the calamity. a section of mainstream Indian media, bent over backwards to give the crisis a communal colour and worked harder to held Muslim community responsible for the growing cases of pandemic in the country. It all unfolded following a religious congregation which was

organised by the Tablighi Jamaat members at Markaz Hazrat Nizamuddin Mosque, New Delhi, prior to the announcement of the nationwide lockdown. The congregation had reportedly 9000 attendees, both from India and foreign countries, and by April 18th 2020, according to some reports, of all the reported cases, approximately 4300 were linked to the Markaz event. Due to some alleged dereliction on part of some members of a religious organisation, media began ridiculing the whole Muslim community in India. After the lockdown was declared in the country on March 22nd 2020, a number of similar instances of carelessness occurred, but media targeted Muslims only, and started fallacious trials of Muslims, especially Jamaat members, depicting Markaz as a colossal source or incubator of the deadly pandemic, flashing pure malevolence onscreen and denigrating Muslim community. Prime time news shows carried headlines like

'jamaat ne phoda corona bomb (Jamaat exploded corona bomb)', 'Corona Jihad se desh bachao (Save the country from corona jihad)', 'Nizamuddin ka villain kaun (Who is the villain of Nizamuddin)' or 'talibani Jamaat (Terrorist group)' which reflected their prejudice against Muslims and a deliberate attempt to foster hatred amongst the audience against India's largest minority community.

This projection of Muslims by this section of media, however was not new. It was similar to the slanders they uttered during anti-CAA-NRC protest, anti-Muslim pogrom in Delhi and lynching episodes. Since 2014, when the BJP government rose to power, discrimination against minorities especially Muslims increased at all levels and media too became very prejudiced and inconsiderate. Mainstream media agencies in large number began pushing aside core issues and setting agenda to vilify Muslims across the country. In order to set such agenda, they manipulate news pieces so as to influence people's opinion on certain issues, sensationalise news reports to bring in the interest of the audience, as media theorist Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw put. A keen observation of their engagements suggests two reasons. First, they want to keep the audience away from the real issues, thus, are duping them with a scapegoat. They do not report the inadequacy of the state's plan to fight the issues of poverty, unemployment, inflation and also COVID-19 etc., but continuously try to give every issue a communal angle. Second, they want to humiliate the Muslim community and promote anti-Muslim hysteria that has been the prime actuator of Indian politics, at-least for last six years. And this has led to several instances of mob attacks, pushing of Muslims out of informal job sector and other serious repercussions.

### **Objectives of the Study**

The study aims at observing how mainstream media has been manufacturing and circulating violent disinformation to target the whole Muslims community. By outlining the priming and framing functions of media, the paper would attempt to highlight how media forces audience to believe that Hindu-Muslim debates and discussions are more important than other issues and why Mus-

lims' loyalty to the country should be questioned time and again. Besides examining the television programs, the paper would also discuss how mainstream media has been using social media platforms like Whatsapp to in-seminate hatred against Islam, the holy Qur'an and Muslims. Using Noelle-Neumann's Spiral of Silence theory, it would observe how Indian media has been trying to influence public opinion regarding Muslim men and women and shape the question of their social and religious identity and citizenship. Furthermore, the paper would look into the attempts Muslims have been making to address the growing anti-Muslim sentiments and develop counter-narratives to fight this attack on their identity and peaceful existence.

### **Research Questions**

- How a section of mainstream Indian media propagate right-wing Hindutva narrative and worked to frame Muslim community as 'Threatening other'?
- How attempts are being made to socially exclude Indian Muslims by distorting historical facts and disseminating fake news? And while doing this, how do they promote Islamophobia in India?
- How does media manipulate the collective opinion of the public regarding terrorism, Jihad and Islamic scriptures?
- What kind of language Indian media use to spread animosity among various religious communities?

### **Methodology**

For the purpose of the study, coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic and Tablighi Jamaat issue, nationwide Anti-CAA-NRC protest led by Muslim women, mob lynching episodes would be used at large. For the study, prime time news shows of four mainstream Hindi news channels would be selected and their coverage of the aforesaid issues would be critically analysed. During the analysis, role of the news anchor, participants in the debate on these issues, images used to attract audience and language used in the show would be observed fundamentally. Apart from this, the paper would also highlight the

portrayal of two minority institution i.e. Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh and Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi in various news reports time and again. Moreover, a small sample of Muslim men and women would be interviewed about the growing hatred against Muslims and the role of media in India.

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# Resisting Dichotomous Narratives and Finding Unity in Multiplicity: Young Muslims' Identity Development in the West

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*MOTAHAREH NABAVI*

*EDUCATION UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA*

**Keywords:** Identity development, Muslim youth, dichotomous narratives, culture of learning, spirituality, sociocultural theory.

## **Problem, Theory, and Method**

Young Muslims in the West face unique challenges throughout their identity formation, as clashing dichotomous narratives essentialize their Muslim and Western identities, pitting them against one another. These narratives, utilized by both Western and Muslim officials and scholars, include East vs. West, religion vs. secularism and tradition vs. modernity; they play out politically and socioculturally, in the media and in mosques, in schools and in homes. Belonging, community, and acceptance play a crucial part in adolescent identity formation, but these clashing narratives create a distorted sense of belonging, community, and acceptance—if any at all. Young Muslims may be compelled to choose between abandoning Islam since it is at odds with their current context or withdrawing from their current context because it is at odds with

Islam (Saatchian, 2015; Ahmed, 2009; Hermansen, 2009). Thus, Muslim youth face psychological distress, identity fragmentation, and a sense of alienation within their context Western.

To understand the root of these narratives, I will trace the sociocultural roots of development and learning within both Western and Muslim history. Sociocultural theory situates learning and development as deeply sociocultural, occurring within frameworks and networks of meaning and institutions that are situated and contextualized. Following the Quranic tradition of relaying stories to more deeply engage man and his many senses – physical, spiritual, emotional, imaginal—I use the qualitative method of narrative inquiry to relay the hi(story) that led to our current inquiry.

## Hi(story): Contextualizing The Problem

A journey through the rise and fall of civilizations and modes of operation takes us back to the time of the prophet and the revelation of the holy Quran. With the first resounding “Read, in the name of your Lord”, the teachings of the Quran created a culture of learning for many years—the message had declared and instructed man to read in his Lord’s name: to read the universe and his own soul, the horizons and his own home, the earth and all that rises from it, and dies unto it, as man will too one day, returning to his Lord. This culture of learning placed the Muslim as an individual in constant pursuit of knowledge through the reflection and contemplation of the signs of God, which cover all that the eyes can see, the heart can feel, and the mind can imagine. This culture which pursued knowledge and learning as the means for god awareness –for all signs point to Him– paved way for the golden age in Islamic history, as polymaths read the entire world through God’s name, in the pursuit of expanding their conception of the world and the self to contain all that God revealed around us and within us (Kazmi, 2005).

This flourishing culture, however, reached its peak and declined, as all civilizations do. This decline and loss of the culture of learning can be attributed to two interrelated events: the institutionalization of religious knowledge, and the ulema-state alliance, which will be covered more comprehensively in the final paper (Kuru, 2019).

The Western civilization, in its dark ages while Islam was in its golden ages, sought to break free from the chains, limitations, and superstitions which held back its progress. After tasting power and superiority in the age of discovery and using Christianity to colonize other nations, Western nations burst into the age of Enlightenment and buried Christianity under the trope of reason and secularism (Ahmad, 2017). The justification for colonization became a rational one, expressed through categorizations like civilized vs. uncivilized and rational vs. irrational, creating a series of “other”s against which the West was superior over, Islam being a main one (Dabashi, 2016). These categorizations were cemented with the on-

set of modernity and continued to shape the world, with theses such as “the Clash of Civilizations” which continued to essentialize and pit Islam against the West. The final blow to this schism was 9/11, which led to the war on terror and rampant Islamophobia in the West.

Unfortunately, rather than resisting these narratives, Muslim scholars directly position themselves on its opposing end. Having experienced colonization, the war on terror, and the current Islamophobic narrative, Muslim scholars operate within a defensive paradigm in which they stand in opposition to the West; its ideals of modernity and secularism are seen as a threat to the Muslim identity, and Islamic values are seen as irreconcilable with Western values (Baba and Zayed, 2015; Halstead, 2004; Hermansen, 2009). Playing into the binary thinking produced by essentializing orientalists, Muslims are forced into a “self-alienating dialogue” by the West, a dialogue with a “defeated consciousness, formed under duress, resulting in Muslims being unable to recognize themselves in the mirror of those other empires” (Dabashi 2016, p. 9).

## Presently ... and Beyond: Conclusions and Solutions

Muslim youth living in the West have the challenging task of resisting the weight of these dichotomous narratives, choosing either to explain both narratives, or reject one over the other to be relieved of the psychological burden. Many Muslim youth, however, are not passive victims of a “cultural clash and/or trapped in an identity crisis” (Sunier, 2016, p. 129). Despite popular dichotomous narratives, Muslim youth positively construct their identity as “active agents of their own cultural environment” (p. 129). As they navigate through their challenges, they are engaged in “a constant (re)construction, (re)interpretation, and expression of their identities” (Khan, 2009, p. 32). By destabilizing dichotomous ways of thinking, they open a third space which is the fluid space of cultural hybridity. This third space of cultural hybridity can give rise to something different, “a new area of negotiation of meaning and representation” (Bhabha, 1990). Within this third space, Muslim youth gain newfound historical agency. This in-between space is marked by “shifting psychic, cultural, and territorial boundaries” (p. 2). Muslim identi-

ty can come out of its confines, not being controlled by traditionalist Muslims, or vilified by Western orientalists, and the hybridized Muslim identity can become “a productive tension filled with possibility” (p. xvi). Although this pressure and tension can create diamonds, it can also crush souls in its process, making this a critical issue to examine and resolve.

The promotion and creation of a holistic identity, I argue, is an inherently spiritual endeavor which resists fragmentation and dualism through aligning with wholeness/oneness. This is in line with the Islamic foundation of tawheed, and God’s directions for our learning in the Quran, which first requires contextualization, and then deep reflection and contemplation on one’s context. As the spirit and culture of learning in Islam have been stifled under dichotomous narratives and gatekeeping of knowledge, I believe it is up to individual Muslim youth to imagine, practice, and create a holistic Muslim identity that is not at odds with any geographical location or time. This identity, directed towards Oneness, is always fresh and ever-renewing, open to reading the entirety of the world in the light of Oneness. Thus, it needs a reawakening of the spirit of Islam, which is united in its multiplicity, not fragmented in its duality. This will be more deeply covered in the final paper.

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# Workshop III

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6 July 2021 – Tuesday / 16:30 – 17:40

Zoom Webinar

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*Moderator: Alev Erkilet, Ibni Haldun University*

**Boudelaa Dalal Isra**

Islamic Identity in Architecture, Urbanism and Environment

**Esra Cifci, Fayrouz Ibrahim**

Tracing the Formation of Muslims Identity in China  
Through The Mosque Architecture

**Kinga Magdalena Surygata**

Modern Muslim Identity in Terms of Contemporary Architecture of Mosques

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## Islamic Identity in Architecture, Urbanism and Environment

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*BOUDELAA DALAL ISRA*  
*AMAR THELEDJI UNIVERSITY*

**Keywords:** Architectural identity, Islamic style, Courtyard house, Algeria, French colonization.

### **Islamic Identity in Architecture, Urbanism and Environment**

The architectural style varies from region to another; it is controlled by many factors, including creed, religion, culture, climate, etc. Thus, we discuss contemporary Islamic architecture, which has acquired various characteristics to prove its identity and noted from other architectural styles in the areas to which it has arrived and entered through conquests and which has spread widely in the Islamic countries in particular; such as Iran, Turkey, the Levant and many other places.

The architecture of those regions was marked by a common architectural element; the courtyard. The was later well known in the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula, contrary in Turkey, and this due to its cold climate. It includes many elements standing out allowing the building to be

efficient functionally. Indeed, the Islamic countries architects have excelled in their design, and paid special attention to; it presents many generic elements among various Islamic structures throughout the world.

As an example, the Moroccan contemporary Islamic architecture is characterized by the use of earth and stone as a building material. In the Levantine architecture, the wall stone rows are marked by an increased brightness, also, it is filled the fountains inside the courtyards. As known, Moroccan buildings are not devoid of colors from light to dark without regularity, which increases attention to them, as is famous for the Moroccan style with external sessions. Although both Morocco and Tunisia have been exposed to the French colonization that strongly contributed to changing the citizen's thinking in all fields and especially in architecture, they were able to preserve

the architectural Islamic identity even in the light of contemporary.

In parallel, we find ourselves in the midst of an architectural problem in Algeria, which lost its own Islamic architectural identity due to different factors, the most important of which was the French colonization that caused it. Its atrophy became a purely chaotic colonial architecture.

How Can We Ensure the Unity of A Contemporary Architecture Compatible with The Islamic Identity Characteristics?

The answer can be resumed in the imposition of an action plan that can unify Algerian architecture contemporary Islamic identity, which guarantees consistency in it. In addition, adopting curricula works to consolidate the architectural Islamic identity in the minds of the citizen who has become searching for modernity represented in skyscrapers and other things away from his identity, which represents the most wonderful architecture.

Architecture tells everything and history can be read through it. As it shows the society culture and its thought by embodying its identity in it, so it is possible to distinguish between one country and another through its architecture, as each geographical area is distinguished by its architectural characteristics and we take an example of Gothic architecture which represents a stage of European architecture influenced by Roman and medieval architecture, its dwellings were distinguished by a specific structural style, such as prominent arches and polygonal architectural arches, so their buildings were thus markedly distinguished from others by polygonal vaults and stained-glass windows as well as their interior design in dark colours. Gothic architecture was able to preserve its religious identity in a contemporary way by merging its spiritual and religious elements with modernity.

On the other hand, Islamic architecture expresses its identity with its great legacy left by the ancient Islamic civilization of the interest of Muslims and their respect for Islam and society. It shared its dwellings with Muslim countries, with a courtyard house "house with patio".

In the Levant, for example, the house was noted by the presence of an interior room, "the courtyard", open to the sky, while preserving the privacy of the place, and in the middle of it was a fountain that hydrates the interior atmosphere and is surrounded by plants. The rooms are distributed around it, whose facades overhang it. On the ground floor there is usually a kitchen and a guest bedroom the walls of which are decorated with decorations and Quranic verses, and on the south side of the house there is the iwan, which is a high place of the courtyard level which is completely open for family sessions, and the facades are decorated with a wooden window protruding from the wall and closing called "muchrabieh". As for the outer door, it is connected to a portico called the corridor, and from there to the outside.

### **Architecture in Iran**

The houses of Iran are very similar to the architecture of the Levant, except that they differ only in their dimensions, they are larger and this is due to the different climate

### **Architecture in Algeria**

Algeria's Islamic architectural identity shares with the countries I cited as an example in patio houses, however, colonialism has depleted its identity and this is evident in its regions, but the type of colonialism differed in its northern and southern regions. For example, in the North, all buildings demolished and replaced with buildings of a purely French architectural character.

As for the south, more precisely in Laghouat city, which is considered as the gateway to the Algerian desert (about 400 km from the capital), colonialism has transcended the culture, the architectural and urban identity of the whole city and created distorted hybrid neighbourhoods in wrong places, creating an unrealistic mix, then worked on colonization. The thought of the inhabitants of the region, which has been established until now even after independence, so people see the Islamic architectural character indicating poverty and backwardness, so it seeks development by creating neighbourhoods with blocks of chaotic concrete that lose the architectural

spirit without taking into account the environmental, aesthetic, functional and privacy aspects that characterize the Islamic regions. It is limited to following the French character until we lose our contemporary architectural identity and become without identity.

To provide a solution for unifying the contemporary Islamic architectural identity, I conducted a study in some neighbourhoods of Laghouat city, including residents living in houses with courtyards, and suggested that they change their houses to others they refused to join. I also made this suggestion to the locals who do not live in houses with a courtyard that they refused because they see it as a symbol of poverty (i.e. the country has become without an identity mixed with chaotic buildings devoid of architectural taste).

The solution proposed on my part was an attempt to integrate Islamic identity into architecture in a contemporary manner which consisted in unifying the architecture of the city while preserving and without compromising the freedom of the inhabitants, under conditions such as the implementation of a law of "town planning code" consisting in obliging people to unify the color of the facades with light colors (and this for the reason that the dry climate of the region requires the use of this color) as well as the use of certain elements of Islamic architecture to preserve the identity while respecting the freedom of arrangement of the interior plan of the owner. It is for new construction, as for old buildings, we redesign them in order to ensure their compatibility with the identity, by providing the State with an amount that helps the owner to reformulate the facade.

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## Tracing the Formation of Muslims Identity in China Through The Mosque Architecture

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*ESRA CİFCİ<sup>1</sup> & FAYROUZ IBRAHİM<sup>2</sup>*

*<sup>1</sup>MARMARA UNIVERSITY & <sup>2</sup>FUDAN UNIVERSITY*

**Keywords:** Identity; Mosque architecture; Chinese Muslims; Diversity; Muslim minority; Integration.

The challenges of the modern world force the traditional understanding and institutions to redescribe the identity. Through the direct relationship between architecture and the human mind, the search for identity to be reflected in the architecture and makes it possible to follow it. Particularly through religious architecture perception of collective identity can be readily observed. Similarly, in the Islamic tradition, Muslims have transmitted their collective identity in the public sphere with mosque architecture. Today, as in the past, Muslims continue to reflect their collective identities on the mosque architectures. However, due to the close connection of architecture with the mind, tracing the mosque architecture also depict the search for identity concerns and confusions of Muslims. Particularly Muslims who live in different socio-cultural contexts such as non-Muslim majority countries confronting more with the problem of how to reinterpret and transmit the identity. To-

day Muslims deal with various internal and external factors and have confusions about how to formate their identity in religiously diverse or non-muslims majority societies.

The requirements of redescription of the Muslim identity in the non-Muslim majority context- is not a new phenomenon for Muslims. Throughout history, Muslims had various experiences about living together with others and building intercultural identity In the non-Muslim majority socio-cultural contexts. In this regard, the mosques reflected the collective consciousness of Muslims and played a pivotal role in externalizing the identity. However, the essential question in this point is how Muslims deal with the problems and reconstruct original, intercultural identities confidently as a minority group in the past. To answer this question, in this paper we will trace the unique experience of Chinese Muslims' search for identity through the historical mosque architecture.

Chinese civilization was as shaped by Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Since the 7th century, Islam came to China and Muslims became essential and irrevocable components of imperial China in time. However, due to socio-political reasons, Muslims were obliged to reconstruct their identities with a new vocabulary in a way to express their similarities and differences in the non-Muslim. This situation prompted them to seek an identity that would let them be both Muslim and Chinese.

The reconstruction of Chinese Muslims' identity and its reflections can be examine in four main periods. The first is the Tang-Song dynasties period when Islam entered and spread to China, and Muslims were temporary settlers and foreigners. The second is the period of the Yuan dynasty, (can be called the transitional phase), in which the Muslim population and ethnic diversity in China increased and they became permanent settlers. The third is the Ming-Qing dynasties, when localization began, and Chinese Muslim had identity fusion. Thus, they produced a unique identity by transforming from Muslims in China to Chinese Muslims. The fourth is the Modern period when new identity confusion was experienced with the effect of modernity and globalization.

During the Tang-Song dynasties, Muslims began to come to China from the Turkic, Arab and Persian lands and settle in trade cities. However, in this period, the mixing of foreigners with Chinese people was restricted by law. For this reason, Muslims preserved their foreign identity, maintained their mother tongue and local clothing. They didn't leave their cultural baggage. The perception of the identity of Muslims were still "others" or "foreigners" in China, which shows itself in the mosque architecture of the early period. In the early mosques, they used a style close to the Islamic architecture of the period rather than Chinese architecture. In this regard, Guangta Mosque is the only example.

The number and influence of Muslims in China increased during the Yuan dynasty, established by the Mongols. At the beginning of the Yuan dynasty, Muslims got higher social status than the Chinese people due to their foreigner identity. For this reason, they did not tend to localize and continued to protect their foreign identity. However,

towards the end of the Yuan dynasty, ethnic and cultural diversity among Muslims increased. This situation initiated the transition process towards a rubric and local identity among Muslims in China. Although no mosque has survived from the Yuan dynasty to the present day in its original form, it can be traced that they used some elements of Chinese architecture in religious architecture such as tombs and cemeteries.

Muslims initially faced the challenge to their identity by Chinese civilization during the Ming dynasty. The Ming dynasty implemented an assimilation and Sinicization policy towards foreigners in China. During that time, Muslims forced to localize and develop a local identity. Muslims' ties with their homeland and mother tongue weakened and they forgot in time. The challenge and quest during the Ming dynasty created the Chinese Muslim identity. They transformed from "Muslims in China" into "Chinese Muslims". During the Qing dynasty, a dual identity policy has been adopted. From the Ming period on, a new era began in mosque architecture as well. Instead of the architectural style that emphasizes foreignness and carries external elements, only the main principles of mosque architecture in the Islamic tradition have been adopted. Chinese Muslims reinterpreted the mosque architecture by using the local vocabulary according to the changing conditions, just like the localization of the identity. In this regard, Xian Grand Mosque and Beijing Niujie Mosque are important examples.

By the end of the dynastic period in China, both Chinese and Chinese Muslims faced a new identity challenge by the west. Modernity and globalization have created confusion among Chinese communists and Chinese Muslims. This confusion reflects itself in architecture as well. The view of local architecture has changed with the effect of globalization. Like the Chinese, Chinese Muslims have begun to gravitate towards global rather than local architecture. For this purpose, vertical height instead of horizontal width, dome instead of triangular roof architecture, thin pencil-style minarets instead of pagados were preferred in mosque architecture by Chinese Muslims, as it is in Pudong Mosque in Shanghai.

Some studies were done on the political, social history, and architectural heritage of Chinese Muslims. Despite this, few studies have been conducted on Chinese Muslims regarding the relationship of their identity and mosque architecture. In this study, we aim to examine the constructions and transformations of Chinese Muslim identity through mosque architecture. Our main questions are, how did the transformation of Chinese Muslim identity reflect itself on religious architecture particularly in the mosque architecture, and how did Muslims in China combine Islamic understanding with Chinese architectural vocabulary, so they created a unique collective identity. We will analyze some of the historical mosques built in different periods of time in Chinese history and today. We will analyze them with comparative and descriptive methods. Chinese Muslim's identity construction experience in the past might be an alternative and pluralistic proposition for today's Muslim's search for identity, opposition the uniformization trend of globalization that emerged in the modern period.

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# Modern Muslim Identity in Terms of Contemporary Architecture of Mosques

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*KINGA MAGDALENA SURYGALA*  
*MARMARA UNIVERSITY*

**Keywords:** Islam, Muslim identity, Architecture, Art, Mosques.

## **Introduction**

Designing a mosque entails very specific challenges for architects: the strict and detailed requirements for the typology were established centuries ago and remain paramount in creating a place of worship for Muslims. Consequently, these buildings have long been associated with conservative styles employing well-recognized traditional forms and aesthetic details. Mosques, being a place of worship for Muslims worldwide, typically incorporate traditional designs and a strict structure including a dome and minarets. But with the world turning to contemporary design, where does that leave classical mosque designs? Globally, countless architects and designers showed us that sticking to the typical guidelines to designing mosques is not the only way of presenting this place of worship - mosques are also forms of architecture that can be interpreted through modern design.

Architecture can be regarded as an expression of culture, giving clues as to who we are and embodying our concerns. For example, religious buildings may be seen as reflections of spiritual and social concerns and skyscrapers as symbols of corporate power. The mosque is Islam's most emblematic building. My focus here is on the architecture of the mosque expressing identity. How identity is expressed in mosques in the different areas of the world depends not only on cultural factors but also on regional building mores and tradition of designs, architecture, and construction.

## **Architecture, Identity and Islam**

The mosque, derived from the Arabic masjid, is the place of worship. But since the earliest mosques, the building has also been seen as the center of Islamic life, both sacred and secular. A mosque complex frequently includes

ancillary buildings or rooms for scholarship, social functions, and even commerce. The mosque itself houses a prayer space oriented towards the Qibla, the direction that faces Mecca. There is a place to remove shoes and to wash in advance of entering the prayer space, and there is separation of men and women congregants. While the mosque typology has readily legible architectural similarities - the dome and the minaret among them - there are no rules within the religion regarding form. There is no prescription for a mosque in the holy text in the Quran. It just says that those places should be respected and that the public should have unfettered access.

Historically, the mosque aesthetic has varied dramatically from region to region. The Muslim world extends from Spain and Africa to Asia, resulting in seven distinct regional styles—from open courtyard plans in Spain and North Africa to the pyramidal roof construction of Southeast Asia and the massive central domes of Turkey. Within the mosque, the architects employ minimal ornamentation and indirect natural light to help carve out a spatial experience. The exterior will be clad in natural stone and structured by folds, friezes, and decorative entrance portals as well as calligraphy—a classic design element in mosque architecture.

Today, architects are being asked to reference and refine regional mosque architecture with

a contemporary audience in mind. In countries with a large Muslim diaspora, such as the U.S. and the U.K., congregations are often composed of parishioners from diverse ethnic backgrounds united by their religion. Here, you see Islamic architectural traditions melding with local vernacular. It is perhaps the architectural statement that newly proposed mosques make that causes communities to bristle. The Muslim community was already there, but it is in the commissioning of a purpose-built mosque that the trouble starts. Mosques are perhaps the most contested building type in the city, provoking debate, sometimes fierce, on issues of identity, social change, race, politics, style, and taste. Even with the charged political climate, that it is an exciting time for the architectural commission of mosques. The religion is a way of life but

not an architectural style itself. Domes and minarets are beautiful architectural symbols, but not Islamic by themselves. Muslims can expose the inner beauty of a local vernacular in a uniquely Islamic way.

### **Case Study: Turkey**

Over the past two decades, Turkey has seen a rapid increase in mosque construction. Earlier this year, the country's largest place of worship, Istanbul's Camlica Mosque, which can accommodate 63,000 people officially. Designed in the style of the grand 16th-century mosques of the Ottoman Empire, it was inaugurated by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It's just one of a new breed of neo-Ottoman buildings now popping up all around the country. But some critics say that the recent proliferation of neo-Ottoman mosques across Turkey could be politically motivated. Nonetheless, the award-winning Sancaklar Mosque, designed by Turkish architect Emre Arolat, appear to be distancing themselves from politics. Sancaklar Mosque cannot simply be regarded as an architectural by-product of a careful re-reading of Islamic precepts. What Arolat has achieved was not merely on the basis of picking out old and baseless stereotypes that are inherently non-Islamic. Clearly he has no such religious ambition, theological expertise or a new vision for the everyday practices of a Muslim community, yet he shares with his Turkish compatriots a set of common ethical and moral values, reminiscences and cultural legacies. Sancaklar Mosque was designed to address moral considerations, satisfy ethical anxieties, and respect and respond to the age-old memories of a devoted Muslim Turk. How can this radical exemplar be constructed in a country where the majority of mosques embody political ideologies and historiographical nostalgias? Possibly because its architect replaces the modern ideological and political paradigms that have served to fossilise recent mosque architecture with theological ones to which no Muslim can easily object.

### **Conclusion**

The mosque is Islam's most emblematic building, as well as an expression of collective identity. By exploring the

built form of mosques around the world and prevalent architectural trends in mosque building, this article considers what makes mosques identifiable to Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as the ways architecture represents the identity of a community and also shifts in accordance with changing social and cultural context. In conclusion, I would stress that the importance of the architecture of the mosque lies not only in the forms or architectural language but also in the collective meanings it transmits to us over time—from its humble beginnings as the house of the Prophet to the pluralistic manifestations we find the world over. It is its symbolism that conveys what the mosque is about, and it expresses who we are to ourselves and to the community at large. To understand the mosque is to understand the architecture of the region and place, and even more significantly, the sociology and the culture to which it belongs. For in the end, architecture is not about buildings, it is about people.

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# Workshop IV

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7 July 2021 – Wednesday / 14:40 – 15:50

Zoom Webinar

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**Moderator: Ahmet Köroğlu**, *Istanbul University*

**İsmail Noyan**

Civilization as an Ambiguous but Productive Term: Perspectives of the Nahda and the Tanzimat Intellectuals

**Yusuf Abubakar Wara**

The Roles of Civil Society in Promoting Islamic Identity: A Case Study of ASMA Köprü International Students Association, Ankara-Turkey

**Maria Vyatchina**

Gendered Rules, Halal and Islamic Popular Beliefs: Negotiating Healthcare Practices In Tatarstan, Russia

**Aadil Beig**

Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Conundrum: Contesting Islamic Identity and Geopolitical Changes

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## Civilization as an Ambiguous but Productive Term: Perspectives of the Nahda and the Tanzimat Intellectuals

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*ISMAIL NOYAN*

*SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY*

**Keywords:** Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, Butrus al-Bustani, Tanzimat Reforms, Nahda Movement, Civilization.

Ahmet Cevdet Pasha (1822-1895) is one of the leading figures of the Ottoman reform movement in the second half of the 19th century with his roles as governor, intellectual, historian, and legal scholar. He served as a governor in regions which are crucial for Nahda the Awakening, such as Aleppo and Damascus. Thus, it is very likely that he encountered with the Nahdawis in person during his missions. Further to that, since he was competent in Arabic, one can easily speculate that he was familiar with the journals and other intellectual outputs of the Nahda movement and in contact with the Nahda intellectuals and their ideas. He was a respected governor in Arab provinces, his Mecelle the first codified civil law in Muslim World was quite influential and controversial among Muslims; and some of his works including the twelve-volumed infamous history book *Tarih-i Cevdet* was read in Ottoman Turkish and also translated into Arabic. When he was in Aleppo as the governor, he initiated a local newspaper published, *Firat* both in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish in 1867, and he was in touch with Damascene ulema. The aforementioned examples are far from being complete list of how entangled and connected Ahmet Cevdet Pasha and the Nahda movement were. Yet Oddly enough, there is no study aiming at comparing and/or

contextualizing Ahmet Cevdet Pasha by considering the Nahda movement(s). Therefore, this essay aims to close this gap in the literature through suggesting a conceptual framework to examine the Tanzimat and Nahda intellectuals/reformers with a special emphasis on Ahmet Cevdet Pasha.

This study builds upon the premise that the Nahda was part of the Ottoman reform movement, and the intellectuals and reformers affiliated with the Nahda and the Tanzimat reforms were not in isolation but rather organically linked to one another. Therefore, this is an attempt to examine some of the pioneers of the Nahda such as Butrus al-Bustani (1819-1883), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Salim Naqqash and Tanzimat reformers and intellectuals such as Ahmet Cevdet Pasha (1822-1895) and Namik Kemal (1840-1888) under the same framework. I chose civilization as the common framework to examine these figures mainly because civilization is among the most conspicuous concepts in the 19th century Ottoman intellectual life. Also, intellectuals and reformers across the Ottoman Empire not only used the term passively but also actively engaged with controversies around the definitions and different perceptions on civilization in

their works and even wrote pieces exclusively for the purpose of elaborating their understanding of civilization.

The overarching arguments of the study are as follows: first of all, civilization is a crucial term for the 19th century Ottoman intellectual life but it does not mean that there is a consensus on the definition of the term and thus its definition cannot be taken for granted. Therefore, due to its ambiguous and contested nature, it cannot be used as an analytical tool without engaging with definitional controversies.

Second of all, certain prevalent clichés about civilization might serve as good starting points, but conclusions should not rely heavily on them. I argue that although these intellectuals and reformers are familiar with Ibn Khaldun's understanding of civilization and they even use Khaldunian vocabulary, their stances on civilization cannot be constrained to Khaldunian approach. Although Ibn Khaldun's impact is observable in these figures' approaches, they substantially change the meaning of the concept by considering the requirements of the time and other intellectual sources. Another important suggestion of the chapter is that all of these intellectuals and reformers aim to find their own ways to assert that 'they' used to be civilized in the past and 'their' respective communities are eligible candidates for civilization again. Further to that even if they accept the idea that "Europe took civilization from 'them,'" not only their suggestions regarding when but also with which means Europe started to be civilized are not identical. I claim that their own perceptions and blueprints of 'how to be civilized' drastically affected the way they narrated 'the European story of becoming civilized.' That is to say, they looked at the European history retrospectively and cherry picked the events in such a way to substantiate their own ways and methods of bringing about civilization. Yet, it does not mean that they perceived the European civilization as the perfect example without any fault. On the contrary, they endeavored to differentiate fake and true civilization by avoiding blind imitation of European civilization. Therefore, European model was there as a successfully working

example, but all of these intellectuals and reformers filter it through their own worldview and find their own unique ways to include it in their own recipe for civilization, which is beyond being a carbon copy of the European one.

Thirdly, I argue that civilization is an extremely productive concept in order to understand these intellectuals' and reformers' perceptions of modernization, change, and reform. That means, the way they understand and describe civilization is highly influenced by their own agendas and priorities so much so that even when they refer to the very same aspect of civilization their conclusions can be completely different. Put differently, they instrumentalize (not necessarily with negative connotations) the ways they understand and define civilization to serve for their own purposes such as to substantiate their own understanding of reform. In the last chapter, I dwell on these intellectuals' and reformers' own understanding of civilization with specific emphasis on Bustani and Ahmet Cevdet Pasha. I argue that their understanding of civilization and the way they describe this concept is under heavy influence of their agenda so to a significant extent they instrumentalize the concept of civilization in order to serve for their ends. That is, Ahmet Cevdet Pasha defines civilization as a way to catch up with Europe without losing the empire's traditional values. As for Bustani, his understanding of civilization is very much in line with the way he describes the ideal Ottoman order.

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# The Roles of Civil Society in Promoting Islamic Identity: A Case Study of ASMA Köprü International Students Association, Ankara-Turkey

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*YUSUF ABUBAKAR WARAA*  
*ANKARA HACI BAYRAM VELI UNIVERSITY*

**Keywords:** Muslim Identity, Civil Society, Roles, Educations, Programs.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are undoubtedly one of the major sectors that promote societal culture and identity. It is also important to note that Civil Societies' activities are supposed to moderate attitudes, promote social interaction, facilitate trust, and increase solidarity and public spiritedness (Coşkun, 2013: 40). In doing these they shape the society, moderate it, modify it, and decorate its culture and identity. Islamic Civil Society Organizations (ICSOs) play a major role in promoting the ways in which a Muslim follows the customs and practices of the religion which is generally termed as Islamic Identity. Generally, the identity model of behavior associates a person's sense of self with different social categories as well as with the rules or prescriptions concerning how people in those categories ought to behave (Berglund, 2012: 28).

In this respect, CSOs are at the fore front in enhancing the religious identity that they believed in. Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs) that are defined as any institution, organization, or congregation affiliated with a religious, faith-based, indigenous, or spiritual tradition, are carrying out numerous functions in their immediate society to promote and sustain the basic cultural identity, including teaching moral obligations to protect the planet (BhumiGlobal, 2020: 3-4). In this regard, the roles of CSOs in promoting Islamic identity will be deeply analyzed to ascertain how CSOs are active instruments in determining societal identity. The aim of this study, which is prepared based on the situation in questions, is to reveal what exactly CSOs are doing in promoting Islamic Identity among youth who are studying in Turkish capital from different part of the world.

The concept of identity itself entails the way and manner a person behaves and relates with others around him. As Fearon quoted (Hogg and Abrams 1988, 2) Identity is “people’s concepts of who they are, of what sort of people they are, and how they relate to others” (Fearon, 1999: 4). In other quotes identity is seen as to the ways in which individuals and collectivities are distinguished in their social relations with other individuals and collectivities” (Jenkins 1996, 4). To this end, what actually constitutes Muslim identity is what this article tries to analyze by looking at how CSOs promotes such identity. The Muslim identity itself is describes in the Holly Qur’an where Allah (SWA) says “Say verily my prayers, my sacrifices, my living and my dying are for Allah, no one else shares (that) with Him, and I am the first (and foremost) of those who submit/devote to Him .” [Quran, Surah Al Anaam]. In a nutshell, Muslim identity is the way of behavior of a Muslims according to Allah’s instructions and prophet Muhammad’s (SAW) teachings.

This study will be carried out using the interview questions in accordance with the qualitative research method. The aim of the method is to garner information from the target group to justify the aim of the research. To this end, an in-depth interviews otherwise known as the unstructured interviews that usually described as conversations held with a purpose in mind – to gather data about the research study is developed and will be used as the data collection tool in this study. A total of ten questions will be asked to ten executive members of the Asma Kopru International Students Association, Ankara-Turkey. The questions for the interview are completely related to how the organization promotes Islamic identity among young international students from different countries who are studying in various Turkey’s capital universities and even high schools.

The questions are coined around faith, education, eating habit, dress code, brotherhood and other social activities. The responses will be analyzed based on discuss analysis in which data gathered through the interviews and from the relevant publications are interpreted to determine how the chosen organization was able to pro-

mote Islamic identity through organizing lectures, sermons, seminars, courses and other numerous programs that shape the daily behavior of the youths in accordance with Islamic culture and principles.

ASMA Kopru International Students Association, as a civil society that deals with international students who are studying in various academic institutions in Ankara, Turkey’s capital, has adopted academic methods that includes but not limited to regular weekly lectures and sermons, camping, Ramadan Programs, courses, Islamic debates and quizzes to teach the students about Islamic culture and values. Through such methods they are able to inculcate into the mind of the youth the ethics and principle of Islamic teachings.

During their camping programs Arabic language is taught along sides Hadiths and other Prophet Muhammad’s teachings. The concept of Muslim Brotherhood is mostly highlighted, in such programs. The aim is to ensure unity and love for one another among the Muslims as the religion itself teaches peace and highlight the importance of one Ummah. However, in such programs and events the danger of taking alcohol, takin interest ribah and doing usury are clearly explain to make the youth distance themselves away from them. Such campaigns have yielded significant results as students who relates with the organization did not only distance themselves from alcohol, they also see smoking as taboo.

The weekly lectures and sermon program organize, supervise and sponsor by the organization, on different topics that include Islamic ethics, dress-code, permissible and forbidden things in Islam halal and haram, marriage in Islam, faith and other concepts of Islamic teachings have helped in redefining a lot of Muslims behavior shaping it to the teachings of prophet Muhammad (SAW). It was observed that most of the student who take part in the organization’s programs and events are beginning to adopt the Islamic mode of dressing, eating, drinking and their daily actions and inactions is tilting towards Islamic teachings.

To what extent have CSOs are able to contribute to the promotion of Islamic identity among Muslim youth is the first question that will be investigated and analyzed in this study. The second question that will be looked into is the approaches and methods taken by CSOs to promote Islamic identity. The third question is what actually constitute Islamic identity will also be answered through discussion with leaders of the selected civil society and by analyzing their publications. The study shall reveals that CSOs such as Islamic Organizations are at the forefront of promoting Islamic Identity in a given community. It would also point out that the methodologies used by CSOs in promoting such identities are significant and varied enough to enhance and sustain such identities.

To response to above mention questions, responses gathered during the interview as well as the periodicals examined from the library of the ASMA Kopru will be analyzed to critically justify how CSOs are promoting Islamic Identity through programs and events. The research will also give some recommendations that will improve promoting Islamic Identity among youths by Islamic Civil Society Organizations.

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## Gendered Rules, Halal and Islamic Popular Beliefs: Negotiating Healthcare Practices in Tatarstan, Russia

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MARIA VYATCHINA

*CISR CENTRE FOR INDEPENDENT SOCIAL RESEARCH (CISR)*

**Keywords:** Agency, Gender, Sociology of Health and Illness, Islam, Russian Federation

The project focuses on the practices of Halal medicine in Tatarstan, in one of the regions of the Russian Federation, to switch attention from the well-studied regions like postcolonial or post-soviet capitals. The study illustrates the heterogeneity of the Russian cultural landscape where Muslims have been and continue to exist as one of the cultural communities. In my doctoral project, I highlight multiple boundaries that shape the lives of my research partners, Muslim persons from the middle-working class who use or avoid the Russian public health care system.

My main research question is how the religious acceptability of medical service in institutional settings in the relationship triangle “Muslim patient - a physician - religious expert” is constructed or, in other words, how do different actors define the scale of “halal” of medical ser-

vice? Halal medicine can be defined as a mode of medical care emerging at the intersection of biomedicine and religion.

### Conceptual Framework

The halal medicine field emerges at the intersection of biomedicine and religion in a post-secularist environment and is supported by nation-building and identity politics. The notion of post-secularism [Turner 2010] describes the modern social context in which, for various reasons, religions become important for personal and group identification, regardless of the observance of religious practices [Yusupova 2018: 348]. The importance of religious identification creates the basis for political discussions of everyday issues that are beginning to be widely discussed and regulated by general legal documents (for instance Russian Law on Insulting religious

feelings or discussion on headscarf (hijab) at educational institutions). One of many emerging issues is the religiously sensitive medical practices, and in the aggregate is the social space of Muslim (Halal) medicine, which can be thought of as a set (repertoire) of practices carried out by certain actors.

In the repertoire of Muslim (or Halal) medical practices, I analytically include a variety of ways to maintain the health of Muslims, for whom Muslim bioethics is important. The main principle of Muslim bioethics is gender segregation since Islam is a gendered ethical system [Ayubi 2019]. Another principle of Muslim bioethics is the exclusion of “Haram”, components and their derivatives prohibited by Islam (alcohol, pork, etc.). Compliance with these two principles makes medical practice permissible for Muslims. However, Islam offers a developed system of multiple interpretations, and accordingly, context and contextual interpretations become significant. Based on this, I propose to consider the diversity of practices depending on the social context as a repertoire or a kind of scale of interpretations with two poles (religiously acceptable and religiously unacceptable).

To analyze Halal medicine in Tatarstan, I use the tools of Pierre Bourdieu’s theory [Bourdieu 1986], namely, elements of the field theory and the social capital theory. In Islam, multiple interpretations of the rules are permissible, which depend on the contexts of a particular territory/community, institutions, as well as on the validity of the judgment and personal choice of the individual. Multiple interpretations create space for the competition of different actors - it upholds the legitimacy of the interpretation of what “acceptable” medical service should be for Muslim patients, according to what rules it should be provided.

The analysis of the social space of Muslim medicine in my study focuses on three main agent groups: physicians (medical professionals), Muslim patients, and religious experts. These agents are promoting their projects of Halal medicine, relying on the available resources (social capital). I use the emic term “Halal medicine”, which refers to a category of goods and services for which there is some consensus among all agents. However, this term

also refers to the process of distinction that agents produce. Each time, appealing to “Halal”, agents separate it from non-Halal, participating in the struggle for legitimacy, using their own and expert authoritative knowledge of professionals and religious experts. At the same time, the field of Muslim medicine is characterized by relative novelty and instability: rules and practices are constantly redefined in it, the field is mobile and subject to change, that is, emergent.

I also negotiate ideas of “piety” and “consumerism”, which are found empirically in observed practices and are different strategies for achieving religious acceptability. Piety in the context of Islam is the work for cultivating humility, the pursuit of education, the cultivation of virtue. Piety is one of the characteristics of the “docile agent” phenomenon, which the anthropologist Saba Mahmood described using the example of the project of female religiosity in Egypt [Mahmood 2001]. Sharing Saba Mahmood’s approach, I use and develop one of the hallmarks of a “submissive agent” - piety, and define it through the concept of Bourdieu’s cultural capital in order to include it in the description of the field of Muslim medicine. Piety requires considerable work on oneself (“on paie de sa personne”) [Bourdieu 2002: 61] like all types of cultural incorporated capital.

The opposite practices of consumerism rely on material resources. The consumerism strategy is implemented by those patients who can afford to consume market services by paying for private medical services with a Halal certificate.

### **Research Design**

To explore such a heterogeneous phenomenon with undefined boundaries in the medical field for Muslims, I opted for a multi-sited ethnography strategy. I looked at different places (clinics, hospitals, ritual places etc.) and analyzed their appearance since 2010. The fieldwork took place in 2018-2020 and was aimed at the retrospective reconstruction of the actions of the actors of the field of Halal medicine from 2010 to the present. Since the mid-2000s, the Halal medical services market has been

gradually moving from traditional healers and individual specialists to multifunctional centers that offer a wide range of services meeting the requirements of Islam. Professional medical associations have been emerging too. In addition to the quantitative increase in the number of Muslims, among the prerequisites for the popularity of Halal medicine are such major social phenomena as the loss of institutional trust in public health care and the search for alternatives to depersonalized biomedical care from the side of middle-working class.

The study was structured by the principles of a qualitative methodology of social research. I have made the participatory observation, reviewed documents, and in-depth interviews. My interviews were with patients, experts, and healthcare professionals (doctors, managers, nursing staff). During the field study 49 interviews were conducted. All interviews were conducted in accordance to the principles of informed consent and anonymity

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## Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Conundrum: Contesting Islamic Identity and Geopolitical Changes

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*AADIL BEIG*

*JAMIA MILLIA ISLAMIA UNIVERSITY*

**Keywords:** Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Islam, Geopolitics, Middle East.

The relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is strategic that has rarely been talked about in detail. The close and cordial ties between the two countries is a well-established fact which traces back to the historical roots, religious ties, and their shared values. Over a period of time, the relationship between the two countries evolved and both of them were on the same page of history at some crucial junctures of world politics like the Cold war. However, with changing dynamics of global politics and national interest taking precedence over ideology, the two countries have witnessed phases of bitterness in their relationship in the recent past. The basis of relationship stood on the ground that in both the countries perception being made was the centrality of the role of Islam in their respective politics which served as a common ground to formulate ties. Because of the projection of Islam in its foreign policy, especially in the

developments taking place in the pre-independence period, Pakistan earned the sympathy of the Muslim world which helped it to forge closer ties with them. The formation of Pakistan on the ideological lines makes it different from the rest of the countries and is hence considered as an 'ideological miracle and not as some separate geographical landmark'(Cohen: 2006). Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, being a birthplace of Islam, besides the custodian of two holy mosques, holds a special place in the Muslim world and together with Pakistan tried to forge that Islamic solidarity. However, this common perception of states with the same ideology or belief system (Islam and Sunni) in the case of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia being instrumental in shaping the relationship has been put to test in the world driven by pure power politics.

While fear and insecurity dominated the foreign policy

of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia on its part apart from averting external threats was aimed more towards the survival of the Al Saud regime, besides promoting its brand of Wahhabi Islam. Pakistan's foreign policy because it leaned towards the West was strongly resented by the Arab world with Saudi Arabia terming it as 'a stab in the heart of Arab and Muslim world (Burke: 1990). The relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia suffered a jolt by this move since Saudi Arabia and the other Arab world harboured strong anti-west feelings because of their stance over the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was in the late 60's that new geo-political realities dawned upon them which led to the change in perception regarding each other. The convergence of interests was the result of mutual realisation of the importance of improving their ties. Pakistan's attitude towards Saudi Arabia was brought up by its growing disillusionment towards the US and the subsequent increasing significance of Saudi Arabia (Siddiqi: 2019). While the booming oil industry of Saudi Arabia provided enough reason for Pakistan to amend its ties, Saudi Arabia on its part also realised the potential of Pakistan in its regional politics. Saudi Arabia in its fight for influence in the region with Egypt looked at the prospects of well-trained Pakistan's armed forces as a significant factor in its rivalry with the competition. This growing proximity between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia because of the confluence of mutual interests transformed this relationship into more of a strategic partnership as the large working-class from Pakistan began to move to Saudi Arabia. The ensuing period saw Saudi Arabia support Pakistan's position on the Kashmir issue with India in 1966 and also provided moral support to Pakistan in the 1971 war with India (Rizvi: 1980). This growing importance for each other would mean the added pressure on Pakistan to play a pro-Saudi role in the region festered with sectarian divides which comes at the cost of its relationship with an important neighbour and Saudi rival in the region, Iran.

The recent geopolitical changes taking place in the region which saw Turkey asserting political Islam and getting closer to Pakistan has emerged as the new challenge to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia on its part has witnessed a change from being stuck with its traditional mode of

achieving its policy goals in the shape of protection from external threats and the survival of the Al Saud regime towards being a more proactive player in the region. Riyadh's deteriorating relationship with Pakistan and its growing rapprochement with India has posed a renewed challenge to the Imran Khan-led government, already battling a grave economic crisis facing the country, to keep the relationship back on track. At a time when there is a growing chorus in the Middle East region about starting diplomatic ties with Israel, with UAE being the latest country to join in, there seems to be a persistent pressure on Pakistan to recognise Israel, especially when this whole process seems to be having the back of MBS. In the backdrop of political churning taking place in the region, this paper will be an attempt to look at the future prospects between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. This paper argues that despite following different trajectories defined by realpolitik, Islam will continue to have an important role in defining the relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. To analyse the intricacies and behaviour of these nation-states in changing geopolitical setup, this study will employ theoretical framework of patron-client to unravel the underlying phenomenon.

This study is multi-variant research that will employ both primary and secondary sources of data for an in-depth study of the topic. The research will focus on the analytical and historical methods to study the topic undertaken. Also, the comparative-analysis and cross-analysis methods will be kept in a consistent focus to enhance the credibility of data-evaluation and opinion formulation.

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# Workshop V

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8 July 2021 – Thursday / 10:30 – 11:40

Zoom Webinar

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***Moderator: Necati Anaz, Istanbul University***

**Tanjeel Ahmed**

Palestinian Refugees at Home and Abroad:  
National and Cultural Identity Crises

**Nourelhoda Hussein**

Egyptians' Religious Identity After Diaspora: Dynamic or Static?

**Nuraddin Aman**

Trajectories of Muslim Popular Movements in Contemporary Ethiopia

**Abdulgafar Fahm**

Muslim Identity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A Study of  
The Legacy of Ethno-Religious Representation

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## Palestinian Refugees at Home and Abroad: National and Cultural Identity Crises

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*TANJEEL AHMED*

*ISLAMIC ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY*

**Keywords:** Palestinian, National Identity, Culture, Muslim Identity, Devastation, Refugees.

### **Introduction**

In the present international context, the issue of Palestine is a crucial topic of discussion in the international media. In accordance with it, this paper examines ruining of the culture of Palestinians. The existing Palestinians, who remain in the Israeli territories, are surviving a life of distress and pain. They are very brutally treated and are forced to survive on minimal facilities. Also, their rights have been demolished; they have no voice and have no right to self-determination. Even their presence in the country is not a great affair for the nation. Palestinians are the largest and longest-suffering group of refugees in the world; around 80 percent of all Palestinians living in Mandate Palestine became refugees during the 1948 War. This paper intends to explore the reasons behind how Palestinians lost their national identity and culture;

what efforts they are making to preserve their 'tradition and culture' because of the deportation. Today, some 5.5 million Palestine refugees are eligible for UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) service. It is a relief and human development agency.

The topic also depicts the abroad refugees, Palestinian refugees who are rehabilitating in neighboring countries since last six decades have no identity, no political rights, they themselves do not know their future, and they could not fulfill their own rights, and they could not express their miserable condition to the present local government of the country. Near about one-third of the registered Palestine refugees, more than 1.5 million individuals; live in 58 recognized Palestine refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem (UN-

RWA). The land was leased by the government from the local landlords and this land given to the refugees for shelter. Syria is the most affected area where Palestinian refugees are suffering because of the Syria turmoil.

### **Refugees Question**

What is the Palestinians refugees' issue? Before knowing about this issue, let's study the historical perspective of refugees in Palestine. The major historical conflict between Israel and Palestine is the cause which still not have resolved by the international community. In the contemporary world, the vast majority of the refugees are Palestinians. Many of them have been expelled from Palestine when the state of Israel was created and continue till now. For the last 70 years, Israel continues to deny the Palestinian refugees for repatriation in their ancestral hometown and villages. There were several attacks did by the Zionists and aimed to annihilate the Palestinian population and even the policies of ethnic cleaning still continued. Approximately 50% of all Palestinian villages were destroyed in 1948, and many cities were cleared from their Palestinian population. Five hundred and thirty-one Palestinian villages were entirely depopulated and destroyed.

According to UNRWA, Today, some 5 million Palestinian refugees are eligible for UNRWA service. About one-third of the registered and, 1.5 Million individuals live in the 58 recognized camps in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. They face many large difficulties like Food, poverty, employment, health, and education. The culture and the foods are totally different from their own countries. And they still are facing the problems of their own culture as well as national Identity.

### **Identity Crises: National and Cultural**

Identity is strongly intertwined with the socio-culture factors, such as language, societal norms, values, and history and belief systems. It is the tools by which the people become known, and they have their own dignitaries because of their own identity. As a result, the migrants are frequently having experience normative acculturation identity crises, including Ethno-cultural Identity con-

flict, which has a negative impact on the psychological and socio-cultural.

National Identity is one of the identity or sense of belonging to one state or one nation. It is a sense of a nation as a solid whole, and it is represented by many distinctive traditions, cultures and languages, and politics. It depicts the identity of the person to which he/she belongs to and legalizes the citizenship of a person. National Identity saw terms of physiologically as "An awareness of differences", "a feeling and recognition of 'we' and 'they'". But the contemporary plights of the Palestinians that they are not free from their own legal rights and consider as a second-class citizen.

Likewise, professor Ilan Pappé said in his book about 'Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine' that "it is an elimination of another group from a given territory on the basis of religious, ethnic or national origin. Such a policy involves violence and is very often connected with military operations. It is to be achieved by all possible means, from discrimination." At every place of earth where the Palestinian refugees are living, they are feeling cultural crises. The Palestinians have their own culture and tradition like the others citizens have in their own country. Their antiquated cultures, which they celebrated every year, are losing the opportunity to celebrate, whether they are at home or abroad. In there, they have food, clothing, and occasionally functions. They have many traditions in the marriage ceremony, are going to lose because they have no such resources and facilities to fulfill all these functions.

### **Fact and Findings**

The author chooses the topic related to "crises of Palestinian Muslims identity (national and Cultural) under the title of 'Muslim identity in social life and customs' of the conference. The motive to choose the topic to exposed the plights of the Palestinians, who have been liquidating by the other racial community following Zionism's ideology. The Palestinians not merely have the crises of their national and cultural identity but also facing the challenges as more Islamist Muslims. So, there is a need to address

the questions of land and property that have symbolic, religious, national, cultural, and economic significance for the Palestinian community inside Israel as a whole. Since last seventy years, the Palestinians are fighting for their national, cultural as well as a 'Muslim identity.' The Muslim identity is connected with Masjid-al-Aqsa, which is the third holiest place in Islam, while the Masjid-al-Aqsa is under the control of the Zionists army.

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## Egyptians' Religious Identity After Diaspora: Dynamic or Static?

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*NOURELHODA HUSSEIN*

*ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY MALAYSIA (IIUM)*

**Keywords:** Diaspora, Dynamism, Egyptians, Religious identity, Mobility.

Mobility has become a significant social event that attracted the attention of many researchers as they considered it essential in understanding societies. Due to the new wave of migrations, new forms of diaspora came into existence as individuals disperse, whether forced or on their own will, from their homeland while enduring their affiliations, memories and emotions (Schumann, 2007). This flow of individuals has enhanced the area of research with new academic interest in the phenomenon of diaspora and how it affects different aspects of social life. One of the important areas of study is construction and transformation. It has overtaken a significant space in literature in contemporary human and social sciences in the last decades. Huge number of studies has been conducted to explore the elements that constitute individuals' and groups' identity, how individuals prioritize certain identities and how multiple identities exist (Bru-

baker and Cooper, 2000). However, fewer attention has been dedicated to study how individuals negotiate their identities in different locational ties due to mobility and migration especially in the case of Muslim diaspora (La Barbera, 2015).

Exploring the modern theories of identity and its relation to mobility and space, many theorists have described the nature of identity as mobile, dynamic and incomplete. On the other hand, religion as a significant aspect of identity has been characterized by some theorists as a static phenomenon associated with fixed or traditional beliefs. Therefore, this research focuses on the religious identity of young Muslim Egyptians after diaspora. More specifically, this paper investigates how Egyptians perceive their religious identity to understand the nature of Muslim identity in relation to mobility and space. It iden-

tifies the key components of this identity in the context of diaspora.

According to the case of Egyptian Muslims, there are some aspects that should be put into consideration, which are the changes in the political environment. At the end of the nineteenth century, migration has become a general social phenomenon among Egyptians. In the beginning Egyptians tend to migrate mainly to rich Arab countries after the elimination of Nasser's restrictive emigration policies, however, in the last decades they migrated significantly more to Western countries. Another pivotal political change that affected the migration flow was the Egyptian revolution in 2011, followed by the military take over in 2013. Egypt, now, has become one of the largest countries from whom its citizen migrates to other countries with an estimated number of 3.4 million Egyptian migrant (Müller-Funk, 2020).

Using a qualitative methodology, this research has investigated how Egyptians perceive their religious identity in order to understand the nature of Muslim identity in relation to mobility and space. Participants were recruited using snowball sampling technique (Russell 2006). Some participants were selected from the researcher's personal network, others through persons connected to the social or professional network of some of the participants.

The criteria of choosing participants included (1) Egyptians living in a Western country, (2) travelling with a purposive reason (e.g. studying), and (3) sharing same religious belief which is Islam. The participants were selected within the same age group namely 28 and 29 and are within the same educational level as they are all doing post graduate studies.

Semi-structured interview was employed to obtain relevant data. The structure of the interview was determined by reviewing similar researches, related literature and consulting an expert researcher. The interview was guided by five main questions: 1) How do you identify your religious identity? 2) What is the impact of mobility on your religious identity? 3) Who is/are your source(s) of support? 4) What have changed in your self-presenta-

tion? 5) Where do you feel a sense of belonging?

Data analysis was performed using thematic data analysis method which focuses on the perceptions, feelings and experiences of the participants in order to derive shared patterns. Seven Egyptian participants were enrolled with an average age of 28, four are females and three are males. All live in Western countries, five are staying in UK, one in Germany and one live in France. They travelled for the purpose of studying post graduate studies, four are doing their PhD, while three are doing their Masters studies.

This research has identified four main themes that convey the religious identity of Egyptian Muslims in Diaspora. Firstly, participants have characterized their religious identity as an individual character rather than a social one. This is due to the unavailability of a community to whom they can belong. Besides, the secularization of the western community in diaspora promotes a more individualistic religious life.

Secondly, they expressed their belonging towards a spiritual territory rather than a spatial one. Having a negative experience from their community in homeland has created a sense of detachment. This shows the impact previous experiences in homeland have greatly affected their sense of belonging.

Thirdly, the sense of estrangement that the participants had in diaspora provided them with a positive perception and appreciation towards their own religious identity. It differentiated them from the defects of their surrounding community.

Finally, participants have expressed their fear of the dynamism of religious identity in diaspora through holding on to their fundamentals. Whereas they highlighted the decrease of their practice level. These findings propose that the religious identity on the personal level, which is related to the fundamentals, is more likely to maintain its level, while the social level, which is related to the religious practices, is more likely to decrease.

Moreover, it can be concluded that the religious identi-

ty of Egyptian Muslims in diaspora cannot be examined without considering the political and the social history of individuals. Undeniably, identifying the complex multi-layers of the religious identity is an essential step in determining its nature.

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# Trajectories of Muslim Popular Movements in Contemporary Ethiopia

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*NURADDIN AMAN*  
*ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY*

**Keywords:** Trajectories, Muslim, Non-Violent Movement, Actors, Factors, Contemporary Ethiopia.

## **Trajectories of Muslim Popular Movements in Contemporary Ethiopia**

Since the 7th century, in the course of flow and ebb, Islam as an integral part of the different Ethiopian nation and nationalities religion has rejoiced both in secular and non-secular activities and sometimes quarreled with other religions so far. In the modern history of Ethiopia, mainly starting from Emperor Haile Selassie I (1930-1974) regime up to the EPRDF (1991-2018) the Ethiopian Muslims have been passed through three major stages in the long history of Ethiopian Muslim movements. Accordingly, they have protested against the government in different periods by bringing three major questions into the wider public such as the quest for citizenship/equal right, public holidays and the quest for the establishment of the Ethiopian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (Majlis).

The coming of EPRDF into power in 1991 paved the way to practice the religious rights and freedom that subsequently resulted in the revival of religious movements, particularly for Islam and Protestant Christianity (Terje Østebø, 2015:31). Thus, this new political arena has heightened the freedom to propagate religions, allowing the distribution of religious texts, both the imported and locally published and relaxation of press freedom allowed for the translation in various vernaculars (Jawar Mohammed, 2013:7). These kinds of proceedings have also paved the way for marked interest, produced a new consciousness among the Muslim population generated new religious affiliations and made Islam in Ethiopia more visible compared with the past. The improvement of technological facilities, the movement of the peoples from rural to urban and in recent times social media have all allowed for greater availability and dissemination of

information. This consequently has been released an increase for religious revivalism in the vast area of Ethiopia. However, in the late 1990s, the approach of the EPRDF towards Muslim Ethiopia has deteriorated due to the fear of the development of Islamic militant movements in the horn Africa and the context of regional and global geopolitics (Dereje Feyissa Dori, (2011:7-8). Therefore, the religious rights and freedom that boosted the Muslim Ethiopian following the coming of EPRDF in 1991 have retreated firstly because of the 1995 incident at al-Anwar Mosque between the Muslim and government forces. This incident abruptly follows the interference of the government to control the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council, the restriction/close of some Islamic institutions and newspapers (Mohammed Dejen, (2016:78-7,129). In 2008, the Ministry of Education has decreed a law that enforces a ban on religious symbols' such as the niqab (woman veil) and congregational worship in all educational institutions both in private and public. Following this decree, the Mekela University was the first institution that implements this law and thus dismissed Muslim students that found performing congregational prayers inside the campus. Subsequent to this measure, on December 8, 2008, Addis Ababa University Muslim students called for an organized wide protest in solidarity with Mekela University Muslim students. In fact, the protest that instigated in different universities resulting in this ban has played a major role in paving the way for the birth of a nationwide Muslim movement that orchestrated in 2011.

As mentioned above, the context of regional and global geopolitics has deteriorated the positive approach of the EPRDF government towards the Ethiopian Muslims and thus results from the interference of the government to control the Majlis, restrict/close some Islamic institutions and newspapers, ban on religious symbols' and group prayer in the universities. In addition to this, in July 2011 the Ethiopian government together with the then Majlis has invited the Al-Ahbash ideology from Lebanon in order to blend the Ethiopian Muslims by this ideology throughout the country. Therefore, the quest for secularism, reform of the Majlis and imposition of the Al-Ah-

bash ideology by the government are among the major factors for the Ethiopian Muslim movements that mainly exploded in 2011.

The movements that embarked in 2011 onwards are initially undertaken without well-organized leadership. However, following the increasing number of the movements from time to time and the fundamental demands of the Muslim people, the movement requires leadership that has a capability to facilitate the protests, manage meetings with concerned bodies and above all finding ultimate solutions for the Ethiopian Muslim as well. Thus, this study finds out that in contemporary Ethiopian Muslim popular movements different actors such as the committee or representative of the people, Demtsachen Yese-ma secret group (literally let our voice be heard!) and media outlets and; the external actors are mainly Diaspora Muslim based civil organizations and Diaspora based activists are among the key actors in the contemporary Ethiopian Muslim movements that played a pivotal role in this non-violent movement that mainly takes place from 2011-2018.

To sum up, the recent Ethiopian Muslim popular movement has served as a tool of unifying force the wider Muslim public in particular and the country in general. They have proven that demonstrations by religious groups can be peaceful and that the implementation of secularism can be the aim of these groups. It furthermore entrenched the nature and technique of non-violent symbols of peace during the protests which is a new stratagem in the history of the country that inspires others too. Taking this into consideration, this study attempts to present the trajectories of Muslim popular movements in contemporary Ethiopia. Accordingly, the main factors and actors during these movements from different perspectives are addressed in this paper. In addition to this, the sociopolitical impacts of the Ethiopian Muslim movement are treated as well. To do so, both primary and secondary data are employed in order to bring significant data on the mentioned topic.

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# Muslim Identity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A Study of the Legacy of Ethno-Religious Representation

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*ABDULGAFAR FAHM*  
*RELIGIONS UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN*

**Keywords:** Muslim Identity; Postcolonial; Nigeria; Ethno-religious.

Examining the concept of Muslim identity within the framework of ethno-religious representation in Nigeria – specifically within the areas of ethnicity and religion, colonial influence, and the politics of religious identity – can provide significant insights into the intricate connections of the ethno-regional-religious construct bequeathed by the colonial administration to post-independence Nigeria. This study investigates how the construction of multiple Muslim identities have shaped relations in post-colonial Nigeria and how the divergent identities within the Muslim community affect external factors and power structures as well as the relationship between the Muslim and the ‘Other’. This research is qualitative, in which a textual analysis technique is applied to historical and relevant contemporary materials on Muslims in Nigeria. firstly; the Muslims’ ideological belongings and convictions to different groups cum varying ethnic backgrounds. When the onlookers tend to examine and weigh the heated controversies within these Muslim entities from afar, leaving behind the spectacular and implicit factors, they per-

haps conclude that no unity is found to the Muslims and there is likely to be “trueness” in a Muslim faction (possibly lax) that fits into their political and economic framing. Rather, Muslims hold themselves bound together by one force of identity\_ Ummah and, while the differences occupy a notable place, radicalism in the struggle remains unjustifiable and detached. Secondly, Muslim identity in public spheres, especially in political pursuits and advancements, has been perceived in a mistrustful way\_ a gradual plot or strategy to “Islamize” public institutions and the Nigerian state in general. This outlook is a result of the ethno-regional-religious construct bequeathed by the colonial administration to post-independence Nigeria. The study, therefore, concluded it is only when undue mistrust and overgeneralization tendency are shunned that such notions or misrepresentation of identities can be effaced. Findings highlight an increasing interaction between Nigerian Muslims and the wider Muslim world. It also revealed how undue mistrust and overgeneralization tendency has been responsible for shaping Muslim

identity in Nigeria, which has in turn continued to affect Muslim identity representations or misrepresentations.

Probing Muslim identity in postcolonial Nigeria – especially in a time when there is a rise in anti-Muslim hate crime and continued portrayals of Muslim communities as violent and extremist, war and oppression prone – can provide important insights into Islam's place within Western culture and political systems, and the role that faith communities can play in seeking peace and reconciliation (Hardy et al., 2017). Notably, narratives on Muslim identities are oftentimes framed through theological concerns, Islamic fundamentalism, extremism, the temporal and spatial construction of hate and fear, and increasing incidences of 'Islamophobia' through the construction of Muslims as 'the Other', which invariably leads to superficial portrayals of Islam and Muslims' contributions in promoting a peaceful world (P Hopkins & Aitchison, 2016; Hughes, 2013; Marranci, 2009). Hence, several researchers have examined the issue of Muslim identity and social change (Brenner, 1993; More, 2004; Nash, 2012; Poulton et al., 1997). This study explores the extent to which Muslim identity is influenced by colonialism premised mainly on the ethno-religious nature of the country and how ethnicity plus religion have shaped postcolonial development in Nigeria.

In Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, just like in most neocolonial countries of the world, colonial legacies remain until contemporary times (Umar, 2006). The bequests of colonial conquests are indeed manifest in the continued lived experiences of the colonized, which directly or indirectly rest upon the heritage of the effects and influences of the colonial age. On this note, Iwuchukwu (2013) observes that:

Needless to say that when Nigeria gained her independence in 1960 from the British, the entire country seemingly commenced new social political endeavor as a nation of peoples previously, for the most part, with differing administrative principles and structures. The challenges, threats, and probable possibilities for the peoples, cultures, and religions that the British authorities had macro-managed for

about a century took new dimensions (Iwuchukwu, 2013, p. 39).

This demonstrates that the question of a Nigerian identity can be more understood within the precept of colonial and postcolonial contexts (Akanji, 2011). Aliyu (2017) noted that the colonial period had greatly interrupted the socio-economic, political, and cultural lives of the people to the extent that it was impossible to go back to the old ways. This, no doubt, is not unconnected to the glaring effect of the divide-and-rule administration of the British, which brought about the maximum exploitation of the Nigerian state and also promoted ethno-religious and cultural differences. The colonial policy thus, not only infused and poisoned inter-ethno-religious relations among communities in the country but had also created permanent mistrust and suspicion among the different ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria (Bamidele, 2018).

Ethnic and religious prejudices have found a strong ground in Nigeria so much that there is neither a national consensus nor a binding ideology (Idike & Okechukwu, 2015). This also places the issue of identity as a historical construct that not only emerges but also transforms along and within particular political, social, and ideological contexts (Petersen, 2016). According to Petersen, identity is not only self-attributed but also asserted and established by outside actors or factors. Also, power structures and audience assumptions are said to limit and shape how identities are constructed and received. For instance, Muslims today, despite their attempts to express their self-identity, are confronted with powerful dominant representations that are more likely to be recognized as authentic by many of their non-Muslim neighbors (Petersen, 2016; Vaughan, 2016). Moreover, Muslim identities have accrued irreconcilable dimensions in the post-colonial Nigeria, based on the Islamic religious tendencies or ideological convictions, as well as the diverse nature of the country's ethnicity. All appearing to be overlapping and co-acting forces and on which bases the country's polity and multi-cultural propensity have been shaped for long.

It is against these backdrops, that this study addresses

the following questions: who is identified as a Muslim in Nigeria? By what definition or description, and on what basis; who recognizes those identities, and in what contexts; who contests those identifications, and how; and what are the benefits or implications that extend from those identifications? In response to the above questions, this paper addresses the following: Muslims in Nigeria, conceptual analysis: ethnicity and religion, ethno-religious factors and colonial influence, Nigerian Muslims and the politics of religious identity, Nigerian Muslims and ideological parameters: an implication, , and conclusion.

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# Workshop VI

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**Moderator: Nia Deliana**, *International Islamic University Malaysia*

**Mur-Hamida Eldani and Albaris Tahiluddin**

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## Conflict Management in Bangsamoro Conflict in Mindanao, Philippines and the OIC and Japan participation

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*MUR-HAMIDA ELDANI & ALBARIS TAHILUDDIN*  
*KASTAMONU UNIVERSITY*

**Keywords:** Bangsamoro, Japan, Mindanao Conflict, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

The Muslims/Moros in the Island of Mindanao Philippines has been struggling for a long decade since the time of Spanish colonization up to the 21st century. The American colonists also tried to put hands on them through pacification and assimilations. After the declaration of Philippine independence in 1946, Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan Islands were illegally annexed and included to the Philippine territory. Many Filipinos migrated to the lands of the unconquered Moros and the Moros in contrast became marginalized. They have been undergoing various conflict and injustices since the time of colonial era until under rule of the Philippine Government.

The Moro people had established negotiations by peace dialogues and by fighting as portion of provocation of their rights of self-determination. This is for a fact that Muslim or the Moro people in the Mindanao region has been independent for a long time. They have their own culture, politics, and established Islamic faith and religion. In short, the Muslim Civilization existed numerous decades ago before the coming of the colonizers and before the claimed discovery of the Philippine Island.

Moreover, the Moro revolutionists conducted peace negotiations as part of their efforts to achieve their long-desired peace and autonomy. Although the first recognized Muslim movement MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) and the GPH (Government of Philippines) made an agreement that resulted to ARMM region, the implementations of the expected developments for the Muslim Filipinos' turned to be unsuccessful and it did not meet the fundamental interests of the Muslim people in the country. The original goals and missions of struggle has been diverted and not truly contented. On the contrary, armed conflict repeatedly emerged and resulted to the birth of diverse Moro factions such as Abu Sayyaf, BIFF, and Maute group. Many innocent people lived in predicament condition. Consequently, the detrimental effects of the revolutions turned to be contagious to all the Muslim communities in the afflicted areas in Mindanao. Under these consequences, other legitimate Moro group; MILF or the Moro Islamic Liberation Front started another phase of peace negotiation with the Philippine government. The peace negotiation process also joined by other international parties similar to the first di-

ologue with MNLF group with OIC assistance. Other international parties such Turkey, Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia joined the peace process in search for conflict resolution. After series of incessant and some failed peace talks, likewise bloody years of fighting particularly in Mindanao region, finally the Moro people had become victorious in establishing once again their self-governed Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), Philippines. And with the establishment of the newest Bangsamoro autonomy in the Philippines, the Moro leaders with the cooperation and support from the Muslim communities, desire to achieve justice, peace and prosperity to their land and people. Now, everybody is looking forward for a betterment of the socio-political, cultural and economic conditions of the Muslim people in Mindanao.

The Bangsamoro conflict in Mindanao had become internationalized. Besides, it is no surprised if several nation-states drew attention to the Philippines especially to the Bangsamoro people in Southern part of the country. Aside from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation or OIC, other Asian countries such as Japan, Indonesia, and Malaysia provide much attention to the Moro dilemma. OIC is an active organization that operates globally mainly and particularly concern in the various situation of the Islamic countries. The organization deals with the social, economic, political and cultural facets of the Muslim Ummah. OIC also aims to protect the interests and to preserve the harmonious relationship of the Muslim countries, and focuses on the issues of Ummah and the whole humanity. Thus, the organization subsequently extends its help and assistance towards the Muslims of the Southern Mindanao in Philippines. OIC played an active role of being a mediator in Mindanao conflict, which influence the Moro rebels and GRP stands in handling conflict. On the other hand, Japan's policy on peace-building extends to the Moros. Thus, Japan became a strong supporter of the peace process in Mindanao Philippines. Japan facilitated in the peace negotiation between the GRP and the Moro groups. Japanese organizations such as JICA became responsible in assisting the Bangsamoro, and adopted preventive measures against the conflict in Mindanao region. Concerning this, in able to fully understand the Self-determination struggle of the Muslim people in Southeast Mindanao, Philippines as part of longest internal armed conflict in the History, we need to look back and re-examine the Moro insurgencies in the Philippines. Thus, the role and contributions of the international third parties mainly of OIC and Japan in resolving and managing conflict in Mindanao must be primary discuss in this research.

In this connection, this research paper would like to focus on the conflict management in Bangsamoro Mindanao Philippines and the participation of international third parties mainly of OIC, and Japan in resolving the conflict. This work would also mention some important actors in Mindanao conflict such as the Philippine government (GRP), MNLF, and MILF. Thus, it will examine the contributions and cooperation of OIC and Japan in the peace negotiation, as well as their influence to the involved parties towards ending the Bangsamoro Mindanao conflict in the Philippines. This paper also aims to provide concrete idea on the efficiency of the international third parties in helping to resolve extensive conflict outside their jurisdiction and vicinity. Thus, through this research the readers would be aware on the effective ways of managing conflict, which could be adopted in the near future.

Based on gathered literature, the Bangsamoro conflict has been resolved by negotiation and mediation process. The GRP and the Moro rebels, both MNLF and MILF heeded and accepted the diplomatic interference of Organization of Islamic Cooperation and Japan towards handling the extensive conflict in Mindanao Philippines. Besides, OIC's leverage, material and financial assistance made the concerned parties to continue the peace negotiation instead of continuing war for independence from Philippine state. Japan diplomatic intervention, aid and assistance for the Bangsamoro in line with country's peacebuilding also positively brought progress in the lives of the Bangsamoro people in Mindanao. In addition, its preventive projects and measures did decrease the hostilities in the region.

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# Spirit of Islamic Populism in Contemporary Indonesia: Between Islamic Resurrection and Conservative Turn

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*HUSNI MUBARRAK HUSNI*  
*SHARIA AND LAW UIN AR-RANIRY ACEH*

**Keywords:** Islamic Populism, Islamic Resurrection, Conservative Turn, Contemporary Indonesia.

## Introduction

This research is purposed to portray the condition of Islam and Muslim in contemporary Indonesia in the span of the last two decades, after the end of Soeharto regime or more known as the reformation era. At least in the last twenty years, there has been a phenomenon of Islam and Muslims that have had a greater opportunity to articulate their Islamic values in their life nationally and stately. Beginning from the Islamization of banks in the late of 90's; the stipulating of zakat (Islamic alms) and waqaf (endowment) laws; the proliferation of Islamic banks which are usually used as a barometer of Islamic revival in the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. It is not surprising then that Fazlur Rahman, a Muslim intellectual from Pakistan, has ever had big hopes for the revival of Islam in the 20th century emerged from Indonesia.

On the other hand, some foreign observers and intellectuals claim that the strong demand for shariatization law in contemporary Indonesia as a symptom of "conservative turn" (Bruinessen, 2013). It could be seen through policy of Islamisation in many aspects of national life including the rejection of secularism and liberalism (Fatwa of Indonesian Ulama Assembly, 2005) as well as rejection of non-Muslim leader candidate in the procession of Government Leader Election, both at the state and provincial levels, as in the case of the election for the Governor of the Capital City, Jakarta, in 2017. This such situation often seen as a backward option in which the Indonesian Muslim community is considered less accepting of the fact that Indonesia is a plural and diverse nation, and unable to fuse into the realities of a pluralistic society.

Meanwhile, at the level of current political government policies, in fact, Muslim population in Indonesia are not too much favored by government policies that have been set, even they are often being marginalized, which then force them to voice their ideas and aspirations in a crowd on the street such as demonstration, peaceful action (aksi damai), etc. in order to channel their aspirations, rather than through official political institutions. This situation, however, could be seen sharply in the last few years that contemporary Muslims in Indonesia seem lost their access in political as well as economic access in the country which at the last has put them as “the periphery majority”. The crowd, as mentioned by Le Bon (1995) has its own mass psychology, either alienated or siege mental. Unfortunately, such crowd to perform aspirations in a democratic way which has become and known as “Islamic populism”, then mostly accused and associated with fundamentalism, radicalism and violence.

Actually, Indonesian Muslims through history have a large social capital to revive and make glory again. There are at least two large moderate mass organizations that represent hospitality and moderate Muslim Indonesia through their social activities until now, such as Muhammadiyah and NU (Nahdhatul Ulama/Awakening of Ulama). Both Islamic organizations has had operated since long time even before Indonesia’s independence (1945), in 1912 (Muhammadiyah) and 1926 (NU) respectively. The existence of such organizations must be strengthened in order to bring Islamic populism or Islamic movement to a more fruitful resurrection.

Turning from this point, it becomes a challenge how to construct the fact of Islamic populism in contemporary Indonesia to a more bargaining and beneficial situation by diverting it from the spirit of populism, slowly move to channeling Islamic policies in the economic and political sphere. In turn, the fact of Islam and Muslims in contemporary Indonesia is a challenge for Indonesian Muslims to masterfully divert the spirit of Islamic populism which is perhaps widely accepted in Muslim societies in Indonesia into a canalization of Islamic Awakening that touches the political realm and the economic at large, and as much as

possible to eliminate the conservative impression as has been stereotyped so far.

### **Key Research Questions**

This research will focus on the reality of Islamic populism in contemporary Indonesia in the last two decades. It will explore the question of how Islam appears to be a primary source of identity when Indonesia is undergoing the so-called “reformation era”? This research will also examine how to divert the spirit of populism slowly move to a canalization of Islamic Awakening and resurrection in contemporary Indonesia?

### **Research Methodology**

This research is a qualitative one, includes both theoretical overviews and empirical investigations. The theoretical overview will begin with bibliographical research through literature review in which books, journal articles, and academic thesis containing the target issue. Meanwhile the empirical investigations will be conducted through observation, documentary research and in-depth interview. The interview will be employed for the important figures mentioned in the unit analysis above, either academician, politician, chair of Islamic mass organization, etc. For analytic technique, a thematic analysis will be used. By using thematic analysis, this study will analyse recorded interviews with a focus on their content.

### **Research Objectives**

This research is aimed at studying the dynamics of Islamic populism in contemporary Indonesia. It will also rebut a superficial perspective that simply views that Islamic populism as fundamentalism or conservative turn.

### **Significance of the Research**

This research will provide a comprehensive and inclusive account on the Islamic populism in contemporary Indonesia, particularly in the last two decades of reformation era in Indonesia. In addition to that, this research will also identify factors that can support the spirit of populism slowly move to a canalization of Islamic Awakening and resurrection in contemporary Indonesia

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## Muslims, Identity And Crisis Of Nation State In India

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*MOHAMMAD SAIF*

*ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY*

**Keywords:** Muslim identity, Nation state, Nationalism, Secular modernist, Multi-ethnic state, Nationalist.

The concept of nation is basically recognized in singular and homogenised form. The idea of progress is directly linked with homogeneous nature of nation state system in India. This model of nation state is singular, monolithic and homogenised European conception which became the ideal of Indian nation even across the world. At several places there are plenty of provisions in India constitution that very vehemently clarify this desirable condition of India to be considered as a homogeneous nation state like Uniform civil code and the promotion of Hindi languages at national level along with its core tendency to this point. Notwithstanding this desirability of the ruling elites of India, the Indian trajectory of the nation building process greatly diverges from European experience in which the recent form of nation state was achieved at the cost of brutal elimination of diversity. While, contrary to this India believes in different vision of accommodation diver-

sity that is “unity in diversity” or “diversity in unity” that comes through the Nehruvian consensus of maintaining India religious, cultural and linguistic diversity. This vision of maintaining “Idea of India” is very fundamental to Indian experience since its inception, and also this vision is nearer to Indian experience of nation building. A political process that resulted not only in strengthening the federal character of the nation but also in making pluralism, diversity and democracy essential features of Indian nationhood along with the functioning of India as multiethnic nation-state.

But the recent rise of right wing politics in India diluted the very vision of inclusiveness of religious minorities and the recognition of their Identity that totally disconnected the discourse of India as multiethnic nation state, which created a question on the very nature of Indian nation state in the vision of right wing political elites.

In India Muslims are the largest minority in terms of population even they consist much population than many Muslim countries in the world. The discourse of Muslim Identity in the pre partition over the minority was highly debatable basically there were two dimensions in India at that time when the Indian intelligentsia analyse the accommodation of Muslims, one is the secular modernist dimension and another was Nationalist construct. The secular modernist dimension is very much based on the cultural realm, which means assuring protection of languages, scripts, religious practices and personal laws. In addition to it, the nationalist construct of Muslim minority question was considered synonyms to the communal problem which directly contrasted with emerging Indian nationhood. This trend of analysing Muslim question is still continued, despite of worsening situation of Muslims that is day by day, acknowledged by many reports in between seven decades of Independence. While looking on theoretical part the of secular modernist dimension , not like the situations prevailing in Western Europe and America, the case of Indian Muslims offer much complexity that needs to be outline. In western liberal democracies, collective group right and identity are being demanded are being demanded at a time when community life to a large extent, has weakened, even philosophical debates of western minority lies in communitarian aspect. While this demand of minority rights emerged from immigrant populations and indigenous people; these are the factors which are producing western writing on minority, Additionally, Muslim minorities in India neither immigrant nor outsiders which needs to be accommodated by rest of the people. This accommodation of Muslims in India by approaching western model of minority rights creating discomfort with the Indian Muslims in the recognition of their religious and political identity. Like the recent case of NRC and CAA protest in India was blamed as communal one which suffered the blame of communal agenda, while on the several place the religious assertion of Muslim Identity also degraded.

While the nationalist construct of Muslim question in India which was inspired by the European nation state system does not show the compatibility with diverse looking

Indian society because nation state system acquaint itself with homogeneous nature of society. So, I will be intriguing about the new dimension of theoretical debate of secular modernist accommodation of Muslims in India and to analyse its acceptability in dealing with Muslim identity. While on the other hand to judge the ambiguity of the of nation state system in making recognition of fixity and flexibility of Muslim identity or does it need further qualification?

In a broader aspect, the study seeks to interrogate, the idea of “nation state” its structure and ideology in the Indian context. Precisely, it will be an attempt to unravel the relationship between the concept of Nation state and Muslim Identity as operative In India.

### **Methodology**

As a methodology, this research uses comparative and historical approaches to reach a conclusion. Primarily this is done to reflect the debates within western political theory and its implication in India context of Muslims. The comparative method also helps to locate the uniqueness of Muslims societies in relation to other societies. This research also uses an Interpretative method of analysis wherein the basic texts delineating Muslims in different Non Muslims dominated societies would be studied. This study will also be using explanatory qualitative research which seeks to analyse the genealogy of nation-building in India. This study will be based on both primary and secondary sources including books, journal articles, reports, newspapers, and also the government documents available. Policy reports, as well as policy briefing of the governments, will also be included. The published material from different spatial locations will be consulted. Moreover, discourse analysis method will also be employed to carry out the study.

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## The Rise of (Charismatic) Religio-Political Leader in Post- New Order in Madura

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*ABDUL JABPAR JABPAR*  
*UNIVERSITAS ISLAM NEGERI (UIN)*

**Keywords:** Kiai, Charisma, Religio-political leaders, Democracy.

Madura has a long Islamic history. Some theses were submitted by researchers related to islamization of Madura, for instance, the role of traders from Gujarat and China, the role of 'wali' and kiai, and the role of local kings.[1] Madura as word, it's first appeared in historical records through its relationship with the kingdom of Shiva Budha, Singasari, in the 13th century.[2] The role of the kiais themselves in the islamization in Madura reached its crystallization during the VOC occupation.[3] Therefore, Madurese are known as religious people. On the other hand, they also are identified as community which is filled with acts of violence.[4] That the reason why Madura island called as an "island of piety, tradition, and violence". [5]

There are three main features of Madurese's socio-religious life, namely, kiai, pesantren (Islamic boarding school), and NU (Nahdlatul Ulama).[6] All of these are structures of santri tradition. According to Geertz san-

tri is 'the purer Islam". A sub-variant of the Javanese cultural system that has deep Islamic religious knowledge. The santris not only perform obligatory worship such as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage, but they are also involved in the whole of complex social life, charitable, even Islamic political organization.[7]

Kiai occupy an important and central position in the daily life of Madurese. The uniqueness of the kiais position in their community can be explained by the principle of "buppa-babu'-guruh-ratoh". The principle describes the hierarchy of public respect for both parents, teachers, and finally the head of government. Kiais as guru who have deep and extensive knowledge get very high respect before people, after admiration toward parents. [8] Consequently, the kiais have charisma[9] that makes people submit to their orders, direction, and da'wah. With such a situation, the kiais have sufficient power to direct the community to certain a point, both socially,

politically, even economically. In other words, kiais have very hegemonic[10] power in people's lives.

The collapse of the Suharto regime as the beginning of the reform era was marked by openness of democracy in Indonesia. In Madura, this situation makes it possible for kiais as religious leaders or charismatic leaders to compete for a central position in local government at the district level. Since 2004, there has been a phenomenon of kiai who are regents (kiai-bupati) or regents who are kiai (bupati-kiai), because of the victory of the kiai in electoral politics in four districts in Madura, namely Bangkalan, Sampang, Pamekasan and Sumenep.

This phenomenon can be said as the rise of (charismatic) Religio-Political Leaders in Madura. The kiai gained a central position in the local government bureaucracy through democratic elections which would be based on legal norms and rules. The regent as head of the region is a political position based on legal and rational rules. While the leadership of the kiai in the pesantren is based on tradition and charisma. The first leadership model is based on a "rational-legal authority", while the second is based on "traditional authority" and "charismatic authority".[11]

This article tries to describe the transition landscape of the role of kiais as a "religious leader" to "political leader", or the transformation of a new model called "(charismatic) religious-political leader" which emerged after the New Order in Madura. Then, the perception of the Madurese community towards the transformation of the role of the kiai.

[1] Samsul Ma'arif, *The History of Madura: Sejarah panjang Madura dari Kerajaan, Kolonialisme sampai Kemerdekaan*, (Yogyakarta: Araska, 2015), p.155.

[2] Helena Bouviere, *Lebur!: Seni Musik dan Pertunjukan dalam Masyarakat Madura*, (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2002), p.

[3] Kuntowijoyo, *Radikalisasi Petani*, (Yogyakarta: Bentang, 1994), p. 83.

[4] A. Latief Wiyata, *Mencari Madura*, (Jakarta: Bidik – Phronesis Publishing, 2013), p. 5. See E. Touwen –Bou-

wisma, "Kekerasan di Madura", in *Agama Kebudayaan dan Ekonomi: Studi-studi Interdisipliner tentang Masyarakat Madura*, (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 1989), p.159. See also Huub De Jonge, "Stereotypes of the Madurese", in *Across Madura Strait: The Dynamics of an Insular Society*, (Leiden: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal, Land en Volkenkunde Press, 1995), p. 13.

[5] Yanwar Pribadi, *Islam, State, Society in Indonesia: Local Politics in Madura*, (New York: Routledge, 2018), p.88.

[6] Samsul Ma'arif, *The History of Madura...*, p.155.

[7] Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, (Chicago - London: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 6.

[8] Mohammad Kosim. "Kiai dan Blater: Elite Lokal dalam Masyarakat Madura", in *Karsa*, Vol. XII No. 2 October 2007. P. 162.

[9] Actually, the charisma theory refers to Weber's idea. He said: "the natural leaders in distress have been holders of specific gifts of the body and spirit; and these gifts have been believed to be supernatural, not accessible to everybody...the charismatic leader gains and maintains authority solely by proving his strength in life". See Max Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building*, (Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), p.19-22.

[10] According to Gramsci, the ruling class does not only obtain community submission through coercion (force) but also with consent (hegemony). He said: "...another issue that needs to be defined and developed: the "dual perspective" in political action and in the life of the state. The dual perspective can manifest itself at various levels from the most rudimentary to the most complex. But this, too, is related to the dual nature of Machiavelli's Centaur—force and consent, domination and hegemony, violence and civility ("church and state" as Croce would say), agitation and propaganda, tactics and strategy...". See Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, edited and translated by Joseph Buttigieg, (New York: Columbia Press, 1975), p. 284. See also Peter Mayo, *Hegemony and Education under Neoliberalism: Insight from Antonio Gramsci*, (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 12.

[11] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 328.

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## Arabic in Strengthening Muslim Religious Identity, A Lesson from the History of Minangkabau Social Transformation

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*ISRAL NASKA*

*MUHAMMADIYAH SUMATERA BARAT UNIVERSITY*

**Keywords:** Arabic, Religious Identity, Minangkabau.

This work aims to show how Arabic, to be precise classical Arabic, can play a role in strengthening the religious identity of Muslim society. The inclusion of Arabic in talking about Muslim society's religious identity is reasonable and promising since it is the Quranic language.

The study on the history of the Minangkabau ethnic, which has maintained no direct relationship with the Arab world, is a promising way to show the essentiality of Arabic in strengthening Muslim identity. In Minangkabau, which is the largest matrilineal society globally, social transformation is Islamization, which gradually changed this ethnic from being an animist to a society that accept Islam is a part of their primary identity. The requirements to be called a Minangkabau people are having a Minangkabau mother and embracing Islam.

To reach the aim, I analyzed Minangkabau historical data from the perspective of the social transformation theory that Sewell Jr (2005) suggested. I obtained the historical data from several publications, such as by Azra (2017), Dobbin (2016), Hadler (2008), and Abdullah (1971).

The relationship between Arabic and the Muslim community's religious identity has been the subject of some research, such as research by Seymour-Jorn (2004), Grewal (2013), Jaspal and Coyle (2010), and Al-Osaimi and Weddel (2014). However, I have not found any paper describing how Arabic can strengthen Muslim communities and societies' religious identity.

Peek (2005) revealed that a Muslim's religious identity might strengthen, but he did not explain the process in which the identity affirms. His publication only provided a general explanation that strengthening comes with age

and knowledge. Regarding the knowledge, several studies indicated the role of religious identity behind Muslim decisions and motivations in learning Arabic. A survey conducted by Belnap (1987) shows that many students in America and Canada went into Arabic for religious reasons, understanding the Quran. Seymour-Jorn (2004) found that the Arab Muslim descent community showed a greater desire to learn Arabic than the Christian-Arab descent community. Al-Osaimi and Weddel (2014) also found that Muslim students believe that learning Arabic is a form of worship in Islam. Grewal's publication shows the efforts to strengthen American Muslims' religious identity by learning Arabic and Islamic Sciences in Arabic speaking countries.

Versteegh's (2001) explanation on the spread of Arabic indicated that the acceptance of Islamic identity and Arabic in several places, which are now known as Arabic-speaking countries, occurred simultaneously. However, it does not mean that Arabic was a determining factor in accepting Islam as an identity. Nevertheless, the political encouragement that Arabs applied was the main determining factor behind the acceptance of Islam outside the Arab peninsula in the dawn of Islam. The Minangkabau case is unique; the ethnic claimed its Islamic identity with a mostly different pattern as the spread of Islam was under the Minangkabau people's initiative. Arabic was among the fundamental resources behind the acceptance of Islam as an identity in Minangkabau.

According to Sewell Jr (2005), the success of the transformation depends on the emergence of agents who comprehend existing social schemas well and then utilize existing resources, both human and non-human, to realize the transformation agenda. In the Minangkabau context, this transformation is Islamization, in which Arabic is one of the leading resources.

In Minangkabau, the Islamization proceeded in at least four significant stages. The first stage is the era of Sheikh Burhanuddin in the early 17th CE. It was an era when the Kaum Surau (Minangkabau ulama and their follower) maintained a sociological basis for Islam, which led Minangkabau people to accept Islam broadly. One of these

was by transforming surau, originally a communal shelter where Minangkabau boys and widowers sleep at night, to be the Islamic educational center (Azra, 2017). The character of Islamic understanding that spread throughout Minangkabau was Sufism or Islam Tarikat (Abdullah, 1966). As elsewhere, the Sufi brotherhood tended to ignore social issues and put more focus on the topic of self-purification (Gibb, 1947). Focusing on individual matters led them not to challenge the Minangkabau existing social orders, making the Kaum Surau not experience significant external challenges.

The second stage was the Tuanku Nan Tuo's era, a notable Minangkabau ulama in the 18th CE. It was the era when the Kaum Surau began to change their character (Dobbin, 2016; Hadler, 2008). Unlike before, they began to concern social issues and commenced some efforts to encourage Minangkabau people to implement Islamic tenets more. It included intellectual endeavors, such as opening an Islamic law class in 1784, and physical struggles, such as attacking bandit groups that Minangkabau traditional law system failed to suppress.

The third stage was the Padri era, which began in 1803. It was an era when Kaum Surau decided to take a more revolutionary approach to make Minangkabau more integrated with Islam (Dobbin, 2016; Hadler, 2008). After more than one decade of civil war, The Padri movement led to reconciliation between the progressive Kaum Surau, known as the adat group, which had been too fanatical about Minangkabau local customs (adat) even though contradicting the Islamic tenets, such as drinking alcohol, gambling, cockfighting, and opium use. This reconciliation gave birth to an entire agreement in Minangkabau, known as the Adat Basandi Syarak, Syarak Basandi Kitabullah (Adat is based on the religion, the religion is based on the Book of God) (Abdullah, 1966). The Padri movement succeeded in giving a path to Islamic tenets to be considered the supreme law above the adat, or local custom.

The fourth stage was the emergence of the Kaum Mudo (the youth group) around the beginning of the 20th CE. As a progressive kaum surau of the era, they attacked the

common practice of taqlid, bid'ah, and khurafat, which they claimed identical with the practice of Islam in Minangkabau (Abdullah, 1971). They argued that the Islamic tradition of Minangkabau, besides contradicting the essential spirit of Islam, also did not contribute to help Minangkabau dealing with the modern era.

Arabic was an essential resource behind the Islamization of Minangkabau. The transformation agents, the Kaum Surau, used Arabic to ensure their group's development and sustainability. Instead of viewing Arabic as a communication tool, the Kaum Surau just viewed Arabic as a tool to understand the Quran, Hadith, and classical Islamic references. Mastery of Arabic allowed them to claim religious authority and their social role.

Besides that, the Kaum Surau also used Arabic to help them Islamize the Minangkabau worldview through the writing of Tambo, a fundamental document of Minangkabau customs (adat) that previously was inherited through the oral tradition. They put many Arabic and Quranic words together with its concept inside Tambo to replace the previous idea. Mastery Arabic also allowed Minangkabau to develop their understanding on Islam, as the reformist Kaum Mudo did or to defend their old religious tradition, as Minangkabau traditionalist Kaum Surau did. Uniquely, the mastery of Arabic allowed Minangkabau ulama to find religious arguments defending their matrilineal system even though they accepted Islam, which is identical to patrilineal tradition according to common opinion.

It is to conclude that the Minangkabau history analysis gives an idea that Arabic is essential in shaping Muslims' religious identity. The history perfectly exemplified that Arabic is an urgent language for Muslims to shape their religious identity.

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# Workshop VII

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9 July 2021 – Friday / 10:50 – 12:00

Zoom Webinar

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**Moderator: Baptiste Brodard**, *Universidad Veracruzana*

**Mohd Yaseen Gada**

Oscillating Between Islamophobia and Racism: A Racial Dilemma for  
Anti-Islamophobia Advocacy Groups in the West

**Fabrizio Ciocca**

Muslim Identity in Italy

**Sabah Khan**

Identity and Transnational Connections of Muslim Diaspora Communities in Britain

**Muzaffer Can Dilek**

The Impacts of Muscular Liberalism Agenda on the Professional Identity of Muslim Teachers in England

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## Oscillating between Islamophobia and Racism: A Racial Dilemma for Anti-Islamophobia Advocacy Groups in the West

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*MOHD YASEEN GADA*  
*INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER*

**Keywords:** Islamophobia, Racism, Advocacy, Dilemma, US, West.

Today Islamophobia is a global phenomenon. Anti-Muslim sentiment has a venerable history in the Western European culture. The 9/11 terrorist attacks only brought about a significant change in the Western imagination and perception of Islam and Muslims. In the recent past, many scholars have attempted to investigate and scrutinize the Islamophobia discourse, its formation, role in policymaking bodies, its beneficiaries, and narratives which indeed is commendable. The investigations primarily view ‘religion’ or ‘other’ as the dominant precursor of the Islamophobia discourse. In contrast, there is a resurgent emerging trend critical to ‘religion’ as main factor behind Islamophobia discourse. The scholars of this new trend view racism—without any distinction to religion—as the threshold of Islamophobia discourse.

The trend argues that racism, largely ignored in Islamophobia discourse, is one of the main factors that foster Islamophobia in America. The racial nature of Islamophobia has remained obscured due to the dominant color blinded approach. There have been many instances of hatred and violence against the non-white people in the West, and surprisingly a good number of them were non-Muslims. For instance, an episode of violence against a Catholic, Cameron Mohammed in Florida; when he was attacked because he looked like a “Muslim”. What marks someone for Americans as a “Muslim” regardless of his/her religion, ethnicity or nationality? The scholars such as Ferik Love believe that “Race is the only way to explain”. With racial categories such as “Muslim”, “Arab”, “Middle Eastern”, “Syrian”, That demonstrate that racial identity is indispensable for every social interaction but “the contours of racial categories are always contested

and changing". Thus ascribing to a single racial category would have profound implications because it ignores diversity, rejects indigenous identity and promulgates its own version of history. Others view that the racial lens distorts and conceals the truth.

It is seen that anti-Racism civil society groups and their strategy confronting Islamophobia highlight the dilemma between the race-conscious and the race-neutral strategies by American advocates working to confront Islamophobia. Moreover it clearly points that advocating groups tend to remain race-neutral for the fear of being a separate community. However, in contrast, that a race-conscious strategy would have potential advantages for it would open various avenues: it will bring all the communities together and promote larger advocacy coalitions; and it would enable powerful use of moral language of civil rights as was experienced in the 1960s civil rights era.

The construction of "Middle Eastern" racial category by the Americans proved beneficial for them to discriminate against such racial category. Later on, the top five racial categories were officially recognised in the US, and surprisingly, the contemporary self-created "Middle Eastern American" identity is absent there. Then how it is possible to gain a huge usage of "Middle Eastern American" identity in the American public sphere as the people from Middle Eastern Americans face tremendous challenge and discrimination. As such, Feric Love points that it is important, in that perspective, that there should be a due recognition of the "Middle Eastern American" racial category in the US. In this way, they would legally fight against any sort of discrimination and violence as the Asian Americans did.

Significantly, such formation of racial identity began to take shape many centuries ago, even before the Crusades in Europe. As such, the European conception of Middle Eastern's was then shifted to American when people from Asia and Africa were taken into forced slavery till the people began started immigration in mass in the nineteenth century. What is important is that the re-articulation of ascribed racial identity is profoundly

important because only in that case racial identity categories can take hold and gain mainstream acceptance. However, there is tremendous disappointed that there have been very few Middle Eastern American advocacy organization that it is yet to get any recognition in America. Only in that case Middle Eastern Americans would be able to fight any discrimination on the basis of an identity.

The welcome trend Delineates and recounts American Islamophobia and racism in culture, politics, and policy. Racism has been endemic in the US since its founding. Islamophobia is systemic, structural and institutional form of racism that runs through the American popular culture, politics and policy in myriad ways. What is needed for many advocacy organization in the US to confront racism and Islamophobia is the clarity of their strategy and unity. So far these organizations have struggled to achieve success for the Islamophobia policies and tactics have proliferated both before and after the 9/11. There is a lack of a durable cooperation and coordination between the most influential Middle Eastern American advocacy organizations. The racial politics has profoundly affected any successful transformational coalition among these organizations, which is essential to confront ever-expanding Islamophobia. Then what is the way forward?

Thus the race-conscious strategy and coalition building among different groups are important to challenge the ever-increasing Islamophobia in Western Europe. One would agree that Islamophobia is not just about religion but it is all about with the people of colour. The argument sounds attractive but at the same time it undermines religious factor/identity—Islam. The present paper explores and examines the dilemma among many advocacy groups and organizations in the US working to confront the increasing Islamophobia. The paper employs analytical and critical approach to answer why these advocacy groups failed to confront Islamophobia in the West. It argues that racial oriented strategy by the victims of irrational fear of Islam and Muslim groups would prove highly beneficial to confront the Islamophobia and racism in the West.

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## Muslim Identity in Italy

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*FABRIZIO CIOCCA*  
*UNIVERSITY OF ROME*

**Keywords:** Islamic worship places, Italy, Islamophobia, Mass-media, Migration.

Italy currently is the third country for highest presence of Muslims in EU, about 2.7 million (which one million with Italian citizenship), representing the 4,5% of the whole population in the Country.

Nevertheless, in comparison with other European countries that have experienced Muslim migration since after the second world, migration flows from Islamic countries into Italy are more recent, starting from the 80s, characterized by a male presence in search of work, coming first from the Arab countries and in a second phase, in the 90s from those in Asia and Europe (Balkans mostly).

Today, the Islamic community is quite varied in ethnic composition, number of languages and cultures. The most prominent Muslims foreign group are the ones from Morocco (400.000 members), Albania (202.000), Bengal (112.000), Pakistan (108.000), Egypt (102.000),

Senegal (93.000), Tunisia (92.000) (Tacchini, 2020).

In addition, the Italian Muslims is a category that include foreigners who took the citizenship, sons and daughters born in Italy by Muslims couples where at least one of the parents was an Italian citizen and a small part of Italians converted to Islam (Ciocca, 2019).

Considering this demographic frame, this paper aims to illustrate how Muslim identity in Italy is perceived at institutional level and public opinion, and, and the same time, how Muslims feels about themselves living in the Country.

The methodology used here includes evidence from monographs, articles, surveys published on internet and an analysis about how Italians mass-media portrait "Islam and Muslims" towards the public.

The first layer to deal with is the “legal issue”, that means how the Italian State has interacted with the Islamic community during the time.

Indeed, regarding the religious demands inevitably tied to Muslim presence, the Italian Constitution regulates the relations between State and religion (at least, non-Roman catholic denominations) in its article number eight:

“All religious confessions are equally free before the law. Confessions other than Catholicism have the right to organise themselves according to their own by-laws, provided they do not conflict with the Italian legal system. Their relationship with the State is regulated by law, based on agreements with their representatives”.

This means that, according to Italian law, every agreement should be reached by negotiations with an official Muslim representation; however, Islam “nature” doesn’t provide for the possibility of an ecclesiastical hierarchy, or a unique church, like Roman Catholicism, and it is basically impossible to find some kind of association capable of representing Italian Muslims as a whole and united group.

Due to this anomalous situation, every tentative regulation between the Italian State and Islamic representatives was proceeded by trial and error, involving mostly the Muslim associations founded during the years.

Still in 2017 the Italian government launched National Pact for an Italian Islam, with a series of targets to be achieved: using Italian language during preaching services, fighting radicalism, transparency for every foreign funding, promoting interreligious dialogue, access for non-Muslims to places of worship, but, due to the constant political instability in Italy, this Pact never entered into force, remaining a list of purposes; the result is that the second religion in Italy, by now, has no legal recognition of any sort.

The lack of a specific law dramatic consequences in terms of religious practice: first, there are only 7 official mosques in the whole Italy and circa 1.000 Islamic centre used as a worship place but this sites are considered by law “irregular”, and can be closed at any time by Police.

In addition, these places tend to rise where the Muslim population is more heavily concentrated, but are often placed in suburban areas, generally in structures like former garages, cellars and warehouses, quickly becoming a symbol of deprecation for the other neighbouring citizens, who see those isolated buildings as quite fitting with the usual populist narrative about the “Islamic invasion”.

How does this influence the identity of Muslims in Italy?

A survey carried out on Facebook in 2018 on a sample of 325 Muslims living in Italy, showed that 30% of the interviewers said to feel excluded as a “Citizen” by Society; still 38% expressed the opinion that daily life would be easier if they were not Muslim.

This frustration is strongly connected with the fact that in Italy Muslim identity is often denied in the “public space” or as a structural discrimination (islamophobia). Mostly of Muslims are still perceived by public opinion as a phenomena connected to the immigrations flows, linked with refugee crisis or crime activities.

In 2014, Pew Research started a research to study the opinion of European citizens on various political and social themes, and the perception of a Muslim minority in their respective countries was one of them. In Italy, the 64% of population had a negative view on the subject; the same research, repeated two years later saw this value rising to 69%.

Vox Populi – National Observatory on Rights – monitors Twitter, to map the categories of people most usually attacked on the web. In its last report 62, covering a survey period going from March to November 2017 and March-May 2018, and analysing more than 6.5 million Italian tweets, those expressing hate and discrimination against Muslims went from the 22.435 of 2016, to the 64.934 registered in 2017/2018; an increase of 300% (Vitullo, 2019).

Even some printed and on-line newspapers often use a strong language against Muslims or the Islamic religion, not bothering to discriminate between faithful and terrorist, exploiting those happenings to further a political agenda. One of the most famous, or infamous is from the

newspaper *Libero*, the day after the terrorist attack on Bataclan in France: “Islamic bastards”, which went viral in the whole world in few hour.

Nevertheless, despite these issues, there are Muslims, generally born or raised in Italy, that are more and more finding their space in society, even through many difficulties, bringing an important contribution to politics (like Sumaya Abdel Qader, councilwoman in Milan, Marwa Mahmoud, coordinator of the human rights committee of Reggio Emilia), to journalism (the most well-known are Karima Moual, Asmae Dachan, Sabika Sha Povia, Brahim Maarad) and to art (the comic writer and graphic novelist of Tunisian origin Takoua Ben Mohamed and the Syrian born actress Sara el Debuch, the Italian-somali author Igiaba Scego).

However, it's been some years since social networks became another important part of Muslim life in Italy: there are lots of pages, on Facebook and Instagram, created by Italian Muslims who desire to confront each other's on many thematics, and who are looking for a synthesis between their dual identities of Muslims and Italians, in order to be part of the Nation and maintaining also their Islamic background.

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## Identity and Transnational Connections of Muslim Diaspora Communities in Britain

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*SABAH KHAN*

*JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY*

**Keywords:** Identity, Diaspora, Religion, Transnationalism.

This study is an attempt to comprehend the dynamics of identity and transnationalism among the Muslims in Britain. There are processes of de-traditionalization, trans-ethnicisation among Muslim communities across Europe, towards reformulations of Muslim faith and practice in more universalistic terms. There is emergent a de-ethnicised Islam and an evident shift from ethnic to religious identities, for instance to specifically Islamic identities among younger generations of Muslims. Geopolitical events have served as 'curiosity trigger' for many young Muslims to pursue further knowledge of Islam and thereby make sense of their Muslim identity as a primary identifier (Warren 2018). Muslim identity in Britain can be seen as constructed against the backdrop of negative perceptions about who and what Muslims are (Ansari 2004). Until the 1980s Muslims in Britain were generally categorised on the basis of their ethnic identities. The

1980s witnessed a formalisation of Muslim identity politics in the aftermath of Rushdie Affair. Rushdie Affair marked the beginning of mobilisation of British Muslims which was national in character and managed to unite the various religious trends. The 1990-1991 Gulf War was the next event to mobilise the Muslim community in Britain. Many Muslims opposed the intervention by Allied forces against Iraq. Another significant episode that mobilised Muslims prior to 9/11 was the plight of the Bosnian Muslims, all served to rally together a sense of communal or associational identity. British Muslims have responded to these international conflicts and injustices by producing a more de-territorialized ummatic discourse. It is in this context that the present research aims to explore religious identity for Muslims in diaspora. Furthermore, focus on the relationship between identity and transnationalism.

This research aims to comprehend the concept of Muslim diaspora by studying Muslims in Britain. Scholars of diaspora studies have always been reluctant to accept religious communities as basis of diaspora (Cohen 2008; Vertovec 2004), however, in the recent years there is emergence of the concept of 'de-territorialised diaspora' (Cohen 2008; Werbner 2000).

It is in relation to this notion of de-territorialised diaspora that some scholars (McLoughlin 2013; Moghissi 2006; Sayyid 2010) argue that there can be seen emerging a Muslim diaspora, united by feelings of Islamic co-responsibility. It is here that the notion of ummah is evoked. When we talk about qualifying diaspora as 'Muslim diaspora' or 'Islamic diaspora' it becomes complicated since Muslim communities do not define their common identity by a mythicised territorial origin. However, borrowing from Brubaker (2005) it is more useful to discuss diasporic "stances, projects, claims, idioms, practices and so on", rather than 'a' or 'the' diaspora.

This paper aims to study Muslims of South Asian origin in Britain i.e. Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian Muslims. In the United Kingdom, the South Asian population is larger than that in any other European country, and indeed of any other country in the world except Malaysia (Brown 2006). The three South Asian groups together (Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi) account for 3.6 per cent of the total population and 45 per cent of the ethnic minority population (ibid.). By looking at three ethnic groups of Muslims in London, it tries to comprehend the differences/similarities in the identification process of Muslims in diaspora. In addition to this it tries to grasp the inter as well as intra group dynamics i.e. inter-relations between these communities. How these Muslims of different ethnic background settled in the same geo-political context engage with the notion of ummah. In addition to this, reflect on the notion of a South Asian Muslim diaspora.

Drawing insights from social identity perspective, this study reflects upon the complexities of participants recognising themselves as a collective group. This concept of identity salience can be used to understand the assertion of one's religious identity over other forms of

identity. This study would particularly look at the identity salience for Muslims. For instance how being a Muslim assumes greater importance in the hierarchy of multiple identities that comprise a sense of self. The salience of religious identity can be seen in terms of preserving cultural and ethnic traditions for immigrants or as a way of overcoming social isolation, etc.

The focus is on religious identity particularly how and why it becomes the most salient form of identification. In relation to this, the other questions asked were, when Muslims mobilise politically, do they mobilise as ethnic groups or as a religious group. In other words, how does identification with religion play out in activism and public articulation. Linked to this is the most pertinent question of Muslim ummah. When there is increasing identification as a Muslim by majority of people and mobilization on the basis of religion, then are we witnessing a transcendence from ethnic identity and existence of a Muslim ummah.

The main objective of this research is to study the formation of diasporic identities, particularly, of South Asian Muslim diaspora in Britain. This research adopts a qualitative approach. It includes both primary data obtained through fieldwork and secondary data from books, articles, reports, etc. In order to get a nuanced understanding of complex issues of identity and transnationalism and role of religion. This research employed participant observation along with interviews. British Muslims have mobilised qua Muslims in the political domain (Elshayyal 2018). This further problematises the question under study, whether it is primarily identity politics or are there other basis of increased importance of religious identity. This paper reflects on the dynamics of ethnic and religious identity for Muslims in Britain and the role played by religion in diasporic setting in which the Muslims find themselves.

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# The Impacts of Muscular Liberalism Agenda on the Professional Identity of Muslim Teachers in England

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*MUZAFFER CAN DILEK*  
*UNIVERSITY OF HUDDERSFIELD*

**Keywords:** Teacher professional identity, Muslim, Muscular liberalism, the death of multiculturalism, Prevent, Fundamental British Values.

## **Introduction**

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in teacher professional identity (Alsup, 2005; Day & Gu, 2010; Knowles, 1992; Olsen, 2016) because teacher professional identity has closely associated with professional effectiveness, individual motivation, and retention in teaching (Olsen, 2016). Nevertheless, surprisingly very little is known about Muslim teachers' professional identity, despite the importance of the concept. Research to date has tended to focus on the career progress of Muslim teachers rather than professional identity. More importantly, the question of how public policy discourses impact Muslim teachers' professional identity has not been adequately investigated yet. It is this gap in research that this study, therefore, sets out to address; especially how current social-political discourses surrounding Muslims shape Muslim teachers' identity.

## **Responding to Diversity: The death of Multiculturalism**

The riots of summer 2001 in the northern town of England which has a highly immigrant/Muslim population (Miah, Sanderson, & Thomas, 2020) has made British multiculturalism a target (Kundnani, 2007). Because it is accused of being responsible for promoting social division, damaging national identity, poor economic attainment and educational outcomes of immigrants and more importantly promoting self-segregation (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013). Moreover, multiculturalism has been blamed for the 7 July 2005 London bombings (Modood, 2013) because the bombers were born and grown in England and defined as "homegrown" terrorists (Elton-Chalcraft, Lander, Revell, Warner, & Whitworth, 2017). Following the failure of the state multiculturalism declared by previous prime minister David Cameron at the 47th Munich

Security Conference in Germany on 5 February 2011, British multiculturalism has lost its ground. Cameron indicated the necessity of the 'muscular liberalism' approach towards state multiculturalism:

Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and a much more active, muscular liberalism. A passively tolerant society says to its citizens, as long as you obey the law we will just leave you alone. It stands neutral between different values. But I believe a genuinely liberal country does much more; it believes in certain values and actively promotes them. Freedom of speech, freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, equal rights regardless of race, sex or sexuality

The next step is to adopt a muscular liberal approach, emphasizing the values discourse (Miah, 2017) to reinforce the sense of national belonging among ethnic minorities. Thus, the death of multiculturalism has underpinned muscular liberalism discourse.

### **The Current Discourse: the Rise of Muscular Liberalism**

In line with the above developments, the UK Prevent strategy was published in 2011 to aims to retain people from being terrorists and supporting terrorism. The Prevent, however, is highly problematic (Thomas, 2016) because it has stigmatized and alienated Muslims and turned Muslims into a 'suspected' community (Kundnani, 2009). On the other hand, the Trojan Horse affair in 2014 has significantly altered the way the government approached the issue of identity, belonging and Britishness (Miah, 2017). The Trojan Horse affair is based on unfounded allegations (Clarke, 2014; Kershaw, 2014) which a group of Muslim fundamentalists were affecting the management of the schools in Birmingham (Miah, 2017) but the government immediately took action on this alleged conspiracy. In June 2014, the government proclaimed the new education policy: the promotion of British values (FBV) in schools. Following this, Ofsted revised the inspection requirements in October 2014: schools must prove that 'the promotion of fundamental British values, [is] at the heart of the school's work'. With

the government's publication of a new Counter Terrorism and Security Act (2015), teachers now have a legal responsibility to prevent students from being attracted to terrorism. Teachers must both promote FBV and be vigilant to identify young people at risk of radicalization, both inside and outside of school, that is, this legal requirement is now a new part of the teaching profession (Revell & Bryan, 2016). Consequently, both Prevent Duty and FBV is part of promoting muscular liberalism (Vincent, 2020). In this research, muscular liberalism will be used to characterize the current social-political environment. In this regard, muscular liberalism 'aim[s] to clarify the core values of liberal societies and use coercive state power to protect them from illiberal and putatively dangerous groups' (Triadafilopoulos, 2011, p. 863).

From this point of view, the fundamental objective of this project is to advance the understanding of how muscular liberalism shape Muslim Teachers' professional identity. To achieve this the following aims of the research will be explored:

Evaluate how socio-political debates associated with muscular liberalism inform Muslim teachers.

Critically assess the impacts of Prevent (especially British Values debate) on Muslim teachers.

Assess the impacts of the retreat of multiculturalism within educational policy context on Muslim teacher professional identities.

### **Research Questions**

How do Muslim teachers construct their professional identity within the context of muscular liberalism?

How has the Prevent policy, especially relating to the Fundamental British Values, shaped Muslim teachers' professional identities in England?

How the public debate associated with the retreat of multiculturalism in England impacts Muslim teachers' professional identities?

## Research Methodology and Methods

Considering the research questions focus on the impact of muscular liberal policies on the professional identity of Muslim teachers, this research will be broadly positioned within an interpretive approach. As stated earlier, teachers' professional identity is at the heart of this study. A good understanding of the nature of professional identity depends on the participants' ability to express their feelings and thoughts freely. For these reasons, qualitative methods can be more useful for identifying and characterizing teacher professional identity. (Matthews & Ross, 2014). Therefore, this study will be qualitative. On the other hand, the most common research methods that appear in literature are the life story approach or narrative inquiry and interview. The research data in this study will be drawn from the interview. Using the interview will likely result in more extensive and deeper opinions about the impact of the current social-political environments.

## Conclusion

As a result, the impact of muscular liberalism is often linked to three critical areas of public policy 1) retreat of multiculturalism as a state policy to manage cultural diversity within British society 2) development of Prevent policy especially related to tackling extremism 3) promotion of British Values within schools. These three crucial policy developments have been developed within the broader national and international policy context relating to Islam and Muslims. It is important to note that the impacts of these policy developments on Muslim teachers' professional identity have not been comprehensively addressed by academic researchers. It is this gap in research that this study, therefore, sets out to address; especially how current social-political discourses surrounding Muslims shape Muslim teachers' identity. Therefore, the empirical findings in this study will provide a new understanding of Muslim teachers' identity by examining the impact of muscular liberalism in education policy.

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---

## Participants

---

**Boudelaa Dalal Isra**, Amar Theledji University

**Mur-Hamida Eldani**, Selcuk University

**Mohd Yaseen Gada**, Independent Researcher

**Nourelhoda Hussein**, International Islamic University  
Malaysia (Iium)

**İsmail Noyan**, Simon Fraser University (Canada)

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University of Raden Fatah, Palembang-Indonesia

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Studies University of Indonesia

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**Maria Vyatchina**, Centre For Independent Social Research  
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**Abdul Jabpar Jabpar**, Universitas Islam Negeri (Uin) Sunan  
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