IISS 6 INTERNATIONAL ILEM SUMMER SCHOOL

TRANSNATIONAL ISLAM AND CHALLENGES OF BEING MUSLIM UMMAH

PROGRAM & PROPOSALS
Scientific Studies Association (ILEM) organizes International ILEM Summer Schools to exchange intellectual experience within academicians, researchers, and intellectuals from different geographies worldwide. The International ILEM Summer School (IISS), which addresses major themes and issues of the Islamic World in every year.

The 6th IISS will occur in the Summer of 2019 and its major theme is “Transnational Islam and Challenges of Being Muslim Ummah”. The intellectual and political imagination of classical and contemporary Islamic thought has played an important role in the creation and continuation of the Muslim Ummah, and its complex relationship to the “Other” throughout history. Aiming to make Muslims united, this mission enables the transnational understandings and identities of Islam(s) / Muslim(s) with new projections and also makes it compulsory to produce new policies.

In this summer school, the ideal of being an Ummah, and the challenges faced by this ideal in the light of contemporary developments, will be discussed with special emphases on Theoretical Frameworks, Contemporary Debates and Future Projections.

Researchers around the world will share their ideas and great intellectual experience during this annual event, which will be held on 29 July – 04 August 2019, in Istanbul. IISS would like to thank supporters; Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), Istanbul 29 Mayıs University, Islamic Cooperation Youth Forum (ICYF), Mavera Education and Health Foundation who collectively have worked to organize the program.
ILEM – Scientific Studies Association

Scientific Studies Association was founded in 2002 with a view to train and support scientists and intellectuals who are expected to suggest encompassing solutions for those problems that have been taking place over two centuries. Studies within ILEM are planned with a comparative and multi-dimensional interdisciplinary approach to assist the training of sapient and sagacious scholars who understand zeitgeist and main dynamics of their own civilization. With this regard, one of the main objectives of ILEM is conducting scientific research to suggest solutions for the questions of humanity by laying a ground for training scientists who preserve our tradition of science. ILEM hopes its scientific studies to inspire varied groups in Turkey and abroad.

YTB – Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities

Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) is established as a public institution under the Prime Ministry of Turkey. After its establishment, Turkey’s relations with its citizens living in different parts of the world, as well as with kin communities with whom Turkish people share a common cultural and historic heritage, have been firmly restructured on a more institutional foundation. Of its various responsibilities, the Presidency’s coordination responsibilities include defining strategies to meet the needs of related communities and Turkish citizens living abroad and implementing steps in accordance with the planned strategies.
İstanbul 29 Mayıs University

İstanbul 29 Mayıs University, which was established by the Turkish Religious Foundation (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı - TDV) in 2010, is a private university dedicated to the pursuit of excellence in social studies. The University offers multilingual education and has the highest number of foreign students in Turkey. The University is also strengthened by its collaboration with the ISAM library, which holds one of the most important collections in Turkey for the study of the Middle East and Islam. The University offers undergraduate and graduate programs in three faculties, the Faculty of Arts, the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, and the Faculty of International Islamic and Religious Studies. The University has been awarded with the European Charter of Higher Education (ECHE) in 2014 and is an active participant in the Erasmus exchange program. The University also has the Centre for Training and Research for Arabic Teaching (Arapça Öğretim Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi, ARÖMER), which is the first institution in Turkey designed to provide training for Arabic learning and teaching.

ICYF

Islamic Cooperation Youth Forum (hereinafter referred to as “Forum”) is an international, non-commercial, non-partisan organization uniting leading umbrella youth organizations from the Member-States of the Organization of Islamic-Cooperation (hereinafter referred to as the OIC) as well as international youth organizations, operating in the OIC region and youth organizations representing significant Muslim minorities worldwide. The Forum was established at its Founding General Assembly held in Baku, Azerbaijan on 1 – 3 December 2004. This current Charter and the Host Country Agreement constitute the legal framework for the Forum. The activities of the Forum are stemming from this Charter, relevant decisions of the Forum’s governing bodies and conducted in line with the relevant decisions of the OIC Council of Foreign Ministers and Islamic Conference of Youth and Sports Ministers.

Mavera Education and Health Foundation

Mavera Waqf’s purpose is to raise generations who are sensitive about their country and social problems, are respectful for humanity, have scientific and inquisitive thoughts, develop their faith and cultural background and who can think along with their history and civilization. Mavera Waqf aims to set up clear and transparent substructures which can be used in all aspects of the society by developing beneficial alternatives in the fields of education culture and health.
IISS 6 PROGRAM
### July 29, 2019 Monday

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<tr>
<td>09:30 – 10:30</td>
<td>Register and Cocktail</td>
<td>29 Mayıs University</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:30 – 11:00</td>
<td>Opening Speeches</td>
<td>29 Mayıs University</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00 – 12:30</td>
<td>Keynote Conference - Cemil Aydınlı – A Global History of Muslim Internationalism</td>
<td>29 Mayıs University</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:30 – 14:00</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
<td>29 Mayıs University</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:00 – 16:00</td>
<td>Panel - New Perspectives of Islamic Historical Experiences: Knowledge, Identity and Civilization</td>
<td>29 Mayıs University</td>
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<tr>
<td>16:30 – 18:00</td>
<td>Panel - Intellectual Heritages of Islamic World to the Humanity</td>
<td>29 Mayıs University</td>
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### July 30, 2019 Tuesday

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09:30 – 11:00</td>
<td>Lecture I – Ovamir Anjum - The Ummah and the Caliphate: History and Future</td>
<td>ILEM</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00 – 11:20</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:20 – 12:40</td>
<td>Lecture I – Ovamir Anjum - The Ummah and the Caliphate: History and Future</td>
<td>ILEM</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:40 – 14:00</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:00 – 17:00</td>
<td>Workshop I -Conference Hall</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:00 – 17:00</td>
<td>Workshop II - Grand Hall</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:00 – 17:00</td>
<td>Workshop III - Terrace Hall</td>
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## July 31, 2019 Wednesday

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<tr>
<td>12:40 – 14:00</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:00 – 15:30</td>
<td>Lecture II – Juliane Hammer – Islam, Muslims, and Anti-Muslim Hostility: Theoretical and Historical Considerations</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:50 – 17:00</td>
<td>Lecture II – Juliane Hammer – (American) Muslim Responses to Anti-Muslim Hostility: An Intersectional Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>17:30 – 19:00</td>
<td>IISS Talks – İsmail Kara – The Concept of “Millet” in the Islamic World; History and Transformation</td>
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## August 1, 2019 Thursday

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<tr>
<td>09:30 – 11:00</td>
<td>Lecture III – İsmail Yaylaci – Rethinking Umma in World Politics’</td>
<td>ILEM</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00 – 11:20</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
<td>ILEM</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:20 – 12:40</td>
<td>Lecture III – İsmail Yaylaci – Rethinking Umma in World Politics’</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:40 – 14:00</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:00 – 19:00</td>
<td>Social Program II - Bosphorus Tour</td>
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## August 3, 2019 Friday

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<tr>
<td>09:30 – 11:00</td>
<td>Lecture IV – Abdullah al-Ahsan - The Concept of Ummah, Its Development in History and in Practice by Examining in the International Politics</td>
<td>ILEM</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00 – 11:20</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
<td>ILEM</td>
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<td>11:20 – 12:40</td>
<td>Lecture IV – Abdullah al-Ahsan - The Concept of Ummah, Its Development in History and in Practice by Examining in the International Politics</td>
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<td>12:40 – 14:00</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
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<td>14:00 – 15:30</td>
<td>IISS Talks – Heba Raouf Ezzat – The City and Civility: Dilemmas of Urmaran from Khaldunian Perspective’</td>
<td>ILEM</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:50 – 17:00</td>
<td>IISS Talks – Bilal Kuşpinar – Intellectual Aspects of Sufism in Modern World</td>
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### August 2, 2019 Saturday

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<td>Lecture IV – Abdullah al-Ahsan - The Concept of Ummah, Its Development in History and in Practice by Examining in the International Politics</td>
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<td>11:00 – 11:20</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
<td>ILEM</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:20 – 12:40</td>
<td>Lecture IV – Abdullah al-Ahsan - The Concept of Ummah, Its Development in History and in Practice by Examining in the International Politics</td>
<td>ILEM</td>
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<td>12:40 – 14:00</td>
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<td>14:00 – 17:00</td>
<td>Workshop IV - Conference Hall</td>
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<td>14:00 – 17:00</td>
<td>Workshop V - Grand Hall</td>
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<td>14:00 – 17:00</td>
<td>Workshop VI - Terrace Hall</td>
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<tr>
<td>17:30 – 19:00</td>
<td>IISS Talks – Mesut Idriz – The Role of Islamic Civilization between Past, Present and Future: A Critical Approach and Challenges Ahead</td>
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### August 4, 2019 Sunday

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<td>IISS Talks – Dzenata Karic – Saving the Ummah through Pilgrimage: Premodern and Modern Perspectives on Hajj</td>
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<td>IISS Talks – Nurullah Ardiç - The Rise of Secularism and Demise of the Caliphate in post-War Turkey (1918-1924)</td>
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<td>Workshop VII - Conference Hall</td>
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<td>14:00 – 17:00</td>
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<td>14:00 – 17:00</td>
<td>Workshop IX - Terrace Hall</td>
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<tr>
<td>17:30 - 19:00</td>
<td>Closing Session</td>
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</table>
**Cemil Aydın**

*Keynote Speaker*

University of North Carolina

Cemil Aydın is a Professor of History at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill. He studied at Boğaziçi University, then he completed his MA in both Istanbul University, and the University of Tokyo. He gained his PhD from Harvard University in 2002 in the fields of history and Middle Eastern studies. He was an Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, and a post-doctoral fellow at Princeton University’s Department of Near Eastern Studies. His research interests are global intellectual history and international history, with a focus on Asia and the Middle East.

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**İhsan Fazlioğlu**

*Panelist*

Medeniyet University

İhsan Fazlioglu is a professor at the Medeniyet University in the department of Philosophy. He completed a Master in the field of History of Science at the Istanbul University. He obtained his Ph.D. in the department of Philosophy at Istanbul University. His research interests are Islamic philosophy, history of science, philosophy of science, Science and mathematics, classic logic, and modern sciences.

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**Selim Argun**

*Panelist*

Presidency of Religious Affairs

Selim Argun is the General Director of Foreign Relations of the Presidency of Religious Affairs and the Vice President of Religious Affairs in Turkey. He received his master’s degree from the University of Johannesburg. He received his PhD from McGill University in the Institute of Islamic Sciences. After returning Turkey, he was appointed as an assistant professor in the Department of Islamic History and Arts in Istanbul University Faculty of Theology. His research interests are: Islamic History, Theology, Contemporary Islamic Thought, Education system in Ottoman History.

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**Muhammed Haron**

*Panelist*

University of Botswana

Muhammed Haron is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at the University of Botswana. He completed a master’s in social sciences and religious studies at the University of Cape Town. He obtained his Ph.D. in the Department of Politics and International Studies at Rhodes University. His research interests are philosophy of religion, sociology of religion, religion and politics, religion and development and world religions.
<table>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>University/Department</th>
<th>Details</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ovamir Anjum</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>University of Toledo</td>
<td>Ovamir Anjum is Imam Khattab Endowed Chair of Islamic Studies at the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Toledo. He completed a master’s in social sciences from the University of Chicago and a master’s in computer science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He obtained his Ph.D. in Islamic intellectual history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His work focuses on the nexus of theology, ethics, politics and law in classical and medieval Islam, with comparative interest in Western Thought.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juliane Hammer</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>University of North Carolina</td>
<td>Juliane Hammer is an associate professor of religious studies and Keman Rifai Scholar of Islamic Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She completed a Masters in Islamic studies from the Humboldt University. She also obtained her Ph.D. in Islamic studies at the Humboldt University. She specializes in the study of gender and sexuality in Muslim societies and communities, race and gender in US Muslim communities, as well as contemporary Muslim thought, activism, and practice, and Sufism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>İsmail Kara</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Marmara University</td>
<td>Ismail Kara is a professor at the Marmara University in the department of Theology. He completed bachelor’s in history and a Masters from the Istanbul University. He obtained his Ph.D. in political science at the Istanbul University. His research interests are Islamism in post-Ottoman and Modern Turkey, religion and modernity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İsmail Yaylacı</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>Istanbul Şehir University</td>
<td>İsmail Yaylacı is an assistant professor at the Istanbul Şehir University in the department of political science and international relations. He completed a master’s in political sciences and International relations at Boğaziçi University. He received his PhD from University of Minnesota Social Sciences Institute Political Science in 2014. His research interests are international relations theory, critical social and political theory, Islamism, and Middle Eastern politics.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abdullah al-Ahsan is a Muslim academic and professor of Comparative History in the Department of History and Civilization, at the International Islamic University Malaysia. He completed his BA and MA in Pakistan from University of Punjab and Quaid-i-Azam University in General Studies and History, respectively. He continued his studies at McGill University, Montreal, Canada, doing a Masters in Islamic Studies, and finally gained his Ph.D in History from the University of Michigan. His research interests are the relationship between contemporary Islamic and Western civilizations with specific focus on education, politics, science and good governance.

Heba Raouf Ezzat is an assistant professor at Ibn Haldun University in the department of Political Sciences and International relations. She completed her Master and Ph.D. in Political Theory at Cairo University in 2007; and continue working on comparative political theory, changing maps of citizenship and urban sociology. In May 2017, she joined Department of Political Science and International Relations at Ibn Haldun University. Her research interests are Trans-local and Cyber -Islam, The Changing Maps of Citizenship, Women and Social Change, Globalization, Democracy, Urban Sociology and Urban Politics.

Professor Bilal Kuspinar is Chair of the Department of Philosophy and Director of the International Rumi Centre for the Study of Civilization at the Necmettin Erbakan University. He completed a master’s in theology from the Middle East Technical University and he gained his Ph.D. in philosophy at the McGill University. His research interests are Islamic Philosophy, mysticism and Islamic Theology.
**Mesut Idriz**  
*University of Sharjah*  
*Speaker*

Mesut Idriz is a professor at the University of Sharjah in the department of History and Islamic Civilization. He completed a Masters in Islamic Studies from the International Islamic University Malaysia. He gained his Ph.D. in Islamic Studies at the International Islamic University Malaysia. His research interests are: Comparative History of Civilizations, Law and Ethics; Euro-Asian History, Muslim History & Historiography, History of Islamic Arts and History of Islamic Civilization.

**Dzenata Karic**  
*University of Tübingen*  
*Speaker*

Dzenita Karic is currently teaching at the University of Tübingen in Germany. She received her PhD from SOAS, University of London and she worked as a researcher at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo. Her research focuses on transformations of religious discourse in Ottoman and post-Ottoman Bosnia, with a particular emphasis on changes in conceptualizations of Hajj.

**Nurullah Ardic**  
*Istanbul Sehir University*  
*Speaker*

Nurullah Ardic is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at Istanbul Sehir University. He received his BA and MA from Boğaziçi University, and MA and a PhD from the UCLA in Sociology. He participated in the foundation of Istanbul Şehir University. His areas of interest include Historical Sociology, Religion and Politics in the Middle East, Ottoman-Turkish Modernization, Social Theory, Globalization, Historical-Comparative Methods, and Discourse Analysis.
Worksop I

30 July 2019 – Tuesday / 14:00 – 17:00
Conference Hall

Chair: Öğuzhan Göksel

Zahid Jalaly
Raji al-Farooqi’s Notion of Ummah and the Challenges of its Reconciliation with the Nation State System

Mohsen Amin
Shii Clerics: Between Nationality and Trans-Nationality the Study of Confronting Iranian Shii Leaders with Two Concepts of Nationality and Trans-Nationality in the Era of the Islamic Republic

Kinga Magdalena Surygala
Modern Muslim Political Thought: Between Ummah and Muslim State

Emrin Çebi
The Idea of Millet: A Comparison between National Islamism and Ummatist Islamism

Sharifah Hajar Syed Ahmad
Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas’ Vision for the Ummah: A Preliminary Analysis on the Preconditions of the Emergence of an Educational Movement
In October 1648, more than 179 diplomats from all Europe gathered in Westphalia to end decades of religious wars leading to chaos and disorder in the continent.[i] Since Europe suffered due to these wars, slogan of “peace for Europe” was raised.[ii] Following months of negotiations, the participants agreed to sign a treaty, which, in terms of Leo Gross, “marks the end of an epoch and the opening of another”. [iii]

Scholars of international relations agree that the Treaty of Westphalia is the cornerstone of the current international order [iv] which is based on sovereignty and nation-state system.[v] Among other principles invented as result of the said agreement was the limitations imposed by religion and clergy.[vi] One can say that the Treaty declined the power of religion in politics.[vii] This order was implemented in Europe for centuries and after the era of colonialism, it spread into other parts of the world as well.[viii]

In 19th century, European powers were competing in colonization of the Muslim lands,[ix] so in the mid-20th century, almost 90% of the Muslim lands were under colonial domination.[x] The colonial dominance continued for a long time. During this period, Muslims were familiarized with new laws and civilizations. Islamic legal system was replaced with secular legal system in some of the countries. overall, Islamic political system was challenged.

The collapse of Ottoman empire, the last empire representing Islamic world order, facilitated infiltration of the Westphalian nation-state system into the Muslim world,
especially through establishment of the United Nations Organization (UNO). The de-colonization left Muslim lands divided into different countries with artificial borders [xi] based on wishes and politics of colonial powers to promote Westphalian world order. However, this development confused the Muslim mind.

This Nation State System, in which allegiance is to the state and not religion, raised questions in the Muslim discourse. The fundamental difference between Islamic World Order and modern Secular World Order, i.e. the Nation State System lays in the Islamic world order, the allegiance must be to Allah, while in the modern nation-state system, the focus, primacy and value is given instead to “national interests” of the state. These notions were alien to and against Islamic thought and tenet. Islam from the very first day stood firmly against the prevailing system of asabiyah, which is the unconditional loyalty to the clan.[xii] The idea of asabiyah is similar to that of loyalty to modern nation-state in any condition.[xiii]

Some scholars, in order to present a solution that addresses needs of the time, tried to reconcile the modern nation-state system with Islamic notion of ummah. [xiv] Also, some orientalists perceived the post-colonial developments in the Muslim world as integration of Muslim world order with Westphalian. Majid Khadduri, for instance, states that the entry and membership of Muslims countries in the UNO is “revolutionary change in the concept of Islamic law of nations”[xv] and hence Islam has changed its political philosophy.[xvi]

Khadduri states:

Twentieth-century Islam has reconciled itself completely to Western secular concepts and most Muslim countries have become members of various international organizations, the United Nations and its agencies in particular [...] based on political and economic considerations rather than on religious or historical connections.[xvii]

However, it would be very naïve to draw that the post-colonial stand of some Muslims countries as Islam’s stand and hence change in the political values and philosophy of Islam. In fact, the challenge of reconciling Islamic notions with that of modern world order are still not solved. Palestinian-American philosopher, Dr. Ismail Raji al-Faruqi is one of the scholars who wrote about this topic and has a completely different view.

Dr. al-Faruqi in his works, especially al-Tawhid: Its Implications for Thought and Life, and a paper titled Islam: Movement for World Order discusses the concept of ummah in detail. Faruqi has completely opposite view of those who are trying to reconcile Islamic world order with Westphalian. He believes that modern stand of Muslim countries could not represent Islam’s worldview and thus Islam’s reconciliation with the Nation-State System. Al-Faruqi uses the term ummah in a wider sense than that of the general perception of the term. Ummah, for him is “a community, a state and a world-order.”[xviii] This paper deals with his views and its implications in detail.

**Structure of the Paper**

This paper, studies in detail and scrutinizes the views of al-Faruqi about ummah and its relations with modern nation-state. At the beginning, it presents roots of the modern Nation-State System and its nature and then looks into the nature and definition of ummah, which is generally not philosophically studied. Then the attempt of modern scholars to reconcile it with the modern world order is studied. Finally, views of Dr. al-Faruqi about the ummah and his unique understand are discussed and elaborated.

**Methodology**

This paper follows the qualitative method of research and is a descriptive, analytical and critical review of the works of scholars working on the concept of ummah and the Nation State System.

**Aims of Research**

Comparing the Nation-State system with Islamic notion of ummah.

Challenges and difficulties in the works of those who tried to reconcile ummah with the nation state.
Identifying Raji al-Faruqi’s understanding of ummah.

Scrutinizing the implications of al-Faruqi’s notion of ummah for the Muslim world.

**Research Questions**

What are the origins of nation-state system?

How does the nation-state system contradict the basic principles of ummah?

How does Dr. Raji al-Faruqi perceive ummah and refute the opinion of those that believe in fusion of the Islamic and Western world orders?

What are the key implications of Faruqi’s views for the political system of the Muslim world today?

**References**


[iv] Ibid.


[vi] Castle, The Peace of Westphalia and The New World Order.


[viii] Ibid.


[x] Ibid.


[xiii] Ibid.


Iranian society had strong relations with religion throughout history. This position, of course, has been promoted in this country after the incorporation of the Safavids and the recognition of Shii as the official religion. Also, this position has become so valuable that the shii faith has become one of the main stem and vital organs of Iranian culture. This situation, especially after the victory of the Islamic revolution in 1979, led by the Shii clerics and the achievement of shii clerics as a political power and a rule based on Velayate-Faqih theory, the possibility of greater participation in the field of policy making for the expansion and description of shii principles. The fact that laws today regulate the government of Iran largely on Al-Jafari jurisprudence.

The authority of Olama and Marjaeyah has long been the pivot of the social life of Iranians, and during the absence of innocent Imam (according to the opinion of the majority of the shii) is responsible to undertake the work of “Ijtihaad” for cultural and social trusteeship of Shii society. The institute that opines with centrality of jurisprudence in societal subjects. In a way that this institute should know about the new social changes first and should concentrate on how to deal with the entire shii community in regard to conditions, based on jurisprudence at the second. In this respect, the role of clerics authority is highly valued such as a religious mechanism in interpretation and sense of phenomena and necessities. The institution(Marjaeyah) that has made big decisions during the history of Shii has made many acts and reactions in issues like war and military defense, boycott of goods, political demonstrations and cases such as in history, makes it clear the position of these religious leaders.
One of the most important issues for Muslims is determining the phenomenon and meaning of nationality. Due to their religious beliefs, they all constitute an “Islamic Ummah”, and essentially the borders of lands for them are a new and unknown phenomenon. But this phenomenon, like many other issues imported from the West, carries reactions ranging from full acceptance to complete rejection. What is considered a new and unprecedented issue for the Shii society is the issue of “Nationality” which is generally rooted in the first moves of the constitutional revolution in Iran and striving to pursue the entry of the concept of nationality from that time onward to Iranian scholars, either religious or secular.

Being an Iranian and land belonging, because of the history of ancient civilizations among Iranians (Civilized Iran) is a precendency record, but the emergence of the new meaning of nationality and national borders are the result of modern history as well as modern developments. The developments that came from the definition of ethnicity to nationality were the founder of new divisions for the world. A new configuration based on national formal borders, which naturally led to the restructuring of national laws and regulations, adopting national sovereignty and etc. This Western modern history causes some new concepts, including: Nation-State, National Identity, and National Interest. Naturally, this new situation has faced problems and challenges, including: fighting on borders, independence and ethnic separatism, immigration crises, and etc. The Iranians also experienced a special historical course in the western Asia region because of geographical, religious and political conditions. One of the most important aspects of this experience is the confrontation of the Shii clerics with the concept of nationality. A group of religious leaders who have been tending to an important and global mandate of Islam and has been got an allergy to the formation of the concept of nationality, being Iranian and homeland. The concept of nationality which is now common to many people nowadays is more common and less scientific, whereas the nationality and understanding of the clerics as one of the pillars of Iranian culture and society can fathom challenges of the Iranian society from the constitutional revolution to date.

The authority of the Shii clergies has a great influence in Iranian society. Submitting a new interpretation of the new issues of the followers, in the form of fatwas, speeches, and writing of books and correspondence, or any other way of communications, are examples of their presence in the heart of Iranian society and leadership of followers. Therefore, studying the positions of this group over history can be largely on the two paths between the unlimited concept of Islam on the one hand and the limitation of nationality on the other hand, as the central core of this study.

In this paper we try to study the interpretations of this religious leaders in relation to the concept and phenomenon of Iranian nationality and trans-nationality. Therefore, we focus only on the history of the Islamic Republic, and merely examine the confrontations of Shii leaders in Iran over the last 40 years regarding the concept of nationality and trans-nationality. So, in this article, we are referring only to Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Motahari, and Ayatollah Khamenei. There is an important and influential period in relation between the Shii and nationality, which has been got double importance for the existence of political sovereignty. In this study, we analyze all the reactions and interpretations of those threes among their published works, in relation to concepts such as nationality, homeland, Iran and Iranian.

Finally, the main question of this study is organized as follows: “What is the interpretation of Iranian Shii leaders from the concept of Nationality and homeland in the Era of the Islamic Republic?” And two sub-questions are: “What are the major changes in these interpretations after the Islamic Revolution?”, And “what does other nationalities, such as being Iraqi, mean for these leaders and how do they interpret it?”

We hope that this will be an important step in identifying the contemporary Iranian society. Especially by shedding light on the mysterious part of the history of the phenomenon and the influential concept (Nationality) and how it is interpreted by the religious leaders, who call for
the universal message of their religion (Shii Islam). They often recognize nationalism as a natural phenomenon, but they speak of the Qur’anic concept of the nation, which transcends international borders and includes all Muslims, despite cultural and geographical differences in pre-modernity form known as “Ummah”.

Therefore, we use the descriptive analysis approach to analyse existing information, like: books, messages and lectures, as well as the attitudes and decisions that have been taken in relation to the concepts associated with Iran, the homeland, the nationality and so-called Shii or Islamic world in return. As the article does not apply a particular theory, this approach is assisted by the qualitative approach (Grounded Theory) that is used to obtain the theories or visionary models from the analysis of data directly and thus to the study of the subject mentioned above. Finally, we would like to make a theoretical or semi-theoretical conclusion of the visions of Shii leaders in the Era of Islamic republic in Iran on the problem described above.

References


+All speeches and published ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Motahari, and Ayatollah Khamene.
The Idea of the State as Ummah

One of the fundamental postulates within the framework of political Islam would be the creation of a Muslim State. However, there is a lack of consensus among Muslims, how such a state would look like and how it would be managed, which is exemplified by the history of contemporary creation of such states as Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. The genesis of their creation dates back to the twentieth century, and the current shape and solutions adopted in them reveal many differences in the understanding of what the Muslim state would be.

The state in Islam, throughout history, has developed as an Ummah. Its basis and the model were the Muslim community in Medina. At its head steel Righteous Caliphs. The Caliph as the deputy of the Prophet on Earth was to protect the unity of the Muslim community and act to spread the message of Islam. It is striking that the history of the election of the four righteous caliphs shows the problem of determining the nature of power in a Muslim state today. It is worth remembering that all four were chosen in a different way. Abu Bakr was elected by the leaders of the groups of refugees (Muhajirin) from Mecca and the Helpers (Ansar) from Medina, and on his deathbed, he personally pointed to ‘Umar as his successor. This decision was then adopted by the Muslim community. Before his death, Umar appointed an electoral body composed of six eminent Companions of the Prophet and entrusted them with the choice of a successor from among themselves. And they chose ‘Usman, who was later recognized by the community as the rightful successor of ‘Umar’. After ‘Usman’s death on the caliph, ‘Ali (Asad, 2007) was chosen by gathering the Prophet in the Mosque, and most of the Muslim Commu-
nity vowed to obey him.

Global Ummah and the Role of Religion: About the Recurring Discourse of the Muslim State

After the Second World War, the idea of creating the Muslim States was once again brought back to the debates. The reasons for this were, among others: unsuccessful nationalist projects, growing state bureaucracy, economic imbalance, a preferential system, giving privileges and high wages to the limited groups of influence, single-party states, and regimes. Abdulkader Tayob (2009) points out that the Muslim state appears as a solution, a mobilizing potential, but also as an expression of cultural identity.

According to Tayob (2009), the Muslim state should be a representation of religion. It contains very important information about the symbolism of the state, which is to represent the specific meaning and understanding of Islam, which prevails among the followers of a given group. The identity role of the state, defining citizens as Muslims, seems to be more specific than the unspecified ideas for the functioning of the system of power and state institutions.

Secular State?

‘Ali ‘Abd ar-Raziq, considered as the creator of Arab secularism, played an important role not only for secular thought but also for the idea of the Muslim state because this book was to be a source of counter-argumentation for the supporters of the state based on the religion system.

The proposal of Ar-Raziq (Tayob, 2009) is based on the fact that Islam is only a religion and does not constitute any foundation for the state. In the Koran and Sunnah, there is no significant argument for a religious government, and the Prophet himself did not teach about the type of government required by Islam. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish clearly the religious and political role of the Prophet. Ar-Raziq recognizes the role of the Prophet as a messenger of the mission, stressing on that the Koran itself says that it has no authority and does not influence whether it will be accepted. Thus, Ar-Raziq believed that the political aspect of the Prophet’s actions was aimed at strengthening the religious mission. Muhammad’s successors could only refer to his political functions (because he was the seal of the Prophets).

Rida’s Utopian Vision

The idea of Muhammad Rashid Rida’s vision (Tayob, 2009): the government as a representative of the Ummah. The authority was to be exercised by a caliph who would enforce the law and implement the will of the Ummah. It would make a distinction between DIN, or what is constant, and SHAR, what variables. The state would exist not only as a means for Islam, but also as a symbol of the idea of understanding Islam, and the ummah as a media of identity. Islam would be progressive because it contains both fixed and open values.

The problem of vision: one of the fundamental weaknesses of various concepts of the Muslim state is their either often utopian or not very precise character. Tayob (2009, p.113) says: “Rida presented a symbolic state that would embody their (Muslim scientists) aspirations and values without tying them up to any specific form or content”.

Mawdudi and the Key Role of Divine Sovereignty

The idea of tawhid destroys submission of one man to another because, according to the assumption of this principle, we are all submissive to God, remaining equal to each other (otherwise we attribute ourselves to a divine position), hence the key role to

Abdul Ala Al-Maududi (Brown, 2001) (remains the divine sovereignty (hakimijat Allah) - which leads to deification of the state (Al-Maududi rejected the name theocracy because there is no official clergy in Islam) and rejection of the Muslim state as an example of the kufr (infidelity) - because in this way we reject the principle of tauhid, essential to all of Islam.

Muhammad al-Ghazali and the Issue of Identity

Al-Ghazali recognized that religiosity (tadayyun) determines identity, and the state is a reflection of the full
identity of the whole society, in the form of the Muslim Ummah. The state exists as a SYMBOL of beliefs, those who live in it. Definition of the Muslim state: Its central role is to sanctify (takdis) religious emotion and respect God’s laws and making the divine word universal (Tayob, 2009).

METHODS

The transnational character of Islam.

Transnational Islamism is not a new phenomenon, regardless of the nature of the group. It plays a very important role due to the strong position of the violent groups, which by their actions strongly penetrate the media and public opinion, even though jihadists as one of the types of transnational groups, constitute only a small part of Islamist groups.

It is essential to divide the world according to the principle of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb. However, there are attempts at a more gentle attitude, such as the Egyptian “new Islamists” who propose coexistence in Dar al-Ahad. One of the important elements shaping the activities of groups with a radical coloration will be an additional division into the “near” and “distant” enemy. Regimes in the Middle East countries will be understood as the close enemy. What is more, people who do not think like them, which is visible in the activities of the Islamic State.

On the other hand, the distant enemy, in simplification, will be recognized as the broadly understood West, especially the USA. The global offensive aims to stop western interference and expel it from every sphere of the Islamic world. Transnational groups present the whole spectrum of activities, but it should be remembered that they do not only include military operations and radical actions.

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Within the subject of this study, two forms of Islamisms as national (millî) and ummatic have been focused. I have observed that the main clash between national Islamists and ummatist Islamists came out as a result of the conversion of the “national” (millî) attitude to “nationalism” (milliyetçilik). Upon this point I have examined the content of specific periodicals concerning these two attitudes within their consideration to Turkey and to the Muslim world.

The journal Yeniden Millî Mücadele published between 1970-1980 was one of the periodicals chosen for this study. I have considered the journal Yeniden Millî Mücadele (National Struggle Again) as representative of national Islamism. The three periodicals Şûra, Tevhid and Hicret, which were published as a continuation of each other, have been considered as representative of umma-

tist Islamism.

Yeniden Millî Mücadele, which had declared its aim as establishing an “ideology of millet”, had approached the concept of millet with its representation of entirety of the population in Turkey. The journal tackled the issue of millet with these ideals rather than incorporating etymological explanations of the word based on my analysis of the publications in the first year. The journal exhibited strong considerations of the social, economic and cultural issues and problems of all the people in Turkey and often made a call for solutions for the entire nation. It was not exclusionary in this sense. This indicates that all the people within the borders of Turkey were considered and included in the idea of millet. This was important indicator to consider this attitude as “national”. Yeniden Millî Mücadele believed Turkey has not been liberated
nationally in real sense and therefore the journal focused on this belief and a national salvation process as the core aim. According to the journal's ideal, Turkey's nationalization—in other words liberation—was the first step in the process of its salvation hierarchy of the Muslim ummah in general. This hierarchy was idealized upon the idea that the struggle for power and the political condition in the world would not allow for Islam to be a system of ordering in the state as yet. To compensate for this reality whilst developing their ideology, the national state (millî devlet) was determined as the first target to accomplish in the process of realizing an Islamic state.

Şûra, Tevhid and Hicret as the representatives of the new ummatist Islamist thinking in this study, concentrated on the literal meaning of millet with the aim to challenge the restrictions of the new identity of the modern nation statehood. These three identified millet on the basis of common belief rather than language or ethnicity. Their understanding of millet can be considered as an effort to overcome the obstacles and the problems that the modern period created for the Muslim states. These newspapers believed that the replacement of millet with the phenomenon of citizenship is the main reason for the problems in the Muslim world because the concept of citizenship was built on certain limitations and on loyalty to an ethnic, and secular national boundaries. According to this new thinking, millet was an entity built on the unity of belief rather than blood or language unity in the Islamic community and therefore it is a broader concept in terms of inclusivity. Furthermore, in this ideal of millet, the manifestation of citizenship has been declared as the religion. These thoughts, developed through vigorous and robust discussions, were also supported by interpretations given to international developments. In the years that these three newspapers were published, the effects of mobilizations notably in Pakistan, Iran, Egypt and the Muslim World, also reached to the agenda of the new Islamist thinking in Turkey. These efforts can be considered as the pursuits of the young masses for new solutions since no solution could be found for the increasing dilemmas in internal politics. Therefore this new Islamist attitude focused on the literal meanings of “nation” (millet) and “nationalism” (milliyetçilik) compared to Yeniden Millî Mücadele to shake the existing perception of millet in the Turkish public.

Ultimately, the most important point that fed the main clashes and discussions between these two Islamisms was the determination of a center, whether it is a nation-state or ummah. The reflection of priorities was in the form of determining the center in these periodicals. While Yeniden Millî Mücadele had adjudged Turkey as the centre for emancipation, the other three periodicals had determined the ummah as the center in their salvation ideal. Significantly, a common effort of these two different tendencies of Islamism was the pursuit of solutions to the problems that, according to them, came out as a result of ambiguity of definition of citizenship in the modern nation state era. This was pursued through building ideas of millet.

The comparison between two attitudes from their understanding of millet is important to understand deeper about the characteristics of these two Islamisms, and their process of differentiation to be able to follow the journey of Islamism as a whole. It is also important to see what kinds of Islamisms came out within the course of time what influenced the variety of Islamisms. It is also important to understand their intellectual sources, their way of adaption or rejection the ideas of the time according to their point of view, what different Islamisms perception of people, nation and state were. How they dealt with concepts, which changed in the meaning according to the world changing conditions. It is also important to understand that how all these attitudes affected each other, what their main argument was, what the ideas they offered for the nation state problems.

Dilemma of nation-state continues even today from the collapse of the Ottoman state, birth of Pakistan Islamic state and Bangladesh’s disassociation as another Muslim nation state. Today many Muslim majority countries are torn apart like Syria, Iraq, Yemen and so on without completing the nationalization process. Besides all, many Muslim majority countries are still dealing with the minority issues in their territories whilst many Muslim com-
Communities exist as minorities for years, evacuated from their lands and they are not recognised as being consistent with the national identity of the hosting countries. Today almost 4 million Syrians are living in the territories of Turkey, and many Syrian youth are involved in national education system for sure they are willing to be part of their new fatherland. They are trying to build a future for themselves by aspiring to a Turkish identity of Syrian origin, within these territories. Comparing the ideas of different Islamisms within the periodicals is significant in terms of observing the evolvement approaches to the concept of millet and other supportive concepts such as milliyetçilik, vatan, devlet and ümmet.

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The state of the world in terms of social marginalization faced by rejected war-bound refugees in the West today presents us with challenges that questions the deep implications of any possibility of unity within a nation-state. The immediate sense of unity in the current modern state-structure are highly dependent upon the concept of nationalism. Hence, the rejection of a national unity faced by these refugees deprived them of their rights to claim an identity of their own. However, does the notion of identity and unity really resides in a national exterior? Without going too far into the discussion of political history and thought, let us answer this question in light of the understanding the concept of identity and one’s natural inclination to search for principles that could unite common individuals before delving into the discussion of transnationalism.

We have experienced this albeit in a micro scale when individuals gather themselves over a common purpose, they would naturally develop a sense of belonging to a community that are similar to that purpose. However, the true basis of unity that considers all dimensions be it physical, spiritual and intellectual aspects must be ‘known’. The role of knowing here is to develop one’s understanding and cognitive conviction that are strong enough to act as the framework to dismiss what is pseudo and arrive to the truth. The knowledge that we are referring to is the knowledge of the purpose which brings individuals together both spiritually and intellectually. Having said that, in relation to the concept of Ummah as brotherhood in Islam, it was introduced based on individual acceptance of the faith. This relation between individuals which are termed as brotherhood is a new concept such that the ‘blood’ ties that tied them were
not based on actual blood, but instead on common belief and willing acceptance of truth as revealed to them.

The beginning of our Ummah properly is when we took an entirely different identity; i.e. it occurred during the first Hijra occurred during the time when the Prophet moved from Mecca to find a purposely built city (madīnah) based on din. [vi] The Ummatic identity of new relation bonded by common truth took place during this event and not to most people’s belief to be during the time of the Prophet receiving Revelation.[vii] This explains why the calendar of Islam begins on the day of Hijra to mark the beginning of a change, a change of worldview among the people. This worldview as explicated by al-Attas provided a framework that shapes their vision of reality that appears before the mind’s eye revealing what existence is all about. [viii]

However, for some, Islam is seen to bring about a vision of reality that is only meant to aid political resurgence of the Islamic reformation.[ix] These instruments of change provided by Islamic movements are for them, all considered as mainly for the purpose of an establishment of the Islamic State. The discussions regarding Islamic Reformations[x] has always been concerning ways of restoring order in our communities through establishing authority and reforming the system. But while undergoing this process, the reformers detached themselves from the equation. [xi] The role of the ‘reformer’ as an individual in this process is conveniently excused from any personal responsibility. Hence, what then do we do if we are in a state where leadership roles and the whole body of knowledge is alienated from its rightful place? This dilemma we constantly find ourselves in is the situation of which Islam demands us to act upon, and that is, to preserve both order and integrity of knowledge in ourselves. Al-Attas illustrated this predicament as a vicious cycle such that the condition where confusion of knowledge that are widespread will lead to the inability to place or recognize true authority for leadership of which these false leaders will create a systemic disorder, corruption and injustice. The outcome is what he called the loss of adab in one’s self.[xii]

Further on, Al-Attas stated that the integral components of adab is both knowledge and action where the discipline of order took place.[xiii] The lack of concern over the refinement of adab in one’s lives may skewed the vision of reality into a movement that gears into merely of social reform. This leads to an over emphasis and exaggeration of the Khaldunian framework of the stages of social reformation through the concepts of ‘asabiyya (group feeling) and khilafa (caliphate) by most Muslim reformists in the 70s. This was highlighted by al-Attas in the proceeding of the 1977 1st World Conference on Muslim Education in Mecca answering the call for solution to the Muslim predicament at the time.

"...they preoccupied themselves instead with sociology and politics, and aspects of jurisprudence that bear upon these subjects. Their experience of the decline of Muslim rule and the disintegration of Muslim empires made them take notice of Ibn Khaldun and they concentrated their efforts on the concept of Ummah and of the state in Islam. They naturally neglected to lay as much stress on the concept of the individual and the role the individual plays in realizing and establishing the Ummah and the Islamic state. Now it is true that the Ummah and the Islamic state are paramount in Islam, but so is the individual Muslim. For how can the Ummah and the Islamic state be developed and established if individually Muslims have become confused and ignorant about Islam and its world-view and are no longer good Muslims? When they say that the decline of the Muslims was caused by corrupt leadership, their identification of cause with corrupt leadership is not quite correct. If we ask ourselves what it is that is corrupt about their leadership, we will recognize at once that it is their knowledge that is corrupt, which renders their leadership corrupt. Corrupt leadership is the effect, and not the cause; and it is the effect of confusion and error in the knowledge of Islam and its world-view.”[xiv]

Hence al-Attas’ vision of the Ummah can be inferred as to establish the individual role in realizing that common purpose in Islam, and that the internal unity of ideas and mind are the one that brings meaning beyond nation-
The unity in the ideas and mind is when recognition and acknowledgement of proper places of things are realized, to this al-Attas called as adab. [xvi] Education, (ta'dib) however, is the absorption of adab in the self. Therefore, the initiative brought out of this should be called the educational movement.

The aim of this paper is to seek to clarify the criteria that preserves order and integrity in ourselves as a preconditions of the educational movement to take place. To do this, we must first identify the type of order that we seek and the role of integrity in Islam. Secondly is to define the concept of Ummah in relation to insān and their positions in reality. The two objectives of research will require an intellectual investigation basing from the works of Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas’ proposition of the solution to the viscous cycle fuelled by systemic corruptions of knowledge breeding false leaderships which results into injustice where the discipline and order of reality (termed as adab) are compromised.

References


[iii] Al-Attas in his speech regarding unity of a nation proposed that must have at least one of these four aspects (1) Shared History (2) A Common Race/Ancestry (3) Common Religion (4) Common Language. Language is only an instrument of unity, but not the basis of unity. al-Attas, “Nationhood” INTAN, Razak Hall, Kuala Lumpur commemorating the Malaysian independence month in August 2013. You may also refer to a summary of a later event referencing to the August talk at http://www.utm.my/casis/blog/2013/09/28/accessed on 5thApril 2019.


[vi] As rearticulated by al-Attas for the first time in his seminary lecture on Islam: The Concept of Religion as the Foundation of Ethics and Morality during the World of Islam Festival in 1976, London. Later published as Islam: The Concept of Religion and the Foundation of Ethics in Islam (Kuala Lumpur, Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM), 1975


[viii] Al-Attas, Prolegomena, 2.


[xi] They are blinded by the fact that the condition they are in is where those two main elements of having legitimate authority and a functioning system are absolved from themselves.

[xii] Ibid., 15-16.


[xvi] Al-Attas, Prolegomena, 17.
Workshop II

30 July 2019 – Tuesday / 14:00 – 17:00

Grand Hall

Chair: Edip Asaf Bekaroğlu

Harun Karčić
Balkan Muslims in Post-Communist Times: A Fragmented Transnational Community?

Orhan Ceka
Religion and Secularism in Post-Communist Transitions: A Comparative Analysis of BiH and Albania

Murad Ismayilov
State-Society Relations and the Changing Landscape of (Political) Islam in Azerbaijan: Towards the Bridging of the Religious-Secular Divide

Damira Sikhimbayeva
Interplay of Nationalism and Islam with Nation-Building of Kazakhstan

Byeibitgul Khaumyen
Negotiating Islam, Identity and Inter-Generational Conflict: Young Kazakh Women’s Experiences with an Islamic Piety Movement in Post-Socialist Mongolia
Since the late fourteenth century, Muslim communities have been present in southeast Europe. For most of their history they were an important and integral part of the Ottoman Empire. However, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when ethnic-based nation-states came to power in the Balkans and as the Ottomans gradually lost control over their Rumeli part of the Empire, most of these Muslim communities were faced with brutal forced expulsions and massacres.

Recent attempts by certain nationalist forces to erase the history of Muslims in the Balkans, particularly in the early 1990s, have led to new interest in these indigenous European Muslims.

After the collapse of the communist regimes in 1989-90, the mobilization of the Muslim populations resulted not only in the constituting of political parties in all Balkan states, but also in the formulation of national claims – going as far as demands for an independent state (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo) or an autonomous territory (Macedonia, Sancak). It should, however, be noted that this wave of national claims amongst the Muslim Balkan populations is for the most part reactive: the awakening of an intolerant and aggressive Serb nationalism, in particular, has largely contributed to the desires for independence of the Bosnian Muslims and the Kosovo Albanians.

With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Balkan Muslims were faced with new problems. Almost 200,000 Muslims were murdered in Bosnia and tens of thousands of them were slaughtered in Kosovo. Particularly, the genocide of nearly 9000 Muslims in Srebrenica within just a few days in 1995 became the seal of the oppression and massa-
that Balkan Muslims experienced. In spite of these atrocities which took place in a period when the concept of civilization and culture was high in the world, Balkan Muslims continued to exist.

Muslims are still a majority in the Federal part of Bosnia Herzegovina. They are indisputably a minority in Croatia and Slovenia. They are in quite a weak position of minority in Serbia (Sancak and Preševo Valley) and in Montenegro. Muslims are an absolute majority in Kosovo and in Macedonia, almost half of the population is comprised of Muslims. Muslims are also a minority in Bulgaria and Greece.

In the Post-Communist period, Balkans Muslims faced the very same problems as non-Muslims regarding their economic condition, social circumstances and ideological transition (from communism to democracy). Features such as the low economic performance of Balkan states, low income and hence restricted quality of life have caused and continue to cause widespread pessimism amongst Balkan Muslims. Additionally, the concept of nationalism seems to express hope for the formation of their outlook, identity and future but yet this seems to be an incomplete picture for Muslims.

The political mobilization of the Muslim populations was accompanied by the reshaping of the relationship between national identity and religious identity. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) constituted itself around a pan-Islamist movement that had appeared at the end of the 1930s, and of which the main figure is Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic himself. Elsewhere, the parties representing the Muslim populations were created by members of the new secularized elites which had appeared during the communist period.

In general, however, national identity and religious identity tended to come closer together. Having in mind the problems that Balkan Muslim societies faced in the last two decades, various Islamic groups from all over the world have undertaken the task of exerting their influence amongst these Muslims. This influence is displayed through the channels of cultural diplomacy in an Islamic framework and a variety of activities in this context in order to win the hearts and minds of Balkan Muslims.

Muslim leaders in the Balkans are often keen to emphasise Islam’s long history in their region and distinguish their communities from those in the West. Such claims of indigenousness made by strains of Balkan nationalism assert that the people with the longest history of settlement in a territory have the most legitimate rights. But the assertion is also a reaction to Islamophobia, which presents Islam as an alien phenomenon. The assertion also reflects the sense that Islam in the Balkans is culturally different from its Arab, African and Asian counterparts, and more compatible with a notional European identity.

However, it appears as though too much attention has been placed on foreign organizations, as many authors downplay the strength and the level of organization within the Islamic Communities. As the following pages will show, Islamic Communities across the Balkan region are the main bearers of an organized Muslim life. With an enormous number of mosques, educational institutions, staff and publications, their influence and the level of their organization is growing at unprecedented speed.

Nevertheless, this re-Islamization of Balkan Muslim national identities should in no case be conceived as linear and based on consensus: on the contrary, it is accompanied by virulent conflicts within each community and appears to be paradoxical in several ways. First of all, this re-Islamization of collective identities does not really reverse the results of a half century of authoritarian modernization and secularization.

This paper aims to trace the linguistically, ethnically, and theologically diverse outlooks of Balkan Muslims. My idea is to paint a differentiated picture which depicts both the fragmentation of these communities along national and cultural lines, as well as unifying experiences and practices of a universal religion. Additionally, I intend to make the point that any debate on Muslims in Europe needs to take into consideration the historical experience and the challenges which Muslims in the Balkans face today.
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Abstract

The late 80’s and early 90’s of the past century has been identified with the fall of Communism, a doctrine and ideology which seems to haunt the present Central and Eastern Europe, in particular the Southeast Europe. This regime fall allowed for different factors, among which religion as well, competing in filling the vacuum that communism left. The long tradition of the Godless society fuelled by the modernization process in the democratic transition appeared to form basis perfectly suitable for secularization theory to be applied, namely elimination of religious influence in the social processes as the society modernizes. However, suppressed by the previous regime, religion in the transition to democracy finally found a way to make itself visible and redefine its position in the new emerging social context.

This paper will thus analyse the role of religion in identity formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina where due to the lack of national belonging and to preserve their distinctiveness within multi ethnic/religious Bosnia, the Bosnian Muslim in the post-communist transition followed a unique path of identifying their nationality and ethnicity strictly with religious affiliation. As a counter-example, I will elaborate the case of Albania which due to its ethnic homogeneity in addition to the exceptional repressive communist rule of Hoxha, self-proclaiming the country as the only atheistic state in the world, resorted to their national history of Illyrians as basis for their identity formation during the transition and circumvented religion almost totally.

Context

Though communism tried its best to eradicate and mar-
ginalize religion, the period since the early 1990s shows that religion not only has survived but has taken the role of the main indicator of a nation. After a long period of Godlessness, it returned back to Eastern Europe, surviving even the most severely repressive persecution of communist regimes.[1]

The collapse of communism in Eastern European countries brought quite high expectations within the masses. People viewed the transition from communism as a period when the benefits of democracy such as freedom of speech, association, conscience and worship could be enjoyed.[2] But as Cvitković argues, in the case of state-religion relationship, the transitional societies are specific in their perception of religious freedoms as collective rather than individual rights.[3] Such a collective perception of religious rights has been viewed by the religious communities, all of which were restricted to work during the communist regime though not on equal basis[4], which instead of having learned the bitter lessons of oppression of religion quickly tried to use the democratic freedoms to regress to their pre-communist privileged status.[5]

The wars in former Yugoslavia of the 1990s, where religious animosity has played important role in the violence, mainly represent the Muslim-Christian intolerance such as in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and to a certain extent in Macedonia.[6] Clearly, the religion in post-communist transition period in Balkans formed favorable grounds for religious nationalism. It was far more than evident that the romantic nationalism, representative of the western liberal democratic societies, could not “serve to identify ‘nation’ in much of Eastern Europe” mainly because religion has been recognized as identifying “who they were”, as having a great role in denoting them as a people, and as a distinguishing characteristic from the “other peoples among whom they were interspersed.”[7]

Religious nationalism on the other hand, fulfilled all the needed requirements for providing security to the identities of the different ethnic groups belonging also to different religions. As an ideology, it found the post-communist transitional societies as an opportunity to use religion in filling the “empty public market after the collapse of the previous regime”. Such a filling of the empty public market gave birth to the ethno-religiosity of the nations in the Balkans, to some in a smaller and to others in a greater extent. The most extreme case where ethnicity is based on religious affiliation is Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the other extreme stands Albania, where the national identity is not based on religion at all but on the historical Illyric ancestors as one of the oldest nations in Europe, to which the nation is the religion as well.[9]

Research questions

What role did religion play in the period of post-communist transition?

Can we talk of a religious pattern that was followed in all Southeast European post-communist countries?

Why is there a divergent identity formation in the post-communist period, specifically in Albania and BiH, the former tending towards secularization while the later tending towards religious ethno-nationalism?

Has the communist regime with its repressive rule on religion shaped the religious sentiment in Balkan post-communist states?

Should the religious revival following the fall of communism be seen as a long-term trend or a short termed one?

Hypothesis

I argue that in transitional SEE societies where ethnic differences corresponded to religious differences, the theory of secularization failed while allowing the religion to take a leading role in identity formation and as channel for animosity towards the others, in distinctive form in the different countries.

Methodology

The structure of the paper will follow a comparative analytical approach. The first section will analyze the general tendencies of the religion-ethnicity relation in the SEE
transitional democracies and the level of the secularization process within them. The second and third section will comparatively analyse the cases of ethno-religiosity in BiH and the secular national development of Albania, respectively. I will mainly rely on the current literature on religion and secularism based on the views of authors eminent in the field of religion in transitional societies and the respective countries, such as Abazovic, Mojzes, Murzaku, Zrinscak, Casanova, Cela and Cvitkovic, in addition to reports and legal documents.


[4] “The persecution differed from country to country (worst in Albania and USSR, mildest in Poland and Yugoslavia) and also within each country some churches received the brunt of the violence while others were treated more gently depending on the political exigencies of the regime.” Mojzes, Paul. “Ecumenism and Interreligious Dialogue in Eastern Europe.” In Quo Vadis Eastern Europe? Religion, State and Society after Communism, edited by Ines Angeli Murzaku, 27-49. Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2009: 29.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., 32-33, 41.


[8] Ibid., 204-206.

[9] As one Albanian proverb goes: Feja e shqiptarit eshte shqiptaria (The religion of the Albanian, is the Albanian-ness).

References


Islamic discourse in Azerbaijan—and broader discourse on national identity—has since the rise of nationalism around the second half of the nineteenth century in this part of the world been dominated and defined by the elite thinking and agency, with intra-societal dialogue on the matter, including in particular across the religious-secular divide, systematically muted and suppressed.

The perception of Islam as a threat and—if left unrestrained—a viable political challenge has long permeated elite engagement with Islam in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, a concern that prompted the Baku regime to seek control of conduits of external influences on religiosity (including religious education abroad, external sources of teaching in madrassas, and religious proselytizing) and fight any public and, above all, collective manifestation of religiosity that threatened to transform religion from an individual identity marker into a social phenomenon—and, hence, a potential political challenge. Islam was seen as “a dangerous genie to be contained,” and the elite’s consistent effort to erase it from—and render it invisible in—the public space, seeking instead to confine religious practices to the privacy of one’s home or state-sanctioned mosques, was intended as “a means of pre-empting the rise of Islamism as a political challenge” (Islamic Human Rights Commission 2003). “Religion is in our hearts and should not be on our streets,” Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, told a Washington Times journalist in 2007, summarizing the regime’s position on the issue (Sobhani 2009).

Apart from a range of practical measures aimed at stifling the penetration of Islamic discourse in public space (including a ban on using loudspeakers during the call to
prayer, a ban on wearing Islamic headscarves in public schools, the closing down of mosques with a massive following, etc.), the symbolic violence the Azerbaijani political establishment has directed toward Islam as part of its quest for legitimation vis-à-vis both the domestic populace and the West has involved at least five intricately linked discursive lines:

Upholding a narrative associating any upsurge of religiosity with the rise of Islamic “extremism” and thus framing it as a threat to state security and domestic stability, particularly if the growth in religious practice finds expression in the rising public activism of religiously inspired groups and individuals (and thus transforms from an individual identity marker into a social phenomenon);

Contrasting the dictate of Islamic fundamentalism in neighbouring Iran and the rising tendency of insecurity, destruction, and war across the Middle East with the overall secular nature of Azerbaijani statehood and stability and security at home;

Linking any trend of rising religiosity to—and grounding it in—poverty, illiteracy, and backwardness, thus effectively rendering it a quality of the outcast;

Linking expressions of religiously inspired public activism to the influence or direct sponsorship of foreign agents (in particular Iran) that are allegedly using Islam to radicalize domestic politics in Azerbaijan;

Promoting secular nationalism (including as upheld in the face of the ongoing conflict with Armenia) and homogenously “empty” multiculturalism as an alternative ideological vision around which to mobilize society (cf. Corley and Kinahan 2012).

As such, the regime has been pursuing two mutually reinforcing objectives. Firstly, in reproducing the post-9/11 notion of “fundamentalist” Islam as a security threat and thus portraying Islamic activism at home as a product of a foreign conspiracy, the elite have sought to position themselves as the only leadership willing and powerful enough to contain Islam’s rising political clout in the country and safeguard the secular nature of Azerbaijani statehood. This effort, intended to justify the need for authoritarian governance, has become an increasing feature of elite engagement with Islam as the regime has grown ever more authoritarian and its governance model has begun to elicit still greater criticism from the West.

And secondly, on a domestic level, the goal has been to discredit any topic that could potentially mobilize the population, among which Islam and ethnicity are the most potent. In view of this, the ruling elite have typically accused their political opponents of cooperating with wider terrorist networks, Iran’s special security services, or both. And while these tactics had initially been applied only to the regime’s religious opponents, such accusations have increasingly been levied at secular groups and individuals as well, thereby justifying state repression against them in the eyes of the West and secular civil society.

As part of the latter endeavour, over the past 25 years of independence, the ruling elite in Azerbaijan has benefited from—and sought to reproduce—overall societal animosity (including as expressed in the attitudes of the secular opposition) toward the country’s religious groups, particularly those opposed to the incumbent regime, these routinely portrayed as radical, potentially terrorist, and ostensibly evil. Not only was the effort to reproduce the social, cultural, and ideological rupture between the country’s secular and religious opposition (and the religious and secular segments of the country’s social spectrum more broadly) meant as a component of the elite’s ingenious “divide and rule” strategy in the pursuit of total dominance and control (including by thus depriving the religious opposition of an organizational toolkit to mobilize society around their cause), but by continuously reinforcing the representation of Islam as an imminent danger to the stability and secular nature of Azerbaijani statehood, the government has sought to position itself—in the eyes of both the “liberal,” “democratic” West and the domestic population—as the sole force capable of staving off the Islamic threat, thus using the radical Islamist card to justify its increasingly illiberal regime and authoritarian practices.
For a long time, the regime’s approach progressed almost without hindrance. More recently, however, the rise of the Union for Moslem Unity under the leadership of Taleh Baghirzade, a charismatic young Shia cleric, and the concurrent rapprochement between the country’s Islamic movement, on the one hand, and secular civil society and traditional opposition (particularly as embodied in the National Council opposition bloc), on the other, has occasioned a dramatic shift. Religious and secular forces, which before were insulated from one another, have now opened a multifaceted dialogue, discussing issues as fundamental as the nature of Azerbaijani statehood, national identity, and Islam’s role and place in both.

This paper offers an account of the conditions underlying the unfolding partnership and convergence of interest across the country’s religious-secular political landscape. It begins by outlining elites’ attitudes to Islam, and the strategy of separating religion and politics in which those attitudes find expression. It then proceeds to show the complicity of civil society and the broader populace in the post-Soviet reproduction of the narrative of Islamic threat and the resultant religious-secular divide. The paper concludes by discussing key factors contributing to the ongoing normalization of Islam across the public realm and the gradual bridging of the religious-secular divide amid ongoing state repression.

References


The collapse of previously powerful Soviet ideological space allowed the post-Soviet citizens to rethink and redefine their social identities. The problems of national identity construction are one of the most hotly debated and still unresolved issues in academic, cultural and political agenda. All the newly formed countries have been striving to alienate themselves from the Soviet past and to develop their pre-Soviet national identities. But the legacy and consequences of the Soviet ideology continues to exert significant influence on nation-building processes. If the former Soviet nations could revive and strengthen their ethnicity through their own ethnic values, literature etc., they could not restore their previous religious identity due to severe official secularism. This problem is especially acute for Central Asian countries that struggle to reconstruct Islamic identity in the conditions of complete destruction of traditional Islamic institutions and teachings. The new Islamic identity has been mostly founded on external influence and sources and causes a certain concern among state authorities as well as nationalists, people with strong ethnic attachments. Currently, strong Islamic identity is widely condemned by public and mostly excluded from nation-building process. The debates on new Islamic identity often occur in public and political realms, however with less academic attention to the issue. In this paper I will focus on complex interplay of ethnic nationalism and Islamic identity within the nation-building of the post-Soviet Kazakhstan and its impact on national and religious policy.

The nature of relationship between nationalism and religion in nation building has been largely neglected by academic communities not only in Kazakhstan, but also in other post-Soviet countries. It is well-known that the

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**Keywords:** Nationalism, Islam, National Identity, State, Ideology, Construction, Nation-Building, Kazakhstan, Religious, Ethnicity, Traditions.
ethnic and religious identities of nationalities of the Soviet Union were coincided and its relationship did not cause any problems for public and academic interest. Many academic works of nation-building in Kazakhstan are mostly based on studying of national, ethnic and civic identities with less academic interest to religious identity. They are primarily preoccupied with language issues, inter-ethnic relations, and ethno-social structure, the dilemma of ethnic and civic forms of national identity. In this regard, the issue of new religious identity and its impact on nation-building has not been considered as something worth paying attention. The absence of serious discussion of religion in the literature on nationalism, the big gap in studying of relationship between nationalism and religion cannot give a proper understanding of development of nation-building. Consequently, it complicates the state nation-building and religious policies.

Currently, in Kazakhstan Islamic identity is increasingly becoming a key component of identity formation processes, but at the same time it faces certain resistance from ethnic nationalism and state. In the issues of preserving and strengthening ethnic identity, the titular nation in Kazakhstan is experiencing strong ethnic sentiments and eminently sensitive to external cultural and religious influences. Although, historically Kazakhs have been Muslims, seventy years of military atheism have completely disconnected the Kazakh Muslim-ness from pre-soviet Islamic heritage. The religious belief of Kazakh people had a syncretic character and Islam has never been deeply rooted in its everyday social and private life. The advancement of new Islamic identity is considered by large part of population as something foreign, contradictory to traditional ethnic culture. The public discussions and mostly state sponsored mass media condemn this trend and describe it as a threat to traditional culture and national security. The increasing number of Muslims for whom the Islamic identity is much more important than ethnic culture and Homeland disturbs the nationalists, people with strong ethnic sentiments and state authorities.

I would like to deal with this difficult relationship and to make an attempt to answer the following questions: Is the current interplay of nationalism and Islam one of the consequences of the soviet nationality policy, which had prevailing primordial approach to national issues? Is it the consequence of the global Islam phobia? What consequences might stem from the policy that push the Muslim population to the periphery of nation-building and make them marginal group of society? How to solve these contradictory trends and what policy should be pursued to advancement of the positive Islamic identity?

The contemporary interplay of ethnic nationalism and Islamic revival in imagining of national identity has revealed many contradictions in public and official state policies. In particular, the dress code of Muslims, giving of Arabic naming, religious rhetoric, and development of new Islamic identity and mode of life strictly based on Islamic laws, Sharia. All these trends were not inherent to ethnic Kazakhs before and cause certain concerns among the vast majority of Kazakh people and official powers. Muslims with ostensible religious dress code are not allowed to hold public positions, to be hired by state research institutes, to public schools and even to public kindergartens. Women in hijab often become a subject for condemn by ethnic oriented population, and women in niqab are often becoming the subjects for assaults from elder generation. The situation is complicated by the situation when ostensible religious (Islamic) dress code is closely associated with the radical Islam. According to official data, more than 500 citizens of Kazakhstan (approximately the same number refers to other Central Asian countries) who fight in Syria and Iraq wear the beard, short trousers and the women wear the niqab. The wide public and nationalists consider the current trends of construction of Islamic identity as Arabization. Thus, contemporary relationship of ethnic nationalism and religion (Islam) is very complex and it requires profound analysis and comprehensive approach to the analysis of given phenomena. This situation is not unique to Kazakhstan context, but common to all central Asian countries and Muslim dominated countries of Russian Federation as well.
Despite the general negative attitude towards strong Islamic identity and exclusive national policy the number of pious Muslims has been significantly increased in recent years. Ostensible Islamic dress code is becoming more visible in public space and generate conflicts in public institutions, especially in public (elementary) schools. Hundreds of parents refuse to take off hijabs from their children despite the government and public schools. These cases are not the exclusion, and this is the first signs of clash (conflict) between the two ideological constructions.

This paper makes an attempt to explain conflictual interrelation between these ideological constructions by analysing the discourse in imagining and establishing of national identity and its imp

References


This proposed paper looks at how the emergence of an Islamic piety movement is affecting individual identity, gender ideologies, and inter-generational relations among a minority population in western Mongolia. Although the Kazakhs are the dominant ethnic group in Kazakhstan, they are a small ethnic, linguistic, and religious minority population in the relatively homogeneous country of Mongolia (numbering approximately 100,000). For decades, the majority of the Kazakh Mongolian population have lived in a geographic enclave in western Mongolia, affected by socialist rule yet culturally autonomous. They have long identified as Muslims, yet their religious beliefs and practices have always included a syncretic mix of Islamic and pre-Islamic beliefs (Louw 2007; Montgomery 2017); many Kazakhs adopted more secular practices during the socialist era. The breakdown of socialism in the 1990s has brought significant changes to this population. On the one hand, the transition to a neoliberal economy has reduced state-funded economic, employment and education opportunities, thus shifting the means by which Kazakhs gained social mobility and integration within mainstream Mongolian society. On the other hand, the communist ideology associated with socialism has been replaced by a revival of Islam as one part of the rediscovery of Kazakh ethno-national identity (Werner et al. 2013). Just as the transition to a neoliberal economy has been influenced by Western development experts, the revival of Islam has been aided by international actors (Roi 2006; Rogers 2018).

The revival of Islam is evidenced by the construction of new mosques (financed by wealthy donors from abroad), the expansion of formal Islamic education (including opportunities studying Islam abroad), the introduction of
more pious behaviors, and the re-evaluation of several local practices (such as shrine worship (Brede et al. 2015; McBrien 2016). Increased international ties with Islamic countries brought about free educational opportunities for young Kazakhs, including women. In comparison, middle-aged and elderly Kazakhs, on average, view Islam as an integral part of their ethnic identity, yet they are less likely to follow basic Islamic tenets, such as praying five times a day and abstaining from alcohol consumption. This has been a complex situation where Kazakh Muslim women have simultaneously struggled to balance ethnic and religious aspects of their identity while also acquiring economic security and social mobility. The women who have participated in this religious revival have faced criticism from Mongolian nationalists and secular Kazakhs alike due to visible marks of piety such as Islamic attire and halal food (Brede et al. 2015). Older generations Kazakhs whose ideologies shaped by secular politics have been critical of these newly constructed identities with Islam. Further, nationalist-oriented Mongolians, influenced by Islamophobic sentiments, have marginalized this younger generation of Kazakh Muslims, limiting their economic opportunities in post-socialist Mongolia.

This paper focuses on the rise of Muslim piety and religious participation among young Kazakh women in post-socialist Mongolia. It reviews how the revival of Islam phenomena is being exercised and conflicted between young and older generations of Kazakh Mongolians. In this paper, older Kazakhs are those individuals beyond 30 years of age, whose identities have been impacted by the anti-religious politics of Soviet Russia until the 1990s. Younger Kazakhs, are those under the age of 30 and have been intensively practicing their newly constructed Muslim identity after gaining freedom to engage in religious practices in the 1990s in Mongolia. This paper is based on the data collected through my pilot study between June 15 to August 15, 2018, in Bayan Ulgii- a Kazakh dominated Western province of Mongolia. The pilot study examined the following questions: 1) how young Kazakh Muslim women construct their religious identity within an ethnically and culturally diverse society, and 2) what tensions may exist between two generations of Kazakhs Muslims whose religious identities were formed within distinctly different socio-political ideologies in post-socialist Mongolia?

I employed a variety of qualitative methods including in-depth interviews with young Kazakh women (N=10) involved in the piety movement, and multiple members of their family (N=13) who experienced socialist anti-religious politics (5-8), elite interviews (2-3), and participant observation. The participants to the interviews were recruited through a purposive and snowball sampling methods. I also used participant observation to gather data on the different experiences, practices, and perceptions of Islam among Kazakh Mongolians in post-socialist Mongolia.

The objective of this paper is to provide a preliminary understanding of how the revival of Islam in post-soviet Mongolia has shifted the lived experiences of religiosity among young Kazakh women in Mongolia and how these changes affect in their everyday interaction with their older generation Kazakhs whose ideologies are shaped anti-religious politics of socialism. In this paper, I make the following arguments. In historically, the experiences of Kazakh women have been subject to the synthesis of diverse influences of the traditional patriarchal culture of nomad heritage, the proliferation of Islam, the emancipation politics of Soviet socialism as well as global neo-liberalism after socialism. All these socio-political events have been navigating the local context of gender and religion in Mongolia in a myriad way. Second, the revival of Islam and increasing international import of religious institutionalization has dramatically affected the religious landscape of Kazakh in post-socialist Mongolia in a broader context. These influences may not necessarily produce a single unified pattern of religiosity, rather creates a spectrum of religiosity in varying degrees from devoted to atheist. Third, I also argue that constructing and negotiating religious identity among young Kazakh Muslim women involves a multifaceted complex process. It is influenced by multiple social and cultural factors such as ideological doctrines of international religious institutions, different attitudes of their older generation
secular Kazakhs as well as their need for successful social integration. Fourth, I assume the interaction between two generations is not always contradictory; rather it is sometimes complementary and respectful towards each other.

References


Worksop III

30 July 2019 – Tuesday / 14:00 – 17:00
Terrace Hall

Chair: Michelangelo Guida

Syed Mohammad Raghib Syed
The confrontation with the West on Islam, Politics and Law

Abdellatif Meshref
How to Judge Using Democracy in a Modern Islamic State

Saifuddin Dhuhri
How is Islamic System of Society Compatible with Democracy? A Comprehensive Study of Maturidi’s Kalam Influence on Acehnese Social System based on Qanun el-Asyie

Shahrukh Khan
Exercising the Benedict Option: American Constitutional Law and the Future of Islam

Jawida Mansour
Interpretation of the Ummah among revert Muslims

Wardah AlKatiri
Ijtihad for the Planet: Islamic Global Environmental Governance for the Ummah within ‘night-watchman states’
This paper will look the Islam, Politics, and law as an encapsulated entity of Islamic faith of religion in the West. This paper will also search for the root of Islam in the West, which was flourished long back, but later it was uprooted in the mid-fifteen centuries from the landscape of the West. The paper will also search the reason and issues of re-emerging the religion of Islam in the West since the last three decades despite an increase of Islamophobic incidents. The core debate here is whether the politics and law are having close relations with Islam in the West. In Western society, law and politics work separately, but despite the different narratives, they ban Hijab, Burkini, Azan, and issue of Minarets building ban on Mosque by the Swiss government which shows their religious intolerance as well.

The word ‘Islam’ is well-known in the West in both good and bad reasons. They know Islam due to the same Abrahamic root and more than that Islam flourished in the West like Qurtaba (Spain), Istanbul and other Balkan lands during the period. So the Islamic religious and cultural development reached into the zenith much in these junctions which were in the Christian control. The Arabs and Barbarians siege the Constantinople the capital of Byzantine Empire first in 7th to an 8th century later by Barbarian in the 9th and 10th century. The historically fourth Crusade started between destroyed most of Istanbul during 1204-1261. Later, Sultan Mehmet II an Ottoman Turk conquered the city and changed the name to Istanbul in 1453. The Muslim lost Constantinople but regained Spain and Balkans lands for a few years. Islam flourished in the West as it was in Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo, Samarkand, and Bukhara. But after 800 years till 1492, Islam had utterly lost the glory in most of the Span-
ish cities and suddenly disappeared completely from the West. Islam was very much visible in the Western Sahara of Africa like in Morocco and Algeria, Tunisia but lost its visibility from Western Europe completely.

The War of Crusade between Islam and Christianity can be seen as a center of enmity point between two Abrahamic faiths and unfortunately the Jerusalem a beautiful place of three faiths becomes the battleground. The West always remembers how Muslim upholds Jerusalem since the first Crusade in 1099 (1095-1099) to the last one, Seventh Crusade led by the Louis IX of France from (1248-1254). For Muslim, the third Crusade was remembered because of Saladin Ayyubi conquered Jerusalem by Saladin Ayyubi in 1187 against the three most powerful Christian states of the West. For holding the control of First Qibla (Bait Al-Maqdis) Muslims are continuing giving their blood for the sake of Islam, from 1948, the situation is different there. British and his allies come up with many laws even the 1917 Balfour Declaration to give Jews the land in Palestine. Since 1967 the Holy Land is now under the control of Israel which is keen to wipe out the Palestinian, Al-Quds and to setup their old temple mount there. Doing so Israel is getting all kind of help from most of the Christian world like Britain, France, America, and many more countries.

The Bosnian War (1992-1995) was also one of example confrontation between Islam and Christian West. During the war, the International laws and human rights have been violated at all level, that cost the massacre of Muslims in the Balkan regions. The total death was 3,50,000 in which 66 percent were Bosnian Muslims. The law took a long time to prosecute the culprits Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Miladic, President of Republic a Srpska and Chief of the Army of Srpska who found guilty on 24 March 2016 and convicted of systematic war crimes by the Joint Criminal Enterprise and sentenced to life in prison for crimes, including crimes against humanity and genocide. [2] The Bosnian war was so barbaric, and the culprit crosses the all line of brutality to punish Bosnian Muslims.

In 2018 Denmark enacted a ban on the wearing of face veils in public joining France and other EU countries. Belgium, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, and the German state Bavaria, have all imposed curbs on the wearing of face veils in public.[3]

In Austria recently approved a ban on headscarf in primary schools from May 16, 2019.[4] the country run by the right-wing government. This kind of political vendetta using law is a clear cut an assault on Muslims culture and identity, which is now looking common in most of the Western countries. The government text refers to any “ideologically or religiously influenced clothing which is associated with the covering of the head”. Two party coalition running the government, the center-right People’s Party (OeVP and the far-right Freedom Party (FPOe), have made it clear that despite its wide description, the law is targeted at the Islamic headscarf.

In response of this ban, Austria’s official Muslim community organization IGGOe has previously condemned the proposals as “shameless” and a “diversionary tactic”. It says that in any case only “minuscule number” of girls would be affected. In the series of halted and Islamophobic mindset, Danish right-wing politician Rasmus Paludan ready to contest in the general election, which is due on 5 June 2019, which will be not welcome by some political parties.[5]

Such is not the maiden incident which took the new shape of violence, the reality behind the violence is the policy of government and law for the migrants and African Muslims, who are jobless and treated as a burden for countries.[6] In the case of France, where Muslims resides around 10 percent of the total population, mostly are migrants and has colonial links.[7] The increase in global hates generated more differences and the propaganda against Islam and Muslim in the name of terrorism, which given free hand to the Western countries to handle them with or without law and prosecute and eliminate them across Europe.

The number of incidents has been reported across Europe in the name of Islam, Muslims and its cultural symbols like Azan, Minarets, Burkini, Hijab, Scarf, Charles Hubdo, Violence in France, Issue of migrants and the ris-
ing right-wing influence across Europe.

The 9/11 also played a more prominent role to increase more anxiety and rift among Muslims and the West. The misuse of the law to invade Afghanistan and Iraq using IAEA, UN and blame for WMD exposed the West hypocrisy and double standard. In the US continue attack going on against Muslims but nothing looking concrete steps. Trump new anti-migration stands also increased more hates form Muslims and migrants across the world in the US.


[5] Danish politician Rasmus Paludan is going to contest in coming general election, which is due on 5 June 2019, URL: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/rasmus-paludan-danish-islamophobe-rises-political-stardom-190516090301567.html


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The Guardian, Danish Burqa ban comes into effect amid protests, 1 August 2018, URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/01/danish-burqa-ban-comes-into-effect-amid-protests.

In the absence of justice in the systems of the Arab and Islamic countries, many Muslim intellectuals called for democracy and to support that they extracted the text of the Qur’an and Sunnah from them. Islam has preceded Westerners to democracy, which is at the heart of Islam. Democracy is not an Arabic word, it is derived from the Greek, a group of two words: the first: DEMOS, meaning the general public, or the people, and the second word is: KRATIA, meaning: govern people’s government.

Democracy is not an Arabic word, it is derived from the Greek, a group of two words: the first: DEMOS, meaning the general public, or the people, and the second word is: KRATIA, meaning: govern people’s government.

The concept of democracy in Islam refers to a method of governance, legislation of decisions and opinion based on a reference status, laws and constitutions not established in accordance with the vision of the Holy Quran and Sunnah which is the main reference for Muslims to devise judgments and issues, knowledge of halal and Haram and what should be done and what should not , Which is equal in the Islamic system of the Shura system, where Shura is an order of ALLAH, God ordered his Messenger and believers in it, where God said to him (159) So by mercy from Allah, [O Muhammad], you were lenient with them. And if you had been rude [in speech] and harsh in heart, they would have disbanded from about you. So, pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult them in the matter. And when you have decided, then rely upon Allah. Indeed, Allah loves those who rely upon Him]

Democracy is undoubtedly incompatible with Islamic law in aspects: The Holy Quran has stated in clear and explicit texts that the judgment is for God, while democracy makes people and deputies the source of government, and also its elites and methods of application which differ in many places from the Shura, From the matters of
the world and ignore in many places the matters of religion, it is here our role to apply democracy in the dress of Islamic origin and balance between religion and the world is the subject of our research.

The importance of research is that it is a modern study, and offers Islamic experiences on the ground, and highlights the role of Islam as a method of governance and governance and how to judge it, and how we submit democracy according to the approach of Islam to suit and fit our communities, providing live experiences from different Islamic ages. And then to link democracy and its origins to Islam as a method of governance and management, as well as to clarify the history of Western democracy from the difficulties and hopes to reality, the study Including providing solutions and mechanisms for implementation and activation. The objectives are:

- Explain the relationship to the concept of Shura Islam and current democracy
- Explain the relationship and what links the Shura to democracy and what are the differences.
- Explain the negatives and positives of modern democracy.
- Provide mechanisms and how to apply democracy to Eastern societies.
- Provide mechanisms for how to build governance systems on the basis of a civil state and a Muslim society.
- Introducing forms of Islamic democracies, in the past and present.

The research provides mechanisms for the application of democratic systems according to the approach of Islam and what is not different with the culture and customs of the Eastern peoples, and the use of modern studies and modern methods, and modern statistics of the forms of systems and tools with full credibility, is a comprehensive theoretical study process, linking Islam and its compatibility with human reality, that gave to humanity a lot, and also explained the Western democracy with its own.

Difficulties
The lack of references to the subject, especially in our old Islamic world, relying on modern translations, takes the subject for a long period of time.

Approach
The researcher will follow the descriptive and analytical research method by collecting the scientific material from its sources, and its Islamic, Arabic, English, French, and international references, and the North African countries, comparing, analysing and critique them to the closest information to the truth.

As for the documentation, the researcher will follow the French system of documentation, which only mentions the name of the author, the book and the page number, and the detailed data of the book will be written in the list of sources and references at the end of the research.

This research is important research because it deals with the reality of the lives of Muslims, as we need such topics that link religion to the life of this nation, and thus enjoy the Islamic community happy life under a civil state and Islamic society, in accordance with international standards while maintaining its Islamic curriculum and teachings Tolerance, governance and management theories, and moral texts that build a society of purpose and value.

Investigation of the Study
The first topic: the impact of colonialism on the destruction of the concept of nation, awareness and learning systems in the Islamic and Arab world.

The second topic: challenges facing the experience of democracy in Arab and Islamic societies.

The third topic: the contradictions of modern Western democracy with Islam and the societies of the East.

The fourth topic: mechanisms to apply democracy to Islamic and Arab societies within the framework of Sharia.

The fifth topic: Examples of successful Islamic countries in the democratic system and progress in the modern era.
Conclusion

A general summary of the most important points of the book.

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There is a growing body of literature that recognises the importance of Islamic heritages by which democratic society is eminently benefited and developed. Upon the interest in Islamic heritages, a great deal of literature celebrates the legacy of Acehnese Darussalem golden eras, where cosmopolitan and harmony society existed. Although extensive research has been carried out on the legacy of those sultanates, Acehnese Darussalam has been subject to considerable discussion. There is, however, few studies exist, which investigate Qanun el-Asyie that emanates the cohesion of Acehnese society and develops cosmopolitan sultanate, which is relevant to democratic system of society. In additions, in agreement with Mu’tazila position, Maturidite Kalam recognised the centrality of rationality/aql as the source of knowledge and law. Maturidite theology and hanafite jurisprudence establish that human rationality has greater role and authority on human affair, whereas divine text is on divinity and non-sensual matters.

Questioning the extent of Islamic system of a society values democratic system of a society, this paper elaborates Qanun el-Asyie to understand the way of Acehnese social system is compatible with democracy and the link between Islamic social system and democracy. this work also explicates the extent of Maturidite theological influence on Acehnese social system of law and theology, which has been standardised and formulated under the banner of ahu al sunnah wal jamaah by the influence of Othman Sultane. This work is greatly significant to understand the compatibility of social system of Islam and democracy. It also aims to understand the mode of social system of Islam responds to democratic society.

A considerable amount of literature has been published on democratic society and the scholarships gradually become grand narrative of democracy versus Islamic system of society. On the other hand, there is a growing body of literature that recognises the importance of Islamic heritage to enrich democratic system of society (Kahin, 1952; Laffan, 2002) and the significance of Acehnese studies to understand the nature of Islam in Southeast Asia. The works fall under several themes: (1) historical studies, which concentrates on power relation and sultanate matters (Alves, 2011; Feener, Daly, & Reid, 2011; Ozay, 2012; Peacock & Gallop, 2015; Reid, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010; P. Riddell, 2006), (2) Acehnese Shari’a and related issues (Feener, 2012; Moch. Nur Ichwan, 2007; Moch
Nur Ichwan, 2011; Salim, 2004, 2008), (3) Islamic thoughts (Azra, 2004), (4) quranic studies and interpretation (P. G. Riddell, 1984), anthropologist studies (Bowen, 1993; Hurgronje, 1906), sufistic art (Hadi, 2000, 2001), and most recently, female in power in Muslim world, which is a pride for Muslim gender studies (Khan, 2017). Although the excessive studies have been undertaken on Acehnese themes, the works, however, have little concern on Acehnese social system and religious order.

The study of Nuriddin Ar-Raniry thoughts has been the concern of several scholars (Al-Attas, 1986; Azra, 2004; Daudy, 1978; Uthman, 2011). Azra discussion on the origin of reformist thoughts, which elucidates Nuruddin Ar-Raniry and Syeikh Abdurauf al-Singkili has failed to brought detail discussion theological aspects of Acehnese dispute on Hamzah al-Fansuri/wujudiah teachings. Insteads of theological background, he is convinced that legal reasoning [islamic jurisprudence] underpinning the main motive for Ar-Raniry to refute Hamzah al-Fansuri’s teaching (Azra, 2004, p; 64). This finding is contrary to Daudy’s and al-Attas studies which have suggested that Ar-Raniry’s refutation against Fansuri is based on theological and philosophical disagreement. Daudy’s work on Ar-Raniry concentrates on his kalam thoughts concerning ilahiyyat and insaniyat, while Al-Attas studies his refutation against Hamzah Fansury’s teaching, which is about wujudiyah (Al-Attas, 1986, 2014). Their investigations are, however, no further studies on theological aspects of Aceh, such as the penetration of Matudite and Ash’arite sects on Acehnese system of law as narrated in Qanun meukuta alam and Acehnese literature of kalam.

The data of this paper is based on the content analysis of Al-Qanun Tazkiratul Thabaqat Bustan al-Salathien fi Khazinatul al-Qanun Meukuta Alam al-Asyie Darussalam of Acehnese system of law and is intended to find the value of democratic system and the influences of Maturidite kalam. The study will be orientated by the following questions:

How are Acehnese system of society as inscribed in qanun el-Asyie influenced by teaching of Maturidi Kalam and hanafite tradition?

To what extent is Acehnese system of society relevant to democratic system of society?

The questions guide the research to look for the mode of the qanun el-Asyie establishes the system of Islamic society and also the way it responds to democratic system of a society. In so doing, four authorities of political powers belong to qanun el-Asyie, which to some extent resembles to trias political system of democracy are studied. Those four authorities are legitimated to King, Ulema, Ulei Balang and Queen, which respectively rules adat, Hukum, Reusam and Qanun (woman affairs). The Qanun vividly delimits the totality of king’s power and delegates it into ulema, Ulei Balang (aristocrat) and queens. The Qanun also determines the nature of each role and position. If ulema derived their power from naqli’s legitimation; king, ulei balang and queen are provided by aql legitimation, which are called qanun, adat and reusam.

Relying on historical approach and the method of content analysis, this work critically analyses the content of qanun Meukuta Alam, which is based on the book “Al-Qanun Tazkiratul Thabaqat Bustan al-Salathien fi Khazinatul al-Qanun Meukuta Alam al-Asyie Darussalam. In additions to the primarily resource, I will rely on other documents related to Matudite kalam and Hanafite jurisprudences.

By the semantic analyses of some book contents concerning Maturidi Kalam, this research attempts to find the position of Imam al-Maturidi’s teaching in formulating Acehnese social system. Analysis of the historical data allows the author to elucidate the role and place of Imam al-Maturidi had played in the Islamic thought of his time and, through the methods of deduction, the conclusion will be made to understand his influence upon Acehnese system of law. The paper aims to bring the light on Acehnese law system and its link to democratic system of a society by using content analysis of the qanun el-Asyie. Then the analysis of the opinions concerning the system of Acehnese society will be considered by interviewing several key informants of Acehnese Ulema and experts. Finally, every individual aspect of Maturidi Kalam impacts on Acehnese community will be discussed to find the Is-
Islamic democratic system of a society.

The central thesis of this research is to investigate the way of Islamic system of a society is compatible with the social system of democracy. Relying on Maturidite Kalam and Hanafite tradition of jurisprudence, in particular Dabbusie, this work greatly contributes to consolidate democratic system of a society with Islamic system of a society as inscribed in Qanun el-Asyie. This work is of great significance to understand the formation of ahlu al-sunnah wa al-jamaah which conjoin every great element of different theologies and jurisprudences of Islam, e.i., Maturidite, Ash`arite, Sufite, Hanafite, Hambalite, Shafi`ite and local wisdom into the qanun of el-Asyie. It also promotes rationality and human free-will in accordance with Islamic worldview, as it will help to deal with mainstream narrative that views Islamic system of society as the deterministic, fatalistic and fundamentalist society.

References


In today’s day and age, religious conservatism for many in the United States has become a fly in the ointment. While freedom of religion is celebrated in the United States, there are many hidden contingencies attached to the acceptance of this pluralism. Religion becomes a matter of choice that many Americans increasingly believe should not be imposed on children from a young age. In other words, religion is like alcohol: please postpone until you are 21. While many scholars – Talal Asad, Saba Mahmood, Patrick Deneen, and Robert George – have written at length about the dangerous conformities that liberalism and secularism demand despite preaching an attractive repertoire of liberatory potentialities for humans, especially at the cost of tradition and confessionalism, not much scholarship has been able to connect these philosophical critiques with more practical legal concerns in the context of American Constitutional Law, in particular the First Amendment, which protects both the free exercise of religion and prohibits the government (local, state, and federal) from establishing or favoring one religion over another. Constitutional law scholar Douglas Laycock has – in the context of same-sex marriage – attempted to promulgate a framework whereby the rights of same-sex couples and confessionalsists are both protected. However, Laycock’s approach does not consider the social hardships that Muslims (and Catholics or Orthodox Jews) experience when confronted with sensibilities, lifestyles, and morals that stand in direct contradiction with their faith in schools or workplaces.

Islam broadly frustrates the full realization of a progressivism that celebrates unfettered fulfillment of carnal desires and the liberation of the individual from historical
baggage that supposedly haunts us moderns. For many proponents of liberal democracy who oppose the primacy (or even the mere inclusion) of Islam’s take on issues of gender, sex, and public ritual, the question is, why should Islamic organizations benefit from, in the words of legal historian John Witte, an “oasis of non-conformity” in an age of anger? We live in an age of politics that purports to rectify past and present wrongs, hoping desperately to reach the promised sunny highlands of moral sanctity that democracy’s most fervent proponents have espoused for centuries.

All of this leaves Muslims who seek salvation in another world in a problem, and it cannot be the case that liberal democracy’s sensibilities and moralities do not have the effect of harming confessionalism and tradition. In this vein, sociologist Philip Reiff once remarked, “Religious man was born to be saved. Psychological man is born to be pleased.” As such, the argument that religious freedom works best in a liberal democracy insofar as people of faith do not harm or threaten others in the course of their practice cannot stand. Liberalism directly contradicts Islam in many ways, and whereas Islam is built on an Eternal, stable Truth, the “hub” of liberalism and the “postmodern life strategy,” in the words of Zygmund Bauman, “is not identity building but avoidance of fixation.” That is, liberalism needs to refuse stability because any sense of “fixation” is a fool’s game.

This paper will explore the possibilities that the American legal system has in store for Muslims and other similarly concerned and situated confessionalists. It will argue that preserving the values of Islam in contemporary America requires a rejection of politics – the main conduit through which American Muslims today attempt to gain acceptance and assimilate into American society. Rather, what is necessary is keeping in mind the demands and restrictions of the American legal infrastructure and sidelined politics as the appropriate way to preserve faith. Christian writer Rod Dreher recently presented this possibility in the form of the “Benedict Option.”

Near the turn of the sixth century, Benedict set off from his home in central Italy, seeking to complete his education in Rome. When he arrived, he was shocked by the “vice and corruption” in Rome, a shell of its former self after the Visigoths sacked it a few decades before Benedict’s birth. The Western part of the Roman Empire was in serious decline after the sack, and Rome’s suffering, Dreher writes, “forced” Christians to “confront a terrible fact: that the foundations of the world they and their ancestors had known were crumbling before their eyes.” In response, Benedict moved to a nearby forest and lived as a hermit for three years. He eventually founded 12 monasteries of his own.

The Benedict Option is not an attempt to push back on hundreds of years of history or change the West or create heaven on Earth. Rather it is to build a way of life that stands “as an island of sanctity and stability” in modernity. The point is not to stop voting or being active in conventional politics. The point is that activism and politics are no longer enough: secede from mainstream culture. Turn off the TV. Put away the smartphones. Read books. Play games. Feast with your neighbours.

Of particular importance to Muslims is when Dreher says, “We are a minority now, so let’s be a creative one...” Muslims are already a minority and following the traditional path towards mainstream acceptance may not be a meaningful way to engage faith and preserve tradition. Seeking exemptions under the free exercise clause for a variety of practices that conflict with Islam could allow for a surprisingly creative and resilient set of laws that help Muslims gain confidence in an age where are losing their iman because they fear rejection in mainstream culture. Exercising the Benedict Option – which requires going in the direction opposite of where most American Muslims are going – will require commitment, dedication, resilience, legal expertise, and inter-faith dialogue.

References


Interpretation of the Ummah among Revert Muslims

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Keywords: Ummah, Concept, Revert, Racialized, Claiming Power, Collectivity, Social Inclusion, Authority, Otherness, Non-Muslims.

In fast-growing societies and globalization, the belonging to a certain group has been impacted including the Muslim Ummah. With other emerging constraints that face humanity such as migration and climate change, Muslim Ummah urgently need to rethink of the collectivity of the concept.

There is a chronological development for the concept of Ummah which occurs around sixty-two times in the sense of a religious community (Akram, 2007). At the very beginning of Islam, it was used as equivalent to a religious community such as Jewish, Christian and Muslim Ummah, however, In the prophet’s period in Madina the Quran begins to address it in a more specific entity to the emerging The Muslim community (Denny, 2004). Studying Islam and Muslims have been attracted many scholars from Islamic and non-Islamic backgrounds. The proliferation of such studies is phenomenally increased with the rise of right-wing in Europe. Akram (2007) points out that the concept of Ummah is appealing to study in light of transnational Muslim networks’ activities to operationalize the ideal of Ummatic unity. Reading the current scholar’s works on Ummah reveals the discourse on the interpretation of the concept; many scholars debated the monolithic aspect of it such as Daniel Pipes (1983) and Martin Kramer, who according to Akram (2007) discussed it from a negative perspective. Other scholarship examined the impact of this concept on the Muslim consciousness such as Syyed Nasr (2002) and John Esposito(1992). Mandaville (2010) argues against the idea that the Ummah has been shaping a primary reference in contemporary Muslim debates about identity or a form of globalized political consciousness. In the context of the nation-state, Mandaville argues that Islamic political
mobilization (or what he called it post-Islamism) seldom attempts to reconstruct an alternative order rather than the structure of Ummah.

Despite the increase of Islamophobia, many were reverted to Islam in the past decade. In this ethnographic research, I analyse the accounts of revert Muslims from European ethnic backgrounds about the process of integration in the Islamic Ummah in a non-Muslim country using a grounded theory approach. The study will hinge on the transnational connection and the making of a Muslim community in Belgium as a case study in an attempt to answer the question of how revert Muslims define and interpret the Muslim Ummah? How should it be from their perspective? What were their initial thoughts on the concept of Ummah? And how it developed while integrating and practicing Islam with other Muslim minorities in Europe.

The initial observations reveal the tension between newcomers to Islam and the existing body of migrants. The imagination of those revert Muslims on what the Ummah has to offer to them and to their non-Muslim settings. It also means that the concept of Ummah in the existing scholarship has in it elements that challenge its members. In other words, what shall the new members expect from this Ummah when belonging to it in the sense that they will not experience their minority position within the minority Muslims in the non-Muslim country? What assumptions were there that led to disappointments among those revert Muslims. And, what needs to be done to improve their participation in the Ummah and facilitate their transition. Moreover, the fact that the transnational Muslim solidarities and cooperation represent an intermediate space of affiliation and social political mobilization but to what extent these synergies or solidarities are still activated in a productive and meaningful manner.

While delving more on the study, it will examine the ways those revert-Muslims experienced ‘otherness’ from their primary European communities and the small Ummah. A nineteen years old woman pointed out that she has to explain herself every time she purchases Muslim products, for example, when she entered a Moroccan shop to buy a praying rug, the shop owner looked strangely at her and aggressively answered: ‘this is for praying not decoration.’ In this sense, revert-Muslims are racialized and became the ‘other’ white who can never entitled to the Muslim Ummah.

One of the ladies who reverted six years ago, melancholy told her experience when a Muslim friend passed away in Belgium and some people referred to her for the process of washing and burying. She approached the mosque with the knowledge that there are a dozen of official washing and shrouding women, but the Imam was extremely outraged on the reason why people referred to her rather than him. So, Why Muslims try to distance those reverts from social and political activities? And why the engagement of those revert-Muslims is seen as a threat to the micro-Ummah? Whilst Mandaville argues that tran-slocal forces are leading the emergence of a wider Muslim public sphere, in this anecdote, it could perceive on the authoritarian forces on the micro level between transnational minorities and the quest of sovereignty over the Muslim practices and daily life as a way of claiming power in the bigger Ummah. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the role of Muslim scholars on adherence to Ummah’s ties and fostering the cooperation in transnational communities. This can be seen on the polarity on leadership nowadays between Turley and Saudi Arabia.

To conclude, this study mainly aims at highlighting the core challenges that revert Muslims face in their way to be acknowledged by the bigger Ummah in a non-Muslim country; what transformations have been happened to the diasporic minorities that cause the differences in their interpretation of the concept of Ummah. And, how the concept can assist in reconcile transnational Muslims in the current fractured Muslim world?

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Ijtihad for the Planet: Islamic Global Environmental Governance for the Ummah within ‘Night-Watchman States’

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Keywords: Green Politics, Climate Change, Peak Oil, Re-localization, Local Muslim Communities, OIC, Ijma, Ijtihad, Islamic Global Environmental Governance, Night-Watchman State.

My doctoral research concludes that there has been a distress call for *ijtihad* addressed to the potentially catastrophic consequences of ecological crisis around the globe, with the dilemma of oil[1] and climate change at the forefront. Majority of world ecologists agree that we have reached a point in history where we are in grave danger of having destroyed earth’s life-sustaining capacity. Accordingly, we will simply enter into an ‘ecological epoch’ where ecological limit determines that humankind has reached the final point in its ideological evolution. Moreover, based on the predictions of climate scientists, we seem to have passed the tipping point of sustainability already. Accordingly, we are inexorably on a downward trajectory in terms of energy use, social complexity, population growth, economic growth, and so on. Along this line of thought, a vast number of environmental scientists, philosophers and activists concurred that ‘relocalisation’ is inevitable. That is, the creation of, or transforming the existing societies into, less-unsustainable communities which are largely self-sufficient, with community-scale governance. My doctoral research (Author 2016) reveals the potential of the Ummah to advance a global network of relocalisation by local Muslim communities with leaders and activists of local Muslim groups, as the vanguards. It stands to a reason that these people live and breathe Islam within Islamic symbolic universe[2] and cosmology, and thereby, identify themselves more as members of the Ummah rather than a nation-state citizen. In this case, the environmental action is meant to be a responsibility of being a steward or guardian (khalifah) of the earth, honoring the covenant, or trust, humans have with Allah (amanah) to be protectors of the planet, moving toward justice (adl), and living in balance with nature (mizan). For that purpose, a world summit by
the Ummah is needed, where Muslim scholars and the jurisprudents (fuqaha) make comprehensive deliberation about the environmental problems and arrive at consensus (ijma). The council that arranges the summit will also need to organize regular meetings and follow-ups afterward. In my view, the council could be founded by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as the most prominent association of Muslim majority countries[3]. Muslim communities from diverse Islamic branches around the world should be called to mobilize ecological actions based upon Islamic jurisprudence in a decentralized Muslim world based upon communities. Certainly, relocalisation movement needs a complex and difficult transition strategy. Leaders and active members of the Muslim learning-communities are the basic nucleuses. They are groups of people that discover the process, organize and make it work.

In envisioning the aforesaid Islamic global environmental governance for the Ummah, however, three central issues must be taken into account:

1. The growing anti-Islamic current in the West
2. The fragmentation of the Muslim world into nation-states’ interests
3. The contemporary phenomenon of ‘Global Islam’ which has often been contested with ‘local Islam’ for political interests (e.g. for Indonesia’s case, see my work (Author 2017))

Conceptual Framework:

1. Green Politics
   Including Green’s rejection of the state system, Green’s rejection of anthropocentric ethics, and Green’s ‘limits to growth’ and ‘post-development’ arguments (e.g. see Burchill et.al. 2005; Dyer 2014; McGlinchey, Walters and Scheinpflug 2017)

2. Religion and Ecology
   Including ‘religious environmentalism’ (e.g. see Foltz, Denny and Baharuddin 2003; Watling 2009; Johnston 2010; Bauman, Bohannon and O’Brien 2011; Grim and Tucker 2014)

3. The trend and aspiration toward a united, yet decentralized, Islamic world and the movement back to the Shariah was viewed in my thesis as an opportunity for a global environmental-movement of a different kind within the Ummah (see my thesis, Author 2016)

Background

Given that there has been no single view of the causes of global environmental degradation in the face of Third World developmentalism and widespread poverty, my PhD thesis (Author 2016) offers a more realistic vision where at least one sector of humanity can possibly advance environmental movement on a global scale under its own ‘sacred canopy’, that is, a ‘global network of re-localisation by local Muslim communities’. Thereby, the thesis advocates decentralism as opposed to centralism, and Dar al-Islam Environmental governance for the Ummah within ‘night-watchman states’.

My PhD research explored the potentials of Muslim groups to advance relocalisation, or returning to smaller scale, more self-reliant communities with simpler ways of living and with self-local governance. In particular, the research investigates the role of an Islamic symbolic universe in the adherents’ decisions to act, including how this affects interactions with the nation-state and modern sciences within the Indonesian context. In advancing this argument, I rely on social constructivism as it was developed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1991), in conjunction with a Symbolic Interactionism premise, to develop a theoretical framework appropriate to Muslim communities and their voluntaristic actions. With a qualitative research method, the research focuses on four Indonesian Muslim groups. Data sources include interviews with leaders, observations, participatory observations, documents, and texts. The outcome shows that capitalising on an Islamic symbolic universe to transition Muslim communities by ‘endogenous relocalisation’ is possible and doable. Of the four Muslim organisations studied, all had potential for support of relocalisation in different
ways, with X and Y providing the closest example of green intentional communities which can be transformed into models of endogenous relocalisation by Muslim groups.

[1] Whether oil has peaked already as some believe, or whether there are still abundant oil reserves as others argue. In case of the former, we are in the brink of scarcity; in case of the latter, we have too much oil that we are ‘cooking the planet’ with it, given that the environmental degradation, in mathematical language, is a function of (i) economic growth, in which energy is needed; and of (ii) human consumption, in which population, human needs, and lifestyle are factors.

[2] The ‘lens’ with which one peers into social reality. Symbolic universe also draws allegiance, bestows meanings, and sets forth ‘normative authority’ (what makes normative claims legitimately binding for that person).

[3] OIC consists of 57 member states with 47 countries being Muslim majority countries

References


Worksop IV

03 August 2019 – Saturday / 14:00 – 17:00
Conference Hall

Chair: Yunus Kaya

Shamima Raihan Manzoor
Analysing the Push Pull Factors for the Sustainable Impact of Inbound International Muslims in Malaysia: An Emerging Diaspora of Integrated Transnational Islam

Yousef Naimi
Challenges of the ‘Muslim Ummah’ in a Post-Colonial Society – a Case Study of the Muslim Community in Belgium

Inam Ullah Leghari
Digital Ummah and Novel Ways of Belonging: A Case of Pakistani Diaspora Community in Athens, Greece

Baptiste Brodard
From Transnational Islamic Movements to New Ways of Understanding Islam - Between Normative Authorities and Individual Religiosity in Europe

Muhammed Roshan CK
Between Transnational Ummah and Contextual Realities: Challenges and Politics of Praxis among Muslims of India

Ulvah Nur’aeni Ulvah
Ideological Contestation on Youtube; between Salafi and Nahdhatul ‘Ulama in Indonesia
The migration in the form of immigration and emigration of global diverse Muslim population towards Malaysia is a recent phenomenon dating approximately back to the early years of the past couple of decades. The rise of Transnational Islamic civil societies to a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic country like Malaysia deepens its Muslim implantation in recent years, which is mostly through educational migration as well as due to the Muslim expatriates and MM2H (Malaysia My Second Home) visa holders.

Transnational Islam manifests itself through an orientation not towards a particular migration circuit or diaspora communities (e.g. Iranian, Turkish, etc.) but towards the imagined community of Muslims at large either within one society or across many. Most of the studies related to transnational Islam have been done in the Western context highlighting the prospect of transnational Islam therein, though the idea has been spreading also in Muslim countries due to globalized social media. However, the conglomeration of Muslims and converted Muslims from various sources of origin throughout the world makes Malaysia a conducive place to study on Transnational Islam. It is a timely endeavour to explore the prospects of the actualisation of the Islamic Ummah with the goal of “Making a place for Islam” irrespective of different origins in a pre-dominantly Muslim country. There are certain cohesive factors to be investigated that help the Muslim immigrants here to be integrated into a transnational society.

The anecdotes behind the migration of Muslims from various parts of the world towards Malaysia are varied. Though migration theory originated from the econo-
mists who were mainly concerned about the movement of people from one locality to another, the complexity of the topic has researchers and academics across disciplines investigating how migration affects individuals, communities, infrastructures, resources and value systems. Previous researchers pointed out that the migration process is selective because factors such as age, gender, and social class affect the way these conditions shape the migrating people’s ability to overcome obstacles. Furthermore, personal factors such as a person’s education, knowledge of a potential receiving country’s culture and systems, and family ties can also facilitate or impede migration.

The current study analysed the push-pull factors under the Theory of Migration, influencing the international Muslim migration towards Malaysia to incorporate the aspect of diaspora philanthropy into the framework of transnational Islamic activism for the ‘totality of all Muslims’, irrespective of their places of origin. This idea of a transnational Muslim community has always had a great appeal, perhaps more so now than ever before. The study has used both quantitative and qualitative components. The list of push and pull factors developed from the relevant literature were pre-tested among a group of experts to ensure the contextualisation of these factors based on the diaspora of Transnational Islam before conducting the main survey. Two non-probability sampling techniques were used to decide on the sampling. Snowball sampling was used to select the respondents for the quantitative survey, and purposive sampling was used to select people for qualitative interviews.

A self-administered survey was conducted among 100 international Muslim immigrants residing in Malaysia comprising both students and expatriates. Besides that, six in-depth interviews with the international Muslim immigrants who were residing in Malaysia for more than 5 years were conducted to reflect their insights regarding the prospects of Transnational Islam in line with the goal of a united ummah. Moreover, every effort was made to diversify the samples and make them as much representative as possible by assigning a certain quota to the country of origin, professional categories, age, marital status, duration of stay in Malaysia of the respondents, so that the samples are not concentrated only on a certain group of people. The survey respondents were given 7-points Likert Scale options to show their degree of agreement/disagreement regarding their source country push factors and the host country pull factors behind such their migration. Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS 22) was used to analyse the frequencies of these factors against the international Muslim students and expatriates residing in Malaysia. Moreover, One Way ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) was utilized to compare means between these two groups of respondents that have an impact on building the united ummah in the perspective of Transnational Islam in Malaysia. Then the semi-structured interviews conducted among a fraction of the same group of international Muslims in Malaysia helped to extract the insights on the future prospects and the consequences of people’s religious beliefs, behaviours, and practices as an integrated community manifesting Transnational Islam.

The mostly highlighted push factors in this study were low levels of education, poverty and the struggle of livelihood, violation of human rights, political unrest and religious discrimination. Among the pull factors, the most significant ones are geopolitical relationships, favourable migration laws, cultural/language similarities, social factors, religious factors, and cost of living. The outcome of this study can provide thoughtful insights on the affirmative impact of certain pull factors of the host country of this study (i.e. Malaysia) on upholding the immigrants’/emigrants’ same mind frame even after migration and thus building optimism for a sustainable transnational Islamic Diaspora. This could also serve as another means of enriching their religious (Islamic) knowledge and awareness of Islamic obligations to other Muslims. The further implication of this study is to generate the food for thoughts for the Muslim scholars, activists and policy makers on initiating a sustainable integrated public sphere which is uniform, homogenous, and beneficial for the Muslim ummah at large.
References


This presentation seeks to present a case study of the ‘Muslim community’ in Belgium and their challenges in becoming a united and established ‘ummah’. The reason I have chosen this particular country is that it is the country that I am native to and most involved in. Like many other European countries, the growing phenomenon of islamophobia has heavily infiltrated not only the political but also the media sphere. It is not uncommon to be confronted with weekly media articles surrounding Muslims and their practices, such as fasting during Ramadan, Islamic preachers from abroad, the Islamic veil or headscarf. Aside from this politics has taken a drastic shift to the right, resulting in a rhetoric which constantly centers around Muslims; examples of this are the notion to ban halal slaughter, headscarf bans in education and public functions and to possibly want to change the law regarding freedom of education to stop the establishment of Islamic schools in Flanders. As Belgium was the target for terror attacks in the past, with the most recent and prolific in 2016, many policies have come forth concerning Muslims and the need to prevent so called ‘radicalisation’. The most recent development in this, is that ‘Salafism’ has become equitable with radical jihadist ideology. Making Muslims who choose to adhere to a certain orthodox lifestyle the target of constant criticism and even hatred from inside as well as outside the community.

**Orientalist Narratives in the Media and Politics**

One example of orientalist narratives in the media and politics if often the discourse surrounding Muslim women. The right wing ‘New-Flemish Alliance’ party has been instrumentalising women, who are from Muslim majority countries like Iran and who no longer identify as Muslim to spread a narrative which portrays Muslim women as
This is also often linked with their dress. The more veiled they are, the more oppressed they are. These women are presented as being without agency and because the female politicians in question come from a Muslim background, the rebuttal is very difficult. Despite there being many female Muslim activists who wear the hijab, it is near enough impossible to refute it, because the media is often complicit in allowing them a platform.

**Headscarf/Islamic Swimwear Bans**

This topic leads on from the previous. The orientalist narratives are means to impose Islamophobic and misogynistic measures against Muslim women, such as the headscarf and more recently also the ‘burkini’ (covered swimsuit) ban. Since 2013 Belgium has instated a headscarf ban in public schools for students. Headscarves have never been allowed for teachers unless they teach Islamic studies. Aside from public schools, catholic schools and public functions (in certain cities) also do not allow it. After a few bans were instated it had a waterfall effect on other institutions and companies, such as healthcare givers, social workers or any function in a private company where there is client-contact. This is one of the many very difficult challenges the Muslim community in Belgium faces, as it hinders young girls not only in their development, but also stops them from pursuing the career of their dreams. Often at times they will be required to do an internship for their studies, in which the hijab is not allowed so they drop out. Aside from this, every election the headscarf debate is a recurring theme, which dominates the political discourse.

**Resistance Toward Islamic Schools and Education**

This has lead to the need for the community to establish their own Islamic schools, however this has to this day still not materialised. Many parties across the political spectrum are playing into the fear narrative, saying that the community will segregate and it could lead to radicalisation. Whenever a school is about to be established their will be copious media attention, and often links made by the media and politicians to stop the school from opening. This has happened in the city of Mechelen and is currently happening with a school in Gent.

**Radicalisation**

The topic of radicalisation and counter terrorism policies have resulted world wide in an operation which makes perceived Muslimness something to be afraid and suspicious of. This is definitely the case in Belgium, where policies have been instated to police the community, by outsiders such as social workers; to spot ‘potential signs of radicalisation’. Issues such as dressing in a certain manner, not wanting to shake the hand of the other sex or asking to pray at work instantly become pointers to show that someone has the possibility to ‘radicalise’. The link between the so-called conservative Muslim and jihadi is quickly made, which has led to the demonization of ‘Salafism’. For example, any imam who has studied in Saudi Arabia, regardless of their religious views today, is viewed as radical and a danger to society.

**Good Muslim/Bad Muslim Dichotomy**

This all has resulted in various reactions from members of the supposed Muslim community themselves. The common theme in this is that it has led to an extremely divided community, where some members agree with government policies and those who disagree are portrayed as the ‘bad Muslims’. This dichotomy is widely played out in the media and used by government bodies to create a narrative of a ‘Belgian or European Muslim’ i.e. ‘the good Muslim’ or even ‘the enlightened Muslim’ versus ‘the bad Muslim’, which can mean conservative or simply even critical of the government/establishment. Awareness about this phenomenon is only now beginning to take shape within the community. Where often Muslims who actively contribute are unaware of the division that is being caused by contributing to narrative, which is ultimately destructive for the entire ‘ummah’ in Belgium. An example of this an initiative by several imams, who portray themselves as the only reliable Muslims in teaching the community a ‘Belgian variant of Islam, compatible with human rights’. This of course is extremely damaging and leaves from the notion that the rest of Mus-
lims are not compatible with human rights and they do not believe in the western values, such as: male/female equality, freedom of speech etc.

**Conclusion**

Whenever the Muslim ummah in Belgium seeks a means to strengthen themselves and empower their own Islamically through employment or education, this is halted by the political forces that be and further exacerbated by the media. There seems to be a very strong orientalistic undertone because the Muslim community is often portrayed as not being able to take care of their own. The ultimate goal from the forces that be therefore seems to be assimilation. Whether it’s halal slaughter or the headscarf ban, perceived notions of outward Muslimness are demonised and constantly criticised. This is an ongoing struggle for the community and creates much division. I hope that this analysis of the current situation in Belgium will not only be recognisable for other Muslims in Europe/the Western world, but that this becomes a topic of discussion to see how we as a global community can tackle this ever-aggravating issue.

**References**


**Bibliography:**


Abstract
This intended research proposal is about Pakistani migrants in Greece. Pakistanis are one of the largest Muslim immigrant group (excluding Albanians) settled recently in Greece. Drawing on ethnographic field work and using qualitative research methods in Athens, Greece, this paper will explain challenges faced by Pakistani Diaspora in Athens, Greece. It will also show the use of ICTs (information communication technologies) by Pakistani migrants to theorize how media-scapes are linked with novel forms of community and Ummah, cultural reproduction, religious identity and transnationalism among Punjabi Barelvi Sufis settled in Athens. More specifically this research paper will show how followers of transnational Sufi Barelvi missionary movement called Dawat-e-Islami’ (‘Invitation towards Islam) use ICTs to construct community and transnational Ummah which is expression of transnational Sufism among Pakistani Diaspora in Athens, Greece.

Introduction
In this age of migration and globalization (Lewellen2002, Castle and Miller 1993), the circulation of culture, people and ideas make the ummah (the community of Muslim believers) all the more visible as a concept, especially in diaspora context. Greece has both Autochthonous Muslim population as well as Muslim diaspora consisting of economic migrants and recently arrived refugees. In Greece, the Muslim diaspora communities are from diverse ethnic back grounds originating from countries like Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Egypt, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Sudan, and Morocco etc. The majority of Muslim migrants in Athens are Sunni Muslims who have
moved from localized Islam of homelands to Global Islam or Ummah. These Muslim migrants face many challenges during migration process. The biggest challenges comes how to preserve their faith and religious identity while facing minority status, racism and Islamophobia, marginalization and uncertainty of livelihood. Among these emerging Muslim immigrant communities, Pakistanis are one of the largest Muslim diaspora group (excluding Albanians) settled recently in Greece. The history and influx of Pakistani migration in Greece started in the early 1970s as male labour migration to work in the Greek shipyards (like Skaramaga at Piraeus) as a result of bilateral treaties between Greece and Pakistan (see Leghari 2009, Triandafyllidou, 2010). However, the number of these Pakistani migrants in Greece was less than few hundred. Pakistani immigrants are one of the early migrants settled in Greece as compared to post 1990 arrivals of migrants from Balkan countries like Albanians, Bulgarians and Romanians. Subsequently during coming decades, Pakistani migration increased as chain migration, ultimately giving rise to the current situation where Pakistani diaspora numbering approximately 50,000 to 70,000 (See also Tonchev 2007; Leghari 2009).

The pattern of Pakistani migration to Greece in many ways differs and varies that to the UK, where long standing Pakistani diaspora is now well recognized, with offspring spanning several generations (see for example Bolognani 2007; Charsley 2007; Werbner 2004.) The migration experiences of Pakistani diaspora in Greece may be seen as fairly comparable to other Southern European countries such as Italy or Spain where the migration started more recently (See for example Kalra 2009; Nobil Ahmad 2009).

Most of the Pakistani migrants in Greece do manual work in professions such as laborers, welders, masons, and mechanics and also in Agriculture sector of Greece. Pakistanis also work in the processing industries, construction work and service sectors. Employment and work conditions of Pakistani migrants in Greece are characterized by low pay, long working hours and social or physical isolation (see Leghari, 2009). There are also Pakistani immigrants who run private ethnic business or entrepreneurship like grocery stores, travel agencies, internet cafes and telephone calling centers etc. These ethnic businesses cater the needs of immigrant community. These small-scale businesses are run through local social networks of trusted friends, fellow villagers and members of the Biraderi (Kinship group)). Majority of Pakistani immigrants in Greece are semi-literate, residing in poor and overcrowded bachelor housing conditions. These Pakistani immigrants use often social networks to find work and settle in new migration context (see Leghari, 2009). The prominent feature of the Pakistani Migrants in Greece is that they predominantly consist of males of various ages. These migrants are largely ‘first generation’ males, with very low levels of family reunification trends owing to bureaucratic and administrative barriers in the Greek immigration system. Pakistani immigrants constitute an ethnically homogenous community as majority of them come from Punjabi ethnic group originating from some specific areas of Gujrat District of rural Punjab.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

This paper will use the concept of Transnational Muslim Public Sphere (Eickelman and Anderson, 1999). According to them a Transnational Muslim Public sphere is being opened up through the use of Information and Communication Technologies (Eickelman and Anderson, 1999). This paper will show how the Muslim diaspora minorities and communities in the non-Muslim countries are using this emerging Muslim public sphere to practice their religion and constructing Ummah and Transnational identities. It will also show the use of ICTs (information communication technologies) to theorize how media-scapes (Appandurai) are linked with novel forms of constructing Ummah and community, cultural reproduction, religious identity and transnationalism among Punjabi Barelvi Sufis settled in Athens, Greece.

This paper or research proposal will try to explore following aspects of Pakistani migrants in Greece.

1- This paper will explain Pakistani Diaspora and challenges faced by them especially in minority context in Greece.
It will also show the use of ICTs (information communication technologies) to theorize how media-scenes (Appandurai) are linked with novel forms of constructing Ummah and community, cultural reproduction, religious identity and transnationalism among Punjabi Barelvi Sufis settled in Athens, Greece.

2-More specifically this research will show the how followers of transnational Sufi Barelvi missionary movement called Dawat-e-Islami (‘Invitation towards Islam) use ICTs to construct community and transnational Ummah and transnational Sufism among Pakistani Diaspora in Athens, Greece.

Expected outcomes

The expected outcome of research proposal will be result in the final version of proceeding paper for the International ILEM Summer School being held in Istanbul, Turkey.

References


Introduction

Over the last few decades, three main religious phases can be identified within Islamic communities in Western European countries. First Islamic associations depended on the migrants’ home countries’ institutions (Césari, 1998). Later, the development of Islamic organizations linked to transnational religious movements, such as the Tabligh, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Salafist movements, addressed more specifically young Muslims born in those countries. Their religious offer differed significantly from Islamic trends followed by migrant parents as they implied activism within the society and rejected ethnic boundaries (Amghar et al., 2007). Thirdly, a new type of local and grassroots associations arose, often youth-driven and mostly independent from the Islamic movements (Barylo, 2017). These three steps represent a common evolution in various countries over the last three decades. This first purpose of this paper is to outline recent evolutions in the Islamic ideological influences in mosques and religious discourses over the last few years in Western Europe by highlighting the transition between these three phases.

A second purpose concerns the new challenges led by the decline of traditional authorities which is coupled with the increase of personalized discourses on Islam and the multiplication of religious offers.

State of the art

Islamic movements and organizations in Europe have already been studied for several decades. However, most research focuses on specific Islamic movements and organizations and fails to provide an overall insight on Islamic trends within a country or even a city. Indeed, research studies mostly described specific movements such as the Tabligh and the Muslim Brotherhood through the lenses of their concrete activities within deprived neighborhoods mostly in France (Kepel, 1987; Khedimel-lah 2001).
Other research indirectly addresses transnational organizations and religious movements while focusing on specific subjects such as religious education or social welfare services (Césari, 1998). Samir Amghar (2013) finally managed to provide an accurate presentation of influential Islamic movements in Europe, focusing on activism and political Islam but extending his description to other transnational movements. Contrary to Amghar’s top-down approach, I would argue that ideologies and authoritative norms are not blindly implemented by the actors: if they may incorporate these norms, they also transform and redefine them according to their own context, sensibilities, and interests. I identified a gap in the academic literature between macro research studies grounded in political science, which provide an insight of the main Islamic organizations and religious movements exploring their global strategies and inner management, and micro empirical researches using ethnographic tools, which studied concrete local phenomena such the influence of Islamic discourses among the youth. These latter often fail to connect their findings to ideological religious trends implemented from above.

**Methodological Approach**

To complete the top-down approaches mentioned above, qualitative methods such as observation and in-depth interviews were needed to identify concrete practices and discourses beyond organizations’ strategies.

This paper aims to provide a rare but needed longitudinal view on Islamic ideological trends and their influence in Western European countries, France and Switzerland in particular. In this respect, it refers to the academic literature as well as to several field observations held from 2005 to 2018 in various countries, including France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Belgium. These field researches were grounded in an ethnographic approach and included both participant observation and informal interviews.

In addition to this background data, the paper mainly refers to empirical data collected through a doctoral research study which focuses on Islamic organizations providing social welfare services.

**Assumption / Argument**

In addition to the academic literature, field research led to the identification of major trends in the Islamic thought within specific temporal and geographical contexts. At the beginning of the 2000s, Islamic religious offer in Europe was shared between transnational movements characterized by their activism and inclusiveness of Muslims regardless of their ethnic backgrounds, and Islamic organizations from foreign states. The first outcome of my paper is to present these main Islamic movements and their features, particularly focusing on their implication in social work and political fields.

Further, the paper argues that we entered in a new configuration, in which transnational movements and the organizations underpinning them have already lost much influence, although they still offer numerous services and activities. Over the last years, many Islamic associations independent from both Islamic transnational movements and foreign religious organizations were launched by Muslim citizens. Some of them were designed to meet social and educational needs, while others focus on advocacy and inclusion of Muslims in society. Their major trend is their religious and ideological rupture with the previous Islamic organizations. Henceforth, new ways to understand Islam and to follow religious norms have arisen, particularly among the youth. Observations have shown that these new youth-led organizations still look for their ways to approach Islamic knowledge and navigate between different religious influences. Their common trend is their will to contextualize Islam and their quest for knowledge tackling the traditional frameworks they previously met in the mosques.

Islamic social work will be used as an example to argue the decline of transnational Islamic movements’ influence. Two ethnographic studies showed that Islamic associations involved in social work were increasingly independent from transnational movements and religious organizations. This sheds light on a new religiosity showing certain independence of Muslims towards the previ-
ous major organisations or religious movements.

More broadly, the development of such independent Islamic associations is an expression of the increase of new ideologies and new trends within the community. Over the last years, Islamic discourses have been increasingly spread through the Internet, which led to the success of “independent” preachers, whose reformist views compete with traditional or mainstream Islamic teachings.

In brief, this shift within Islamic communities’ trends in Europe revolves around three main aspects:

1) Personalization and individualization of religiosity: In a secular environment, many Islamic interpretations are available on the “market”. Muslims have to choose and to build their own religiosity (see Roy, 2001).

2) Crisis of authority: the diversification and multiplication of “knowledge” sources and their “free” access give many options to Muslims looking for “Islam”. This ties in also with the individualization of religious choices.

3) Integration of Muslims in their home countries contributes to define a local Islam, which tends to claim independence from foreign organisations and transnational movements. Islamic texts are read in the light of the context (see Hamid, 2008).

In that context, there is a multiplicity of religious offers and Islamic positions which leads to a competition for “orthodoxy” in the construction of a new Islamic normativity, or conversely, the maintenance of the previous religious models.

Conclusion

The Muslim landscape, particularly in Europe, has become increasingly complex. An overall insight highlighting Islamic movements and their development over the last few decades in Western European countries is needed to better understand the current challenges related to the evolution of Islamic thought in that part of the world. It implies a multidisciplinary approach deeply grounded in empirical qualitative research including participant observation and interviews. Moreover, it involves a longitudinal insight as it examines the evolution of a phenomenon over time. Finally, it is a subject of high importance as new Islamic ideological and theoretical trends may, more than ever, create a transnational impact and contribute to the continuous definition of the worldwide Islamic Ummah.

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Amghar, Samir (2013), L’islam militant en Europe, Infolio, Gollion.


Introduction

In historical and contemporary discourses of Islamic theology and politics, the concept of Ummah has produced a cluster of meanings and imaginations that have far-reaching implications. It conceptualized as a universal framework for religious unity that accommodates various socio-cultural, linguistic, geographic and ethnic diversities among believers; a state of mind/ consciousness; an imagined community with a shared religion, culture and language; a collective identity that embodies ideological, ethical, behavioural and cognitive values and morals of Islam (Denny 1975; Ejaz 2004; Hassan 2006; Sayyid 2014). Concepts like Dar al-Islam (abode of Islam), Dar al-Harb (abode of war/non-believers), Hijra (migration), Caliphate, jihad operates in larger ideological foundations of the Ummah. However, Colonialism, Modernity, secularism and emergence of nation-states have tremendously reconfigured the pre-colonial habitus of the Islamicate world. Since then, the arbitrarily global world has restrictively obsessed with a predominant form of a political community, the Western, secular, liberal nation-state (Mandeville 2001; Hallaq 2012). Muslim countries were not exempted from the nationalism. The incorporation to nationalism alongside ‘Ummatic’ consciousness has produced a dual identity among the Muslim countries. Often, the later identity is eclipsed in the nation’s political and economic interests (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996). However, when nations marked by geographical and political borders, many Muslim societies turned into the minorities that live under the “protection” of the secular states and its constitution. This research paper developed on the basic assumption that the experiences of the minority Muslims are juxtaposed between many other concerns and trends of the majoritarian society and radically different from the other Muslim majority nation-states.

Challenges of being a Minority Community: The Case of Indian Muslims

During the struggle against British colonialism, Muslim aspirations in the Indian subcontinent had primarily three propositions. Firstly, a Muslim nationalism emerged after post World War-I events of the dismemberment of Ottoman Caliphate which popularly articulated through Khilafat movement that had pan Islamic sentiments. It eventually led to the creation of Pakistan. Secondly, the interventions of traditionalists or religious scholars on the religious status of India under British rule and considering it as Dar al-Islam as long as it allows practising of Shari’a. Thirdly, Secular modern Muslims refuting pan-Islamism and identity politics. In any way these are not static categories, these trends ran across the Muslims of
India (Metcalf 1992; Sanyal 2010; Fazal 2014). Later, Partition had extremely changed the identities, history, and relationships of the Muslims in India. However, India constitutionally adopted secularism as its cardinal principle of Indian diversity, the question of loyalty and belonging of Indian Muslims to India or Pakistan have been a matter of serious debate in the public sphere and everyday politics of India. In other words, categorization of Hindus and Muslims into, “We”/“Us” versus “You”/“Them” and reinforcing the historical conceptualization of Hindu/Indian and Muslim/foreign assumptions deeply cemented among Indian consciousness (Pandey 1999). On the other hand, within Indian Muslims, the advancement of Pakistan (then Bangladesh) as secular and multi-religious nation-states instead of proposed Islamic state perceived as a failure of modern Muslim politics in the Indian subcontinent (Pandey 1999; Fazal 2014). In this context of India, Ulama, intelligentsia and Muslims, in general, have been developed new conceptions, interpretations and consciousness for the religious justification of Muslim presence in India while imagining transnational Ummah.

Further, many theories on nationalism have observed that nationalism primarily constructed on two premises. An essential and natural core that is claimed to be the soul of the nation that constitutes the majorities or mainstream of the nation. Secondly, the other minorities confined within the boundaries of the nation. Some others have argued the political rationality of modern state have played a crucial role in altering established religious difference, creating new forms of communal polarization and constructing new-fangled forms of communal polarization and formulating religion more rather than less relevant to minority and majority identities alike (Pandey 1999; Asad 2003; Mahmood 2015). A visible turn towards the natural majoritarian core of India emerged after the 1980s when Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) entered with the propaganda of Hindutva identitarian politics. However, BJP officially adopted secularism as its policy, but later it became more violent and communal. The manifestations of Hindutva’s communal approach towards Muslims became more dreadful in the demolition of historical Babri Masjid of Ayodhya in 1992; Communal riot in BJP administered Gujarat in 2002; mob lynchings incidents against Muslims for disregarding Hindu sentiments in killing and consuming cows; rapes which targeted to fear Muslim families; Ghar vapasi (lit.return to home, a campaign of forced conversion to Hinduism) and many other incidents (Ahmad 2002; Engineer 2004; Rauf 2011). In 2014, Narendra Modi, the towering figure of Hindutva politics – chief minister during Gujrath riots- took the prime ministerial portfolio of India with a landslide majority in parliament. Since then, Hindu nationalist claims have received new vigour. The saffronization of curricula, universities, media democratic institutions and positions have become visibly dominant. On the other hand, the questions of loyalty and belonging of Muslims of India became the routine in the right-wing rhetoric. The marginalisation of the Muslim minority and deep silence of the BJP government on assaults against Muslims loudly enunciated the intention of the right-wing nationalism. The migration of a fringe group of extremist in Muslims to the ISIS strengthened the Hindutva argumentation and campaigns against Islamophobic stereotypes among majoritarian Hindus (Hill 2017; Jalil 2019).

In the contemporary context, as a politics of praxis, Muslims of India along with secular nationalist parties actively engage in politics for reclaiming the “real” secularism of India. Rather than secularity of the secularism, in the everyday context of India, secularism predominantly perceived as a harmonious and peaceful relationship with Hindus, Muslims and Christian along with other religions. In analyzing the colonial and contemporary context of Muslims of India, this paper calls for more nuanced understanding between idealized textual understanding of Ummah and contextual meanings, interpretations and implications considering the concrete realities and material existence of Muslims in each nationhood.

**Research Questions**

Thus, this study seeks to explore two sets of questions. Firstly, how Muslims of India -the third largest Muslim population in the world- relates to institutions and ideals of the Islamic Ummah? How differences in geopolitical contexts influence the conceptualization of Ummah? In
the second part, this paper tries to investigate what are the tensions/challenges of being a Muslim in contemporary India? Where Indian Muslims identity positioned in the complex political context of India?

**Methodology**

For analytical purpose, this study focus on Khilafat movement (1919-1924), Partition of India and Pakistan (1947) and Gujarat riots (2002). The first two incidents are the specific historical moments in the history of Muslims in India that had invoked serious concerns and debates about the mode of Muslim existence in the subcontinent and their relation to the transnational Ummah. The third one, Gujarat riot often labelled as “Hindutva laboratory” which raised alarming questions about the future survival of Muslims as a minority under the protection of the constitution. In so doing, I extensively use the primary and secondary literature that has produced in Urdu and English languages that deals with the research questions and three case studies.

**References**


Ideological Contestation on Youtube; between Salafi and Nahdhatul ‘Ulama in Indonesia

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Keywords: Ideology, Contestation, Religious Authority, the ‘Ulama, Salafi, Nahdhatul ‘Ulama, Social Media, Youtube, Doctrines, Islam.

Introduction

In the case of Indonesia, religious authority shifted from the ‘Ulama and religious institutions (Such as Nahdhatul ‘Ulamā (NU) and Muhammadiyah) to Salafi Ustaz. As charismatic leaders and the biggest institutions, people usually came into them to ask some advices such as religion guidance, family matters, economic business, and political support [1]. However, the religious authority faded because of the massive dakwa movement of Salafi in prohibiting bid’ah (innovations) practices[2].

Progressively, the religious authority contests between the two group are evident in cyberspace. There are 34 iMuslim websites which are affiliated with the Salafi group, such as www.arrahmah.com, www.nahimunkar.net, www.voaismam.com, etc. Although, NU which its aims fighting accusations of Salafi, radicalism, terrorism and Shi’a teaching has 100 websites. Both of them, Salafi and NU, argue to each other, claim the truth and express the hate speech [3].

Based on the reality, this study aims to highlight how does media social interact with ideological struggles, and how does the creation of social media become a focal point of contest over power in Indonesia. This investigation provides the reality that social media in Indonesia has been a key in deploying religious understandings and sustaining collective activities of Islamic movement, in particular, Salafi and NU.

By examining detailed phenomenon, this study is limited to two cases. The first examines Salafi and NU. The second explores both religious groups on YouTube. From these two cases, the study has the major questions to be answered: (1) How YouTube is used by Salafi and NU in...
ideological contestation; (2) How YouTube can greatly facilitate the dissemination of Salafi and NU doctrines;

The study uses YouTube as a platform of free expression for exploring debates between Salafi and NU. As Strangelove said that a “considerable number of video boggers on YouTube engage in debates over religion”[4]. Moreover, Berger and Green assert that YouTube could be a medium of an antagonistic debate between one or more YouTubers that “can sometimes be based around controversial debates (especially religion, atheism or politics)” [5]. In other word, ideological contestation on YouTube is an effective platform for disseminating messages due to the ease of uploading and editing video clips and comments [6].

Ideological contestation between Salafi and NU on YouTube has been undertaken in several ways, namely competing ideas and arguments, organizing contents as creative as possible, and deploying the abundant information. These methods are carried out influencing Muslim thought and action.

For instance, on video of Rodja TV channel [8], Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawas as one of Salafi figure, Jawas conveyed that following their path was a compulsory matter. Salafi is Islam itself in which inherited by Rasulullah saw. He claimed that Salafi was the path that was given nikmat Sunna. Nikmat Sunna is a giving of free from false teaching dan understanding such as doing bid’ah practices. People practicing bid’ah have to be invited and showed the true way.

In Indonesia, NU is a group that is always regarded as bid’ah performer. The group asserted that maulid (commemoration of the Prophet birth), tawassul (intermediary), and tabarruk (seeking blessing) are not bid’ah, nevertheless practices was recommended by Nabi Muhammad. Therefore, to overcome various allegations, the NU Channel uploaded a video about it [9].

On the video, Qosim Arsyadani Shomad explained the prayer intended for people died would be conveyed. Not only the prayer is dedicated from the children to their parents, but also the prayer can be dedicated for everyone else. Shomad’s opinion is based on the prayer which is read at the third raka‘at of prayer for the body. The goal of the pray are requests Allah kindness for people who is died.

In addition, Shomad discussed the argumentation of grave pilgrimage practice. It was state in hadith, “I once forbade you to make a pilgrimage to the grave, so now please make a pilgrimage” therefore, Muhammad allowed its.

**Research Method**

Data sources in the study are based on secondary data by collecting YouTube videos affiliated to Salafi and NU groups. YouTube accounts choosen are Rodja TV, Yufid TV-Pengajian dan Ceramah Islam, and Halo Ustadz as representation of Salafi. Moreover, YouTube accounts affiliated to NU are NU Channel, Al-Bahjah TV and Tafaqquh Video. These accounts were considered because of having three aspects as above: containing argumentation, the creative contents, and having more than 100k subscribers.

The analysis method used is authority online theory in which developed by Campbell. This theory is used to prove that “The question of authority in religious engagement online involves investigating multiple layers of authority...researchers must identify what specific form or type of authority is being affected.”. To Campbell, The multiple layers consist of religious hierarchy, structure, ideology, and text [10].

**Outline**

The study would be organized in several discussions. The first is bringing religion into social media in Indonesia. This part explains how do process and history of YouTube use in expressing religious experiences. The second is Youtube as religious platform. It explores how is effectiveness of YouTube in disseminating religious messages and sustaining Islamic activism movement. The Fourth is the consciousness of Salafi and NU in contributing on YouTube. This discussion was taken because of on several videos affiliated to both of groups asserted that neces-
sary to do dakwa through YouTube. The Fifth is creative content: intriguing and delightful dakwa. This discussion and afterwards is an answer of the major questions. The sixth is the dynamics of ideological contestation: dissam-inating the doctrines.

References


[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7dghY-miz34I&t=1149s

[9] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQfwbd218B8

Worksop V

03 August 2019 – Saturday / 14:00 – 17:00

Grand Hall

Chair: Asena Demirer

Sümayra Yıldız Yücel
Discursive Shifts in The Umma Imagination: Transnational Islam as a Global Civil Society

Muammar Zayn Qadafy
The term “Ummah” in Early Exegetical Literatures: Reading History Through al-Tabari (d. 310)

Ahmed Badawi Mustapha
The Ummah between Dar-al Islam and Dar-al Kufr

Nagat Emara
Conceptual Transformations of the Umma in the Age of Nationalism

Thomas Simpkins
Imagining the Abode of Muslims: The Idea of the Muslim World Revisited
The message of Islam is open to all peoples regardless of ethnicity, nationality, race or social hierarchies. Transnationalism is not only an element built into the teaching of Islam but also ritual observances. Muslim transnationalism has a history dating back to the early Islamic community formation. Muslim transnationalism in the Middle Ages was thriving. The worlds of commerce and scholarship created combined a vibrant space of transnational exchange linking merchants and scholars from Africa to Arabia and across to Persia, India and further East, by thirteenth century. Wallerstein defines the modern world system as capitalist world system identified by a distinctive structure of production and exchange. Borrowing from Wallerstein’s conceptualization, Voll (1994) argues that Muslims have also created an “Islamic world system” which is not based on economic unity but a distinctive set of “sociomoral symbols” for definition of proper human relations. In other words, he conceptualizes Islam as a world system of a “community of discourse” (Voll 1994). He argues that it was that mutually intelligible discourse among all who identify themselves as Muslims that enables the great Muslim traveler Ibn Battuta to journey in the 14th century from North Africato China and yet remain within Dar-al-Islam.

To make sense of the contemporary Muslim politics one needs to take the context of globalization in which these movements operated into consideration. Globalization created a context in which states’ ability to influence decisions and outcomes was limited due to the rise of the global economy, internationalization of information and communication technologies, the expansion of transnational actors, movements, and electronic spheres. Given the high levels of interconnectedness across borders

**Keywords:** Umma, Global Civil Society, Transnational Islam, Transnationalism.

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even the most localized interpretations of Islam are inevitably influenced by global trends and the volume of Muslim transnational activism increased (Mandaville 2007).

Transnational aspect of Muslim politics gained more importance as the number of Muslims living as immigrants and minorities increase. As of 2017, one-fifth of the world’s Muslims live as minorities in non-Muslim countries (Lipka 2017). While the Middle East-North Africa region is home to only about twenty percent of the world’s Muslims, sixty two percent of the Muslims globally live in the Asia-Pacific region. Over fifty countries have Muslim-majority populations, while other groups of believers are clustered in minority communities in nations on nearly every continent. This statistics shows that a researcher who wants to study Muslim politics has to take transnational activities into consideration and any scholar examining GCS misses a huge part of the picture.

Adamson emphasizes institutional and geopolitical structures along with discursive underpinnings of Muslim community. She conceptualizes Islam as an “infrastructure of political opportunities” that provide both ideational and material resources to individual norm entrepreneurs. Discursive opportunity structures, a concept from the social movements literature, refers to the symbolic, cultural and ideational resources that are available for political entrepreneurs to draw upon when engaging in strategic framing (Goffman 1974). Adamson (1994) argues that, Liberalism is one such discursive opportunity structure and Political Islam constitutes a parallel, but not wholly separate, set of internally diverse discursive, institutional, and geopolitical opportunity structures that provide resources to draw upon.

In the last two decades a vibrant Constructivist research agenda has developed around norms, the dynamics of normative change, and the role norms played in political change. However, the research agenda on norms and normative change has been ill-equipped to shed light on transnational actors or the role of Islamism in international affairs. Adamson (1994) identifies two reasons responsible for Constructivism’s failure to account for transnational and Islamist actors in global politics. First, because of a “liberal bias”, mainstream social constructivists exclusively focused on liberal actors promoting liberal norms in the international system. Second, a lack of theory regarding the relationship between individual agents and global ideological structures led to an apolitical view of “norm entrepreneurs” rather than actors who are deeply embedded within particular ideological and geopolitical configurations in world politics. On the other hand, when religion does emerge in the international relations literature, it is invariably in the works of skeptics of international society. Religion, in their view, is often a primitive force working against the possibility of a meaningful international society (Hashmi 1996). Instead, as in the writings of Bernard Lewis, Robert Kaplan, and Samuel Huntington, religion promotes a “clash of civilizations.”

The concept of umma has been constituted a foundational block of Muslim identity since the establishment of the Medina community as a source of solidarity and cooperation. However, there has been discursive shifts in the Muslim’s umma imagination throughout the history. In this project, I seek to investigate discursive shifts, normative reframing in the umma imagination of Muslims throughout the history. I try to understand what the concept of umma meant for Muslims throughout history. How change occurred in their discourse and what have been the political implications of the change in their imagination of umma.

In this paper I first examined the meaning of the term through the analysis of the etymology, Qur’anic text, Prophetic interpretation and application, and finally the formative historical contexts in which the term transformed in Muslim imagination. In this paper, I argue that, both the Qur’an and the Prophetic practice were based on a dual conceptualization of umma. The concept of umma referred to and conceived as “Muslim umma” and “Islamic umma” simultaneously. There were fundamental differences in the “Muslim umma” and the “Islamic umma” regarding universality, openness, plurality, and values they prioritized. The nineteenth century political and social developments led to a trauma in the Muslim imagination and shaped the modern conceptualization of umma.
which dropped the conceptual duality

The literatures I surveyed identify two historical junctures which caused dramatic discursive shifts in the minds of Muslim intellectual and political elite: abolishment of the Caliphate and failure of political Islam. In the second part, I tried to examine the prospective place of the umma both in Muslims’ imagination and in practice. I will examine Transnational Islam which I define as the type of Muslim politics whose primary modes of organization and activism transcend the territorial boundaries of nation states. I propose that it is worth to examine to what extend failures of Political Islamism and increasing transnational Muslim activities all around the world make it possible today to speak in terms of a new umma as a global civil society.

References:


In Qur’anic studies, the term ummah could be approached through two different points of view: the Qur’an or the tafsir literatures. Within the first genre, the Qur’an’s use of the term ummah is analyzed. Some scholars have maintained for the ummah’s unique position as one of the most prominent political concepts in the Qur’an[1]. Other scholars consider the term ummah despite its political tendencies as one of religio-communal Qur’anic terms[2]. Some others argue that the Qur’an occasionally uses the term ummah in religious and civil notions[3].

Within the second genre, scholars assume that during its journey throughout history, the concept of ummah has suffered major development in terms of meaning and use. In this regard, it is very common to suggest that historically the theocratic Ummah of the prophet that was once transformed into a state by the prophet himself was then endorsed by his successors after his death[4]. Dalla>l for instance argues that in the period of the four guided caliphs (al-Khulafa’> al-Ra>shidu>n), principles of the unity of the ummah, that the ummah was the ultimate source of political authority, have been actually conceived[5].

There remains a more technical question: What do the classical literatures of various disciplines (ranging from hadith, fiqh, si>rah and tafsi>r) say about the term ummah and its use in the history of Muslims civilization? One answer has been provided by Ah}med who evaluates contentions of some medieval jurists such as al-Mawa>r-di> (d. 450), al-Baghda>di> (d. 463) and Abu> Ya’la> (d. 458) and concludes that in their hands, the logical connection between the concepts of ummah, shari>ah and ima>mah has been established in order to assert that the khila>fah was canonical rather than rational necessity[6]. Similarly, Dalla>l also takes writings of much earlier legal scholars such as al-Sha>fi’i> (d. 204) and Ibn Hanbal (d. 241) to portrait that the term ummah has been used in legal discourses[7]. Methodologically speaking, since their resources are at the earliest from the third century when the khila>fah of the Abbasid was well established, Ah}med and Dalla>l and other writers who follow their assumption could not provide answers on whether the ummah has been connected to politics in first and second century of Islam, neither conclude about what literatures outside the fiqh genre say about the use of the term ummah within Muslims intellectual history.

Why are these two conditions so important? First, many have argued that the concepts of khila>fah and ummah are vital in the modern movement of the transnational Muslims[8], in its narrow political meaning[9]. Both concepts were gradually integrated and inseparable in the
sense that the khilafah became the political vehicle of the ummah[10]. In the context of the nationalism, the idea of the Islamic Ummah still carries the imprint of the nation-state with which it is competing[11], although some have argued that the Islamic Ummah does not refer theoretically to the establishment of an Islamic State (Dawlah)[12].

As shown by Waddad al-Qa‘di>, literatures in the genre of Tafsir might have different insights on particular concept than their counterparts in other genres. In his article on the term khilafah in early exegetical literature, Al-Qa‘di> convincingly concludes that the connection was not made until the end of the Umayyad period or the early decades of Abbasid rule[13]. This research aims to complete al-Qa‘di>’s inquiries by applying his methods to the term ummah.

This research asks mainly how early Muslim exegetes, living under the Umayyads and the early Abbasids, understand the Qur’anic term ummah when they were governed by caliphs who declared to be caliphs of the Muslims ummah[14]? In other word, this research wants to know whether the term ummah has been connected to somewhat political matters at that time. Methodologically, this research follows Waddad al-Qa‘di> when dealing with the term Khilafah in early exegetical literature. Al-Qa‘di> used al-Tabari> as his main resource because al-Tabari> was both copious and exact in reproducing the sayings of early commentators[15]. However, As al-Qa‘di> admitted, al-Tabari>’s dogmatic position on both politico-historical level and philological level becomes a major problem in exploiting al-Tabari>’s Tafsir in order to reveal views of particular concept (in this case: umma). To solve this, al-Qa‘di> ignored al-Tabari>’s data presentation in one side and his extra explanation on the materials in the other side[16]. The same method is also applied here.

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[9] It must be noted here that the transnational Islam movement could manifest in various forms of non-political expressions. Ina Merdjanova, Rediscovering the Umma: Muslims in the Balkans between Nationalism and Transnationalism (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 54–56.

[10] Kamali, “Characteristics of the Islamic State,” 19; as example, Pankhurst has demonstrated how the two terms were relationally linked by Hasan al-Banna when he established the Muslim brotherhood, see: Reza Pankhurst, The Inevitable Caliphate? A History of the Struggle for Global Islamic Union, 1924 to Present (London: Hurst &


[14] Crone has suggested that Harun al-Rashid was told that he was khalifatullaah fi ummatihi, and that al-Mutawakkil was flattered as khaliifah rasuullillaah fi ummatihi. Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam, 1. paperback edition, University of Cambridge Oriental Publications 37 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), 16–17.


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This paper seeks to disinter the intricacies surrounding the notions of the ummah, dar-al Islam and Dar-al Kufrs a result of their drastic (re) interpretations and how those pose a challenge to conceptualising ‘transnational Islam’ or ‘the ideal Ummah’ currently. Utilising critical constructivists’ Discursive Practices Approach, (Roxanne Lynn Doty, 1993) together with its categorising mechanism of ‘presupposition’ ‘predication’ and ‘subject positioning’, this paper would explore the linguistic, historical, and original contextual connotations of these notions towards understanding how they have evolved. It would juxtapose contemporary contestations with the reformation of the concepts by scholars like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897), Sheikul Azhar Husain al-Marsafi (1815-90) Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) among others toward highlighting how these notions transformed eventually.

While numerous challenges shape the reflections on transnational Islam, the fundamental and overarching problem is the radical reformation of the notion of ‘ummah itself together with its corollary notions of Dar-al-Islam and Dar-al-Kufr. They have evolved from being ‘value-neutral’ to be ‘value-laden’ with multiplicities of articulations leading to their extreme interpretation and application. Capitalising on this drastic interpretation, radical organisations have sought after the division of the world by all means possible. While mainstream Muslims reject this idea, it has nonetheless led to some scholars regarding the ‘ummah’ as incompatible (or in competition) with the contemporary international arrangement. The radical interpretation sees the current world order to represent Dar-al Kufr. There is, therefore, the need to create separate territorial space for the ummah to be known as Dar-al Islam. That has, therefore, positioned
the ummah oscillating between Dar-al Islam and Dar-al Kufr.

**Research Question(s)**

1. What are the origins and the historical milieu of the notions of the ummah, dar-al Islam and Dar al-kufr?

2. How have they been drastically reformed such that militant radical groups utilise them for their ulterior motives?

**A Brief Background of the Problem/Problem Statement**

The notion of the ummah is contested in that while some scholars regard it as apolitical (Piscatori, 1986) others see it as highly political (Saunders, 2008). Scholars, like Efraim Karsh (Karsh, 2003), and Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 2002), regard the idea of ‘the Ummah’ as revisionist as it threatens the global status quo. Efraim Karsh insists that ‘the ummah’ and its insistence on ‘borderless community of the Muslims’ undermines the western state system (Karsh, 2003, p. 1). Likewise, Huntington made a similar claim, ‘that the modern idea of the nation-state is incongruent with the notion of sovereignty of Allah and the primacy of the ummah’ (Huntington, 2002, p. 175).

On the other hand, some scholars see the evolving nature of the notion of the ummah to be a response to changing circumstances rather than confrontational. Oliver Roy opines that it is problematic to view Islam as clashing with the West. Instead, increased westernisation has led to the revival of Islam and the search for the ‘new ummah’, especially among Muslims in the West (Roy, 2004). In the same vein, Derrick regards the transmuting of the notion of the ummah to be a response to changing political and territorial circumstances (Derrick, 2013).

How did these contestations arise among scholars on the notion of the Ummah? The idea has undergone reformation that had impacted on understanding and implementing it. The word Ummah has been repeated not less than sixty times in the Qur’an and has appeared in various ahadeeth (Halliday, 2002, p. 23). It is commonly used to refer to the community of Muslims regardless of geographical boundaries. Historically, the Holy Prophet used the word ummah in different but inter-related senses. In the ahadeeth, he used it to refer to the nascent community of Muslims in Madina and also to mean in some cases the generality of his followers. In the Qur’an, it is used in different senses, but most importantly, a community of Muslims bonded by the Islamic creed. Due to elaboration and reformation of the notion, some scholars now see it represent a challenge to the modern nation-states, which considers geographic boundary as one of its key features within the confines of sovereignty. That is because while the majority of Muslims ascribe to the ‘imagined community of believers’ understanding of the notion, others advocate for the physical Territory connotation of the concept. Scholars like Sayyid Qutb (Qutb, 1989) and Abdullah Azzam (Halliday, 2002, p. 35) have among other things articulated ummah as not only a notion of Muslim community bonded by faith but also by Territory and language (Halliday, 2002, p. 26). Militant organisations like the Al-Qaeda and now the Islamic State(IS) not only call for a Territory for the ummah but also the need for the world to be divided into two abodes, Dar-al Islam and Dar-al kufr.

The legal dichotomisation of Dar-al-Harb (or kufr) and Dar-al-Islam has been transformed into a radical Islamic territorialization concept. The dichotomisation of the concepts of Dar-al-Harb and Dar-al-Islam as they stand have no direct origins from the Qur’an or the Sunnah, but rather scholars of Islamic jurisprudence deduced them through ijtihad. The word Dar is used in the Qur’an in two senses, eschatological and physical space senses as observed by Lodhi (Lodhi, 2018). In the eschatological regards, there are references like Dar al akhira (the last or final abode) dar-al salaam (abode of peace) Dar- al bawar (abode of perdition) while for the physical sense there are references to Madina (Lodhi, 2018). It was in the second half of the eighth century that the Darul-Islam/Dar-al -Harb dichotomisation became developed and widely used by Muslim as a legal concept to help in rulings regarding Muslims’ international relations and to issue some verdicts about Muslim lands (Calasso & Lancioni, 2017, p. 384). The developments in context (and the modern adaptation and usage) by militant organisations are
not for the original intent of dividing the world into two camps by any means possible (Badar & Nagata, 2017). The original rationale behind the theoretical division of the world is entirely misunderstood by radical scholars and militant organisations.

The ummah, therefore, finds itself entangled where it’s very conceptualisation has been radicalised. As a result, its corollary notions of Dar-al-kufr and Dar-al Islam have also been radicalised posing a challenge to conceptualising transnational Islam without facing the challenge of demystifying the complexities surrounding these notions. There is, therefore, the need to untangle this to fruitfully deliberate on the transnational ummah and the ideal ummah.

**Tentative Structure of the Paper**

**Introduction**
- A brief background
- Brief working Definitions of terms – (Ummah, Dar-al Islam, Dar-Kufr).
- Theoretical framework
- Research Question(s)
- Core arguments
- Chapter outline

**Historical and Linguistic evolution of the notions**
- Ummah
- Dar-al Islam and Dar-al Kufr

**Historical trajectories of transformation**
- Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897)
- Sheikul Azhar Husain al-Marsafi (1815-90)
- Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966)
- Abdullah Azzam (1941-89)

**Adaptation by radical organisations**

The case of Al-Qaeda

The case of the Islamic State(Daesh)

**The implication for conceptualising Transnational Islam and Ummah**

Transnational Ummah and territorial state

The division of the world into two abodes and non-Muslims

The Ummah between Dar-al Islam and Dar-al Kufr?

**Conclusion**

Restating arguments

Summarising arguments

**References**


In the age of a globalised, yet fragmented world the establishment of nation-states, has led to numerous intellectual debates about whether or not the nation-state is compatible with Islam and its moral principles. Contemporary Muslim intellectuals explore whether the nation-state has become an inescapable reality or whether there are alternative ways in which communities can re-organise themselves. A different approach concentrates more on accommodating Islam and modernity by projecting the framework of the nation-state on the concept of the ummah.

The concept of ummah has a rich history starting from the time of the Qur’anic revelation until today. It is widely invoked whether in academic conferences[1] and pan-Islamic magazines[2] to religious preachers[3] and humanitarian aid organisations. In other words, the ummah forms a popular imagination and its usage is widespread; yet its meaning still remains rather unclear. What is meant by the concept ummah when it is invoked? Who does it address and what is the framework in which the ummah operates? Can the ummah be deemed equivalent to the modern nation-state? And if not, how do we define the ummah in the contemporary context of a globalised world that is divided and separated by nation-states?

The objective of this paper is to offer answers to these questions in three main ways. Firstly, by tracing back the concept of ummah to its original meaning. Secondly, by embedding the concept of ummah into the socio-political context in which it has been reformulated and its moral dimension geographically restricted. The third object of analysis will be the transitional period - the so-called postcolonial and postmodern world - in which the
idea of the nation-state seems to have lost appeal.

This research will examine how the concept of ummah has been restructured in the wake of nationalism and the onset of modernity. This study adopts a postcolonial reading through which the examination of the change in the meaning of ummah and its ramifications is followed by analysis of the social and political forces that governed this transformation.

The research questions of this study require tracing back the conceptual transformations of the idea of the ummah in their socio-political context. The first research question attempts to detect what kind of role the religious, moral and political dimension played in the conceptualisation of the ummah in pre-modern as well as modern scholarly works of Islamic political thought. The second question examines how the Qur'anic concept of ummah has transformed from the pre-modern to the modern period in Islamic political thought. The last question analyses to what extent the four selected scholars of Islamic political thought use the concept of ummah as a tool to respond to the political turbulences of their time.

The paper will delve into the genre of Islamic political thought starting with a classical fiqhī approach that focuses on the understanding of umma in relation to governance and siyāsa shar‘īyya according to jurists of the classical period: al-Mawardi (d.1058), al-Juwayni (d.1085) and Ibn Taymiyya (d.1328). The field of fiqh has been of great importance for the development of the theory of governance in the classical Islamic period. Thus, it is important to include definitions by these fuqahā’ in order to gain a more authentic understanding of how the concept was used during the pre-modern period in contrast to its contemporary uses in Islamic political theory. The political setting of the classical scholars is centred around the caliphate and their conceptualisation of ummah was drawn in relation to maintaining the existing caliphate. Nevertheless, the ummah played a political role in their theory of governance.

After the decline of the caliphate scholars, scholars such as al-Marsafi in the nineteenth century and Salman Sayyid in the twenty-first century, have sought in various ways to find alternative modes through which Muslims can theorise governance. The concept of the ummah seems to play a decisive role in the new theories of governance. This indicates the centrality that the ummah plays in the Islamic political organisation in general.

Modernity alongside colonialism posed challenges for the Muslim World. There was a significant need to develop answers for how to deal with new emerging forms of collective identity, such as nationalism for instance. In an attempt to reconcile the new world order with Islam, many scholars resorted to the concept of ummah, which is also a form of collective identity, as it is a multi-layered concept and thus lends itself well to a re-conceptualisation in light of modern conceptual structures. Despite the fact that the ummah and ‘national identities’ have commonalities that justify why Muslim scholars draw similarities between Islam and the new world order, there are substantial differences between ummah and nationalism. Nationalism ultimately leads to the formulation of an “other”. It consequently can be argued that the idea of nationalism is inherently exclusionary (See: Sayyid 2014; Hallaq, 2013; Chatterjee 1989; Ho 2002).

For this study the Egyptian Azhari scholar al-Sheikh Hussain Al-Marsafi (d.1890) is relevant for exploring the role of Islam in relation to the emergence of nationalism during the ’Urabi Revolt period (1879–1882) in Egypt as one example for how the understanding of ummah transformed in modern Muslim societies. As mentioned above, the rise of nationalism contests the very idea of the ummah as a universal community that goes beyond the tribal bound communities at the time of the Prophet. Therefore, al-Marsafi provides a useful representative case for analysing how the idea of ummah shifted within the political context of Egypt at that time, due to nationalist and colonialist aspirations. As an Azhari scholar he has adopted notions from the Islamic tradition, thus it will be interesting to explore how he (subconsciously) merged his understanding of the Islamic tradition with the influences of modernity, nationalism and colonialism. He is one of the lesser known Egyptian scholars com-
pared to the likes of Mohammad ‘Abduh (d.1905) and Rashid Rida (d.1935), and there is a scarcity of literature about him, especially on his last book Risalat al-Kalim al-Thaman.

The case study of al-Marsafi shows the tacit transformation of the conceptualisation of the term ummah in the modern period. Instead of accommodating Islamic principles to fit the new emerging modern structure, Salman Sayyid’s conceptualisation of the ummah is an attempt to deconstruct the existing narrative, which according to him, is dominated by “Westernese” or hegemonic Western discourses. Sayyid attempts to analyse the displacements by which the decolonisation of the ummah continues to be disavowed by attempts to defer Muslim capacity to project themselves into the future. His re-conceptualisation highlights the essential difference between the ummah and the characteristics of a modern nation-state. The contemporary Islamicate scholar’s contributions and views on the concept of ummah illustrate what has changed in contemporary Islamic political thought in the postmodern age. The paper argues that Sayyid’s decolonial re-conceptualisation of the ummah can be seen as a contextual response to the political turbulence and challenges that Muslims are facing in the 21st century, which Sayyid defines as the ‘Muslim Question’ (Sayyid 2014).


References


Over the past few years, both the general public and the academy have taken a greater interest in concepts of Muslim unity. While most of the books written on the subject have focused on either the Ummah or the Caliphate, Cemil Aydin in his book “The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History” brings attention to the term “the Muslim world,” arguing it is a post-colonial concept that racializes Muslims. In this paper, I will attempt to offer an alternative genealogy for the concept and argue that ultimately the best classical term to view the “Muslim world” through is not the Ummah (which Aydin disparages but ultimately utilizes himself), but rather Dar ul-Islam. This is as of the three terms of Ummah, Caliphate and Dar ul-Islam, it is the last that has the strongest aspect of territoriality (with the Ummah being more of a metaphysical concept transcending time and space and the Caliphate a political institution/symbol which has only very rarely comprised the entirety of Dar ul-Islam). I argue against the classic Orientalist view of Dar ul-Islam as a purely legalistic term with no effect on reality, seeing it as a concept whose importance for Islamic political thought has been overlooked. By comparing how Muslims utilize and imagine the “Muslim World” and “Dar ul-Islam,” I will trace a number of important considerations when we talk about Muslim unity (or lack thereof) in pre-modernity versus today, such as the difference between siyasa (as executive statecraft or politics) and law in contradistinction to the contemporary notion of politics. This paper is not by any means a direct critique of Aydin’s important book, but rather an attempt to forward an alternative explanation. However, as one of the very few books to cover the concept of the “Muslim World” in detail it will naturally be a constant interlocutor.
Discussions on Muslim unity can easily more confusing than enlightening if not handled carefully, given the multitude of concepts and extent of space and time at hand. I, therefore, find the best way to frame my primary question to be: What are the ruptures and continuities in Muslim institutions and concepts of political and cultural unity today compared to pre-modernity? I find it crucial to highlight both the ruptures and continuities, as even with the transmutation(s) under modernity, continuities exist and it is only by taking both into consideration that an approach can be truly sophisticated. It is also important when discussing unity to differentiate between political unity and cultural unity, as the two should not be necessarily assumed to be the same. Perhaps, even more importantly what are the ruptures and continuities in how Muslims imagine unity? Specifically, I aim to answer the above questions by asking as to the nature of the relationship between Dar ul-Islam and the Muslim World, focusing on the pre-modern difference between siyasa and law.

Given that my primary concern here is with concepts related to Muslim unity and their history, I will follow a conceptual history approach in this paper. Here, I specifically mean concept in the sense used by the German historian and philosopher of history Reinhart Koselleck, that is, something more than just a word or idea, but an idea that contains within itself a plenitude of meanings that functions as a dialectic between language and its socio-historical context. In our more specific context, that is to say this paper will study a history of how concepts of Islamic unity effect and are affected by Muslims. It is important to note that much of Koselleck’s work used its socio-linguistic approach to study the transition of political concepts in modernity. Similarly, I will attempt to trace some of the changes that happened in Islamic political thought related to unity through the transition to “modernity.” I, however, do not take Western conceptualizations of politics to be a priori universal, but rather will make an honest attempt to look at the pre-modern “politics” from the lens of the pre-modern, far from an easy task. Furthermore, in order to have a wider scope to look at the subject, the paper will draw on the growing body of work in the social sciences on the imagination, and specifically the political imagination. Indeed, Aydin in his book fails to offer a satisfying explanation for why Muslims continue to cling on to a “politically impotent” idea. I would argue that this is due to the hold it continues to have on Muslims’ imagination. Indeed, the fact that Muslims around the world still imagine themselves to be a unity, despite being politically split into many nation-states for almost a century speaks to the power of the imagination of Muslim unity. This is not to say that political institutions and actual effectiveness and governance is not important, but only to state that the power of the imagination in the political should not be underestimated. This tendency to only give credence only to political institutions to the determinant of the power of memory and imagination (especially in Islamic history) has in the past blinded scholars, for example, to the continued importance of the Caliphate during the Mamluk period, as convincingly shown by Mona Hassan in her book “Longing for the Lost Caliphate.” In a somewhat similar vein, I hope here that by widening the scope of discussion on the “Muslim World” by focusing not just on ruptures, but continuities as well, and incorporating the political imagination, this paper can contribute in continuing to open new ground in understanding the complexities of Muslim unity and its history.

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Worksop VI

03 August 2019 – Saturday / 14:00 – 17:00
Terrace Hall

Chair: Fabio Vicini

Cyrus Mcgoldrick
An Islamic Revolution for All: Kalim Siddiqui and a Post-sectarian Islamic Vision

İbrahim Enes Aksu
The Intellectual Trajectory of an Islamist between Theory and Practice: An Examination on the Political Philosophy of Rached Ghannouchi

Iqbal Sonaullah
Between Idealism and Political Realism: Reimagining Islamism in the Middle East

Irfanullah Farooqi
Muslim Cultures and the Challenge of Nationalism and Secularism: Mapping a Trajectory from Muhammad Iqbal to Shahab Ahmed

Zeba Khan
Islam and Democracy: Analysing Abdolkarim Soroush and Tariq Ramadan
An Islamic Revolution for All: Kalim Siddiqui and a Post-sectarian Islamic Vision

Keywords: Islam, Kalim Siddiqui, Ummah, Sect, Revolution, Iran, Khomeini, Sirah, Intrafaith, Unity.

An Islamic Revolution for All: Kalim Siddiqui and a Post-sectarian Islamic Vision (Proposal for ILEM Summer School 2019) I propose to explore the work and writing of Kalim Siddiqui, with particular focus on how he envisioned a united Muslim ummah able to work across sectarian and national lines in pursuit of Muslim autonomy and traditional khilafa governance. Background Kalim Siddiqui lived 65 years an activist-scholar, calling the Muslim world to unity and struggle for Islamic governance. From his birth in 1931 in British-occupied India to his death in 1996 in South Africa, he witnessed and inspired tremendous growth in Islamic movement and revolution. Decades after his death, the problems he identified and analyzed have not yet been solved, but his vision and strategy for the revival and victory of the Islamic civilization – developed in great detail in a remarkably coherent body of work, including books, articles and speeches delivered over 40 years – remains relevant and applicable for the masses of Muslims still hoping to find a political solution to their problems in returning to Islamic sources. Even if his institutions suffered from the loss of his charismatic leadership, his scholarly contribution must not be overlooked and unused. His early work on the politics of Pakistan and South Asia was important in its own right but was also an important foundation for his critique of the nation-state and attempts to redirect the energy of Muslims towards capitalism or socialism. His emphasis on khilafah as the political goal of Islam was relevant to its time, and his prediction that this desire would spread among the Muslims seems to have manifested. His analysis of history and political strategy is a massive and still timely collection. His call to Western Muslims to resist assimilation and integration was prescient. His desire to see Muslims from both major sects unite around
the Prophet’s life example for the sake of political unity lives on among many, although it seems farther now than it was then. Nonetheless, his ideas live on, and his body of written work may ensure their survival and success. Areas of Focus His earliest written works articulate the foundations of his political vision, including his affirmation of Islam as primary identity and complete ethical system, his focus on the importance of the political dimension of the Prophet’s life example, and his developing the understanding that nation-states are inherently problematic (with India and Pakistan as prime examples) whereas Khilafah is a necessary Islamic goal (rather than being merely an option). He had already written much on Islamic revolution before the Iranian uprising in the late 1970s, and its success confirmed for him the potential of his ideas. The Iranian Revolution also confirmed for him the potential for intra-faith unity of the Muslims across sect, supported by his experience with his Muslim Institute’s seminar students in 1978, and this remained a feature of his work throughout the rest of his life. Although he did identify as a “Sunni,” he was a major supporter of Shi’i revolutionary groups and lambasted their opponents among “Islamic activists [...], their pockets bulging with Saudi petrodollars.” He wrote, “Imam Khomeini’s insistence that the issues that have traditionally divided the Shi’a and the Sunni schools of thought are ‘no longer relevant’ opens the door towards the healing of the wounds of the Ummah.”

His Processes of Error, Deviation, Correction and Convergence in Muslim Political Thought makes a longer case for his perception that the classical political orientations of both Sunni and Shi’i were deviant, with the Sunna falling for monarchy and the Shi’a falling for a fatalistic resignation to having no imam at all. If Khomeini’s political approach – which traditionally might be seen as a more Zaydi political theory – was a step towards rectifying the Shi’i deviance, the Sunnis were waiting for their revolutionary correction, and Siddiqui at this point could only offer the map. A key method for this post-sectarian call was his use of the prophetic biography as a structure for movement that could serve as the unifying, pre-sectarian paradigm. His book The Seerah: a power perspective (written in 1995 and 1996 but published posthumously in 1998) advances the project mentioned in his Mawlid speech 32 years earlier and his 1989 Processes: a call to study the Prophetic biography in depth from a political perspective, using it as a model for the global Islamic movement and a point of unity for Muslims of different sects and schools. “The ‘depth of darkness’ today is represented by the West and the Western civilization on the one hand, and the conditions into which Muslim societies have sunk on the other,” he wrote. “This is the modern equivalent of the state of jahiliyyah which confronted the great Exemplar.” The work is still essentially an outline and a request for further study, but goes into further detail than his previous works, taking into account the dramatic difference in conditions between the Prophet’s time and the current day, and listing specific areas and issues of research. Conclusion The life and work of Kalim Siddiqui are under-studied by academics and under-utilized by activists and provide a wealth of scholarly insight and practical experience. In our analysis of how we understand the Muslim ummah in an increasingly tribalized world, his centering of the Prophetic life above sectarian narratives and his ability to rise above internal divisions make him a particularly interesting and valuable interlocutor.

References

In this paper, I will examine the transformation of Rached Ghannouchi’s political thought through using Muqtadar Khan’s framework on the political philosophy of Islamic resurgence. According to his framework, political philosophy of an Islamist can be evaluated in three dimensions, which are sequentially critical, constitutive, and programmatic. Mainly inspired from his framework, I argue that the transformation in Rached Ghannouchi’s political thought starts with an idealistic critical position, then turns into more practical programmatic one by admitting the realities of the political world.

In terms of the critical dimension, Ghannouchi, like many other Islamist thinkers in the 20th century have started his intellectual journey by developing a complex critical philosophy within Islamic thought, which mainly focus on the critique of modernity (especially its application in the Arab Maghreb), the critique of the West (mainly due to their support for the authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world and hypocritical attitudes towards the Muslim peoples), the critique of the post-colonial state (primarily because of their authoritarian and repressive attitudes toward their own population), and the critique of the hegemonic coalition in the Muslim world (including traditional ulama and secular/nationalist elites, especially for being silent against atrocities of their regimes). In the second transformative phase, Ghannouchi starts to concern about the applicability of his critiques and ideals and bringing solutions and suggestions to the problems that he deals with rather than just criticizing, which leads him to the discussions around the Islamic state. This constitutive dimension of Ghannouchi’s thought is mainly composed of the discussion of democracy (including
the compatibility of Islam and democracy, the understanding that equates democracy with apostasy, and the participation of Islamists in a non-Islamic government), secularism, and human rights.

In terms of the programmatic dimension, many Islamists including Ghannouchi have obliged to answer questions like ‘how God’s sovereignty can function in the concrete world?’, ‘how to interpret shura in the modern context?’, ‘how to deal with the issues related to women, minorities, and human rights in the Islamic state?’, and ‘how to deal with Muslims who do not favor the idea of Islamic state or Islamist politics?’ So, they have tried to implement the claim ‘Islam is a complete system’ to the practical world through going beyond polemics and seeking for policy-oriented solutions. Ghannouchi, for example, argues that: “The uneducated think that the Islamic program is a ready-made entity: stick it in the mud and implement it,” implying that it is necessary to develop certain and specialized interpretations of Islamic principles for dealing with current conditions. Ghannouchi again says: “I don’t see any choice before us but to adapt the democratic idea.” According to Muqtedar Khan, except self-criticism and reflection, the discourse of these Islamists has been characterized by three dominant themes: “power-sharing, Islam and democracy, and civil society.” In the final transformative phase of his political thought, I will discuss his attempts on the applicability of his democratic ideals, which includes his thoughts and actions on power-sharing, democracy, and civil society in Tunisia especially in the post-revolutionary period after 2011. In conclusion, I will argue that his shift from political Islam to Muslim democrats is an expected result of an Islamist who face the realities and challenges of political life.

Why I Think Ghannouchi is Important

The significance of Rached Ghannouchi stems from his uniqueness in terms of being the last alive Islamist intellectual and political activist who has an extensive sphere of influence on a Muslim society and the ideologue of a largest Islamist movement in Tunisia. In the past, Sayyid Qutb and Hasan al-Banna might have been considered for having a similar kind of profile in Egypt under the roof of Muslim Brotherhood. Hassan al-Turabi who was an Islamist political leader in Sudan and have been influential figure in modern Sudanese politics, might have been seen in the same league but he passed away in 2016. Abul A’la Maudidi, Muslim philosopher and political figure, could be named among others for being the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, the largest Islamic organization in Asia, but he has passed away forty years ago. In Turkey, during the republican period, one can even claim that there has never been a political thinker and activist with such a significant sphere of influence. Necmettin Erbakan, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and many others from the same political tradition are just politicians, they are not intellectuals or ideologues. İsmet Özel, Ali Buluş, and Sezai Karakoç can be named as Islamist intellectual but their influence on the public is easily ignorable. Therefore, Rached Ghannouchi seems like the only Islamist who still has both an intellectual personality and a popular support, which makes it worthy to study his political thought and practice.

The unique position of Tunisia also increases Ghannouchi’s significance not only for Tunisian people but also for all other Muslim countries including those who have lived through popular uprisings starting in 2011, called Arab Spring by many. Tunisia is the first country where the Arab Spring starts with self-immolation of one street vendor as a response to confiscation of his wares and mistreatment of an officer, and it is the only Arab Spring country that has not faced counter-revolution (yet). Such facts make Ghannouchi’s position more important since he is the intellectual and the political leader of Nahdha Party, which has taken a significant part in the revolution. All other Arab Spring countries have neither successfully completed revolution, nor be able to escape from counter-revolutions.

Libya, for example, after the fall of Gaddafi with the NATO air strike, has become a failed state, which suffers from violent clashes among armed groups. Egypt, as another example, after witnessing series of counter-revolutionary protests of mainly secular, nationalist, and liberal groups, has faced a bloody military coup against
Morsi-led Ikhwan government by the Sisi-led Egyptian army, which later ends up with the declaration of Muslim Brotherhood, a significant contributor of the revolution in 2011, as a terrorist organization by the state. Syrian uprising starting in 2011, on the other hand, has been turned into a bloody civil war that has led to thousands of deaths and millions of refugees. The conflict is still not over and it becomes a proxy war between major world powers including the US, Russia, Iran, Turkey. Now, the fight, for Bashar al-Assad and his allies against the armed opposition groups, becomes a “war against terrorism” since their purpose is to overthrow the government. Such catastrophic results of the examples of Libya, Egypt, Syria, and many others make the successful but imperfect Tunisian case and its actors more important for the future of democracy, Islamism, political stability, and secularism in the Muslim world.

References


Abstract of Work Plan:

Between Idealism and Political Realism: Reimagining Islamism in the Middle East

Islam came into being as an innovative and a dynamic force, which professed oneness of God and the responsibility to pursue equity and justice. It is significant to understand the fact that Islam adopted to the institutional practices of the times where they did not conflict with the belief. So, given this inheritance, the question today arises how to build new Muslim societies by incorporating modern innovations which have an undoubtly universal appeal – such as electoral rules and the parliamentary system, and the other elements associated with them including accommodation of dissent. Contradictions are bound to emerge as possible solutions are identified, but, since the fall of Ottoman Empire, the Muslim political and intellectual imagination has failed to bridge the gap between the classical and modern thought.

Islam, of course, owns a glorious intellectual past; but there hasn’t been any significant reform in the existing discursive tradition of the Islamic scholarship during the past century. A few scholars – like Hasan al Bana, Abul Ala Maududi, Syed Qutb and the more recent Abdessalam Yassine – theoretically engaged with the reform process, but their adherence to a certain religio-political idea limited the sphere of their influence. Adding to this is the theological variance between the different schools of thought. Thus, the greatest challenge to the Muslim scholarship today is to track the aspiration of the Muslim youth and bring a solution that protects their dignity. At the same time, it is essential for the contemporary Islamist scholarship to maintain a discursive distance from
the belief that violence is the only – or primary – mechanism of change. This is indispensable to generate preliminary consensus among youth; in this respect the reinterpretation of the principles of mutual accommodation become very determinative.

There is a general agreement among the Muslim theology that the message of Islam is “universal and absolute”. In classical Islamic thought, astute philosophical assertions reasoned with this argument of “universal and absolute”. But contemporary Islamic scholars could not really make this assertion meaningful within the changing socio-religious discourse. And in the wake of global movements – like liberalism, feminism – the notion of “absolute” significantly challenging both the traditional and contemporary Muslim scholarship. Hence, it is vital to see how best the transitional Islam adjusts its value-system in a world which has progressed beyond the “moral” virtues of coexistence. The major chaos to deal with is unabated propaganda against the Muslim identity and the deliberate construction of the “Other”. So the need for the Muslim scholarship is to reinterpret the basic framework of Islamic social life that will allow the Muslim societies to modernize while protecting its dignity and Islamic value-system.

There are, of course, different interpretations of political Islam, so closely connected to each other theologically yet so different in manifestation and political allegiance. Quran encourages “equitable proposition” and mutual accommodation among the People of Book (3:64); this should rather foster peace, than divergence, between the contending political interpretations. But that doesn’t happen, because the norm in which army desists taking orders from civilians has ruled the region for around seven decades. So, any possible deviation from this norm requires a “radical reform”. In 2011, the Uprising provided an opportunity in this regard only to be tumbled-down by the unwillingness of the deep state and the political insincerity of the central actors of transition.

In transitional politics, the conspicuous endeavour of a dominant idea to appropriate authority can provoke a minority to resort to violence against the majoritarian authority. This notion allowed non-Islamist revolutionaries assume that the Islamists’ misappropriation of political legitimacy hijacked the revolution. The Islamists among themselves were also divided, showing the divergence in their respective doctrines – their interpretation of ‘political’ – and subsequent allegiance.

In the context of above debate, it is essential to reinvestigate if the Islamists in transitioning Middle East actually believe in a plural socio-political setup, or do they just use elections to gain legitimacy only to deviate from that system once in power? Also, how does the religious sentimentality shape the political doctrine of the Islamists. Amid all the divergent political interpretations, what could be the standard form of governance that respects religious and sectarian values and heeds to global demands of peace. If they do believe in such a system, then to what extent can the Islamists value the norms and practices of a plural system?

Work Plan:

I intend to divide the research work into two sections. The first section will reconceptualise variant aspects of legitimacy in the Middle East drawing on the notions of “idealism” and “political realism”. This section will revisit the political doctrine of different Islamists parties operating in Arab world to understand the utopian divergence that prevents the governance by the rule of law. Here, it will be indispensable to understand the divergence between the applicability of rule of law in different Middle East countries. The section will establish the missing link between the classical view of Islamic political idea and modern Middle East.

The second section will assess the need to move from the subjective political theories to objective political theories which are more inclusive in nature. This section will put in perspective Lederer’s theory of behaviour (1980) to assess why Arab institutions need to adjust to mutualism that fosters unity, and thereby, peace. This will examine indigenous Arab practices and conceptualizations focusing on three main aspects of conflict resolution: 1) Mutual Accommodation, 2) Avoiding, 3) Collaborating.
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There is a fundamental difference between looking at Islam as a divine command for the salvation of human beings and Islam as a historical and, more importantly, human phenomenon that, across time and space, demonstrates uncommon dynamism and variation. Acknowledging the disconcerting ease with which we, in general, endow terms such as “Islam”, “Islamic”, and “Muslim” with a certain for-grantedness in our everyday conversations, it is not surprising that we do not find merit in genuinely investing in understanding the insurmountable worlds they carry within themselves. Is Islam only to be understood in terms of a unifying force or an accommodative one? Is Islamic to be conceptualised as a given or something that is in perpetual negotiation, an experience that is always in the making? Is Muslim-ness all about following a set of codes or an expression of a lived practice invariably in dialogue with the ongoing. In this paper, strictly from the vantage point of India, I am interested in exploring the challenges that Muslim cultures face with respect to nationalism and secularism. In order to map the trajectory of this confrontation, I want to start with reflections of Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), a poet-philosopher who engaged in a deeply insightful study of Islam and Muslim cultures in the Indian subcontinent at a time when “religious” and “communal” were almost interchangeable. Situating the concern in the light of Iqbal’s reflections, I end with borrowing from extraordinary insights offered by Shahab Ahmed (1966-2015) that help us immensely in unpacking the inner layers of the “Islamic”. In this paper, I extensively borrow from the ideas of these two great minds who, although situated in different historical moments and arguing from different vantage points, help us meaningfully engage with challenges faced by Muslim cultures with respect to newer
demands posed by nationalism and secularism.

Muhammad Iqbal, famously known for his December 1930 proposal for a separate homeland for Muslims of Indian subcontinent, held religion (read Islam) as the main principle that should determine the general character of political decisions. Verily, his 1930 address as the then president of All India Muslim League was a response to a crisis of religion. Nevertheless, it will be unfair to narrow the poet-philosopher’s ideas to a single address and overlook his many other insightful lectures namely “Islam as a Moral and Political Ideal (1909)”, “The Muslim Community: A Sociological Study (1910)”, “Political Thought in Islam (1910)” etc. An informed reading of each of these and several other reflections makes it quite clear that Iqbal was presenting Islam’s case as a culture and not religion. Consequently, he invoked the Muslim community’s right to retain its private individuality. As he remarked, “In order to become a living member of the Muslim community, the individual, besides an unconditional belief in the religious principle, must thoroughly assimilate the culture of Islam”.

Highlighting the paramount significance of the culture of Islam, Iqbal argued that deprived of her cultural apparatus, Indian Muslim was to be deprived of exploring the depths of her own inner life. This is why in most of his political reflections after the 1930 address, he specifically insisted that the future programme for the betterment of Indian Muslims should be partly political and partly cultural. This is remarkably significant in the present age of cultural nationalism where religious ideology of a certain bent has undergone an unholy alliance with an uncommonly narrow nationalism.

Shahab Ahmed’s pathbreaking work What is Islam (2016) draws our attention to the accommodative side of Islam more than its unifying aspect. Making a case for a more meaningful understanding of Islam in the human experience, Ahmed invites his readers to come to terms with “the capaciousness, complexity, and, often, outright contradiction that obtains within Islam as a historical phenomenon that has proceeded from the human engagement with the idea and reality of Divine Communi-
cation to Muhammad”. To him, the ultimate task vis-à-vis coherent conceptualisation of Islam is in terms of reconciling “universal” and “local”, “unity” and “diversity”. Prior to Ahmed, scholars such as W. Montgomery Watt (1968) had raised similar concern though not backed by first rate addressing of the same.

While Iqbal and Ahmed are articulating their concerns vis-à-vis Muslim cultures from completely different vantage points, in relation to the concerns faced by Muslim culture(s) in India, specifically with respect to nationalism and secularism, they both help immensely in making sense of the actual crisis at hand.

Starting with nationalism in India, there is something uncommonly disconcerting about the sentiment being reduced to sloganeering, deep hatred towards Pakistan, faux militarism, and cultural chauvinism. Given an absolutely ill-founded understanding of a national culture, there is a powerful narrative of the outsider as the one who happens to be in India and is not actually an Indian. This is the Indian Muslim who, despite living in the country for many generations, remains, to borrow from Talal Asad (2004), “insufficiently socialised”. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Indian Muslim is to perpetually prove her love for the nation through acts that are defined by, to borrow from Gyanendra Pandey’s (1999) brilliant formulation, “core of the nation”. Muslims are asked to chant Bharat Mata ki Jai (Victory for Mother India)” or “Vande Mataram (I bow to thee, Mother)”. As a hyphenated national, the Indian Muslim spends a lifetime proving her nationalism whereas an Indian Hindu, by virtue of being born a Hindu, I naturally a nationalist. As a result, Muslim cultures experience undesired churning as a result of which they compromise on their individuality and altogether give up on building up a coherent social whole. Under the weight of this performative anxiety that demands proof after proof, Muslims find it exceedingly difficult to conduct themselves in a natural way.

In relation to secularism we can begin by asking, how are religious looks perceived in secular polities? Do symbols such as beard, skullcap, and veil only demonstrate an identity, or they camouflage other identities? In a polity
and culture reasonably sceptical towards religiosity, due
to reasons of various kinds, is religious appearance also,
more often than not, accompanied by a perpetual quest
for approval and acceptance? At a time when religious
can instantly be called communal, I want to engage with
these questions in the larger context of Muslim men and
women who sport religious looks alongside cherishing
deep allegiance to secular outlooks. I am interested in ex-
ploring how, in the case of Indian Muslims, the simultane-
ity of religious appearance and secular worldview, leads
to an anxiety that often pushes the subject to conduct
herself in a way that invites approval or acceptance.

To explore these everyday struggles of Indian Muslims in
more details, I want to dwell on Iqbal’s argument vis-à-vis
centrality of culture of Islam and Ahmed’s seminal for-
mulation of the importance of being Islamic. Other than
these two key thinkers, I intend to borrow from writings
on Islam in Practice (Metcalf 2009), lived-textual Islam
tensions (Ahmad 1981 and Robinson 2000), and how to
engage with Shariah in the times we live in (Hallaq, 2009).

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With the turn of the twentieth century, the question of compatibility between Islam and democracy took over the central space across the world, especially with regard to the region of West Asia and North Africa (WANA). The composition and nature of these social movements, and their demands were truly a socio-cultural departure from the past. The Arab uprisings of 2010-2011 have used the slogans that were originating from the discourses of departure from the past of dictatorship and authoritarianism. The slogans such as ‘Asshab Yuriid Isqaat Inlizaam’ meaning, the people want to overthrow the regime and ‘Idrab Idrab ya Habib, Mahma Tadrab Mish Hansib’, meaning hit us, beat us, O habib, hit all you want, we are not going to leave (Furlow 2017) were drawing a line between the past and the aspired future. These countries had not seen such a massive turn out of people on streets demanding for freedom, dignity and political rights led to the overthrow of autocratic regimes in the countries like Tunisia and Egypt. Decades of silence broke into excruciating noise which turned the political order upside down. The debate of freedom and democracy however turned divisive after the streets failed to translate their anger and protest into democratic deliberations. Egypt saw a reversal of the uprising, Syria was caught in a brutal civil war and Yemen’s story was derailed by external intervention. The Arab uprisings, except in case of Tunisia, failed to introduce democratic process.

The answer of the question “why the Arab and Islamic world failed to introduce democratic process” has divided the scholars, both in the Arab and Islamic world as well as the western world. Abdolkarim Soroush, while analysing the role and nature of multiplicity of identity in these societies, has extensively dealt with the question of
adaptability between Islamic principles with value of modernity and contemporary world challenges. He points out the link between a society and its understanding of a particular form of religion.

Unlike Abdolkarim, Tariq Ramadan says, it is not Islam that should undergo changes in order to bring about the reconciliation between dynamics of external world and religion, rather, its people’s understanding of that conflict/relation that must undergo changes. With the new public sphere, the “invisible movement” as coined by Soroush came out in public. The hegemony of Shari’ah and legitimacy of Shari’ah state is under strong criticism by the anti-hegemonic intellectuals moving towards reform and re-interpretation. To Soroush, in soil of history the seed of religion has become a full fledged tree and we cannot go back to the seed without giving due importance to this reality. The fundamentalist deny any authority to this historicality and historicity to religion and thus are at a reactionary position. The religious reformists are re-reading the symbols of religion in order to comprehend the changing meanings of the text. ‘The meaning of the text is in the flux unlike understood by the fundamentalists’ (Soroush 2001). The study will dwell into Soroush's understanding of reasoning, rationality in relation with Islam and Religious society along with his definition of Islam and democracy. The paper will also discuss his “Theory of Contraction and Expansion of Religious Knowledge” and his examination of the relationship between Fiqh and Iman (Jurisprudence and Faith).

The Arab Uprising Discourse

The Arab uprisings of 2011 re-ignited the long suppressed debate of Islam and democracy, with their more inclusive slogans for freedom, justice and dignity, by which they meant a life without dictatorships. The earlier democracy-Islam discourse was mainly policy-determined evolved by western think tanks who tried to find why World Trade Centre in New York was attacked and how anti-western sentiments are closely linked with absence of democracy in the Arab and Islamic world. Most of these discussions were coming from top and were not reaching to the down. The Arab uprising reversed the process; people at streets were speaking out their democratic ambitions and the top was grappling with the question how to respond to the popular aspirations. Interestingly enough, the Western think-tanks and governments failed to respond and they ended up with either supporting the regimes or pushing them to become violent. The street protests have however produced the missing knowledge on what people want, they opened the debate on legitimacy and exposed the regimes’ vulnerability if they do not respond to the streets more flexibility.

The Arab uprising debate was not defined by just governance related questions, there were very strong questions related to the role of market, employment, women’ rights, minority rights and state’s becoming civil state instead of “Muslim or Sharia State.” This was in contrast with what the Arab dictators have brought as top-down modernity (as in Tunisia) or forced religiosity (as in Saudi Arabia, Iran). The Islamist parties, mostly playing central role in these uprisings, appeared more moderate and most secular parties ended up with supporting the regimes. This presented a precarious pictures as the Islamist were presenting themselves as vanguard of democracy and secularists found themselves supporting the dictatorships. This was a major change in the discursive sphere of the region.

The challenge for the Arab societies is to evolve an inclusive social contract which over the decades has weakened and become more exclusivist, not just to religious minorities Christians for example, but also to Muslims. To make sense of multiple and often competitive identities in Muslim societies, both Sorush and Ramadan’s anti-hegemonic discourses are becoming more relevant in the academic discussions. Especially, during the uprisings, the regional transnational public sphere functioned in such a manner that people could view what was happening elsewhere in the region as a development that encroaches one’s own local reality. The new public sphere was generated through continued discussions and debates of transnational and global characters.

In the rekindled transnational WANA public sphere ‘sociology of religion’ is the central theme of discourse. Be-
yond the top-down approach the emphasis is on ‘traditional particularism’ of the people beyond religion as an ideal but religion as reality, as integral part of the daily life. At this juncture, the nascent civil society needs the support of the ideas of anti hegemonic discourses available at the peripheries. These ideas open up a Pandora’s Box in this transnational WANA public sphere redirecting towards an alternate paradigm to analyse Islam and democracy. These anti-hegemonic scholars made a departure from the conventional sense of thinking and further attempt to relocate the peripheral approach in order to problematize the present discourse.

This paper will attempt to underline how Soroush’s ideas on Islam and democracy can help to unravel the puzzle of relations between Islam and democracy and how the Muslim societies, according to his propositions, have to be studied more through sociological and anthropological perspectives, if their own quest of democracy, freedom and justice has to be mapped out. This helps to evolve Muslims’ understanding of democracy, not just based on their belief on Islam, but also as human being whose long history is not just history of texts but also the history of lives and life worlds, often undermined in describing their aspirations for a good life.

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Worksop VII

04 August 2019 – Sunday / 14:00 – 17:00
Conference Hall

Chair: Yusuf Alpaydın

Naseeb Ahmed Siddiqui
In the Middle of the Chaotic First World War, Imam Ahmed Raza Khan and His Transnational Economic Policies for the Muslim World: 1856–1921

Sanjida Parveen
Resisting Assimilation in Reclaiming Identity: A Study of Indian Bengali Muslims through Select Works of Indian Bengali Muslim Authors

Muhammad Arif
Ideological Dispute between Transnational Islam of Purist Salafism and Local Islam of “Islam Nusantara” in Indonesia (the Perspective of Discourse Theory of Jurgen Habermas)

Kholoud al Ajarma
Sensory Experiences and Transnational Relations in the Moroccan Accounts of the Pilgrimage to Mecca

Shefeeque Vadakkan

Ahmet Köroğlu
Translating Islamism to Turkey: Making of New Islamist Discourse in Turkey (1960–1990)
The virus of enlightenment was defined by Kant as ‘dare to know’ evolved humans who pay no heed to humanity but to please the self-claimed definition of land and people. After, reducing mankind into a product to use, their philosophy even alienated the very soul of humanity as described by Karl Marx. Inequality, injustice, and corruption as defined by the human mind marched towards a future to declare Man as a God. Protected by law, a man can do anything he wants which is legal and no one has a right to stop even if it is categorically wrong from any other perspective. They want to achieve a level in human progress that will not require even humanity. Enlightenment, Romanticism, aestheticism, poetry and the art, the travelers of the unknown path have taken several deviations to at last declare the ‘God is dead’, the ultimate conclusion of their long struggle. Was not it enough that they started a war of methodology to reach reality? All the objective reality is now relative, the paragon of modern progress.

The youth of the Muslim world, why would they try to understand such deep philosophical wars on the world and themselves? He is playing the role of being both modern and traditional. The youth believe in a concept of Ummah but want to act all-time favorite to everyone which is impossible. They do not understand the meaning when Quran says ‘O you who have believed, enter into Islam completely [and perfectly] and do not follow the footsteps of Satan. Indeed, he is to you a clear enemy’. With what quality the Medinians society was evolved into lasting empires, “Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah; and those with him are forceful against the disbelievers, merciful among themselves”. How explicit are the Nobel ways in which the first generation of Muslims evolved?
To enter into Islam completely one has to be merciful to other Muslims and be harsh towards those who fight any of you, Quran says “and if two factions among the believers should fight, then make settlement between the two. This philosophical understanding may not reveal the true colors of Ummah, so had Muslim actually excelled in character to counter the influence of modernization? Plethoras of internal rivalry, economic backwardness, corruption, nationalism, sectarianism, killings, and hate towards fellow Muslim exists. And then from the far west of the earth to the east, Muslim struggle to find the solution of these cries? How to solve it?

**Imam Ahmed Raza and His Transnational Economic Policy**

It is in this environment of the First World War and the crisis of the Ummah, this article introduces the man of the century in the real sense, the polymath Imam Ahmed Raza Khan, the founder of Ahlesunnah Movement in subcontinent India during 1856 to 1921. He was born in a small city of Bareilly, North part of India and became a symbol for the Love of Prophet Muhammad (sal’allahualihiwasallam). With more than 1000 small and large books in almost 56 branches of knowledge including modern sciences like of Astronomy, mathematics, physics, philosophy, geography, history and politics he left his post untouched by anyone. This personality gets more interesting once it is known that he has learned modern sciences within the boundary of his room without a teacher but after reading his astronomical and mathematical works no one will believe this fact. He has established his authority in Makkah and Madina. The Ulema of Makkah and Madina conferred the title of Imam-al-Muhaddethseen on him due to his unique insight into the traditions of the Holy Prophet. He had undisputed command on Islamic Jurisprudence. When a savant of Makka studied his Arabic fatwa, he said at once

“If Imam Abu Hanifa had seen this fatwa, he would have felt proud of Ahmad Raza Khan and would have included its author in the rank of his disciples.”

The justice of Bombay high court has said that there are two outstanding jurisprudence works in India, the one fatawa-e-Alamgiri and the second ‘Fatawa-e-Razaviyya’. The major difference lies in the fact that the earlier was the work of a group of Oulma but Imam Ahmed Raza single-handedly produced such large collection of Fatawa, this is other than the set of Fatawa-e-Africa. He is one of the first proponents of the two-nation theory. When Deobandi Oulma opposed Pakistan, no other Oulma, along with disciples struggled so hard to form Pakistan than the Imam Ahmed Raza Khan and his students. Even on the issue of earth motion, he has written four books in which he falsified the law of attraction (of Newton) and earth motion (Copernicus) on the basis of modern science. More than 60% of Muslims in both India and Pakistan follow this unmatched scholar of Islam who is known as the leader of the Ahlesunnah wal Jamaat movement. Due to internal rivalries and lack of his followers to translate his books in different languages he has been largely forgotten in academia but this is the personality Muslim needs today. The only reason is his methodology to use both religious and modern sciences to prove the case of Islam. As explained earlier about the situations of Muslim around the world, he was asked the below question:

``Qiblah and Kabah, my guide, my master – may Allāh extend your illustrious shade for a long time to come. After expressing my earnest desire to kiss your feet, I respectfully state that I have sent pages of the [newspaper] Al-Mu’ayyad along with this letter.

[My question is:] What should Muslims do in this day and age, and in what manner can we help the Turks?”

In response to this question, Imam Ahmed Raza formulated the four-point economic policy to solve the problem of Muslims. He diagnosed the situation of Muslims and then prescribed the remedy. It is in this answer that he became one of the first in modern time to propagate the concept of Islamic banking if not the first. But he already wrote the book on this matter when he went to Hajj. In the words of Abul-Hasan Nadawi:

``...in his time, a scholar of his class, with such extensive knowledge of Ḥanafi fiqh, its constituents, minutiae, and
nuances, was rare. A testimony for which can be found in his collection of fatāwā, and his book Kifl al-Faqīh al-Fāhim fi Aḥkāmi Qirṭās al-Darāhim, which he wrote in Makkah in the year 1323 AH.15’

Then he envisioned an economic policy same like of European Union long before it but for the Muslims. The European Union’s economic policies are premised on security but in Islam, it is due to the concept of united Ummah. He employed this concept everywhere to propose this trade works within Muslims and Muslim countries. He advocated avoiding the use of modern law and the court system to replace it with Sharia courts whereby the whole bunch of money will be saved under the fold of Islam. Imam Ahmed Raza Khan came up something extraordinary but in a very simple language. If his policies were implemented on that time, there would have been a pre-European union before European union, a pre-Islamic banking before Islamic banking, pre-sharia courts before shariah courts.

References


Resisting Assimilation in Reclaiming Identity: A Study of Indian Bengali Muslims through Select Works of Indian Bengali Muslim Authors

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Keywords: Multiple – ethnicities, Cross-Cultural Encounters, Democracy, Discourse, Syncretism, Ideological State Apparatus, Xenophobia, Liminality, Hybridity and Cultural Specificity.

Introduction

“A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its presencing”[1].

The fabric of Indian tapestry is woven with multiple threads of cultural diversity. The sense of cultural diversity does not necessarily invoke a sense of divisiveness in mind but a variegated lived experience. Being one of the largest democracy, India claims to maintain her status of being by respecting all differences among diversities. Yet the concept of an ideal utopic “sovereign socialist secular democratic republic” has limitations owing to it’s application in reality. This can be explained in nexus to the co-habitation of multiple ethnicities and the cross-cultural encounters.

India comprises of 29 federal states and 7 union territories with 23 official languages and six major religions practiced by her inhabitants resulting in the ‘hybrid’ identities of people. This means that people of India cannot uphold a single identity as their primary one but choose to constantly shift in the “interstitial passage between fixed identifications”[2]. Thus the implication of culture becomes a complex process as it refers to the intermingling elements instead of a monolithic definable entity. This entails the risk of adhering to one’s own faith in its idealized form unable to resist influences of composite culture.

Demography of Indian Muslims

Muslims are a minority in India with a population of 200 million people that is 14.2% of the country’s population of 130 million people (approx)[3]. Yet India is the country
with the largest Muslim population outside Muslim-majority countries. They are scattered across different parts of the countries in varying percentages. A major part of Muslim Population resides in Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Kerala among others. Bengali Muslims are an ethnic-religious minority residing in West Bengal and parts of Assam and they are the result of the syncretism of Islamic and Bengali culture.

Focus of Study

This research will primarily focus on the challenges encountered in retaining the religious identity (Muslim) in a non-Muslim particularly secular country in the contemporary world. The problem stems from the several facets of a single subjective identity i.e Indian Bengali Muslim and also a Woman. Thus an unpremeditated inability to answer the question “Who are you?” propels the subject to seek plural answers. The conflict arises out of the coercive attempts to homogenize multiple identities under one bracket and present that as a universal one as an Indian or Bengali with an emphasis on being secular.

The concept of identity is not restricted to the public domain but intervenes in the personal space as well. The Indian Bengal Muslims undergo this process of ‘othering’[4] from different spheres of social encounter. In order to survive in a secular nation, they are expected to behave in a particular way so as not to be labeled as ‘Orthodox’. Bengali Muslims prefer to live in comfort zones without getting involved in debates. Their main concern lies not only in getting accepted by the majority but also in getting assimilated within the corpus of a single community i.e. Bengali. The apprehension of being dissociated from the Bengali community compels them to not only shun the Muslim of lifestyle but also ‘adopt’ ‘adapt’ and ‘adept’ themselves to a liberal mode of being. This struggle between religious and cultural preferences puts them in the ‘liminal’[2] spaces about the indecisiveness of choices.

This study will aim to bring out the problems faced by these people due to the intervention of the dominant ideology in their day to day existence. The process works through different Ideological State Apparatuses[5] such as society, work environment, schools and educational institutions. Without being partisan, it can be stated hypothetically that Indian Bengali Muslims are affected in their countenance by their non-Muslim counterpart and the contrary is intriguingly seldom seen.

Research Questions

In the contemporary world with the impact of globalization, the concern rests in attempts to restructure one’s identity as a transnational Muslim Umma. The contention stems from the absence of a unanimous image of a Muslim Umma. This research will look into the following questions.

Indian Bengali Muslims encounter threats of being segregated as either too orthodox by the other community when resorting to Muslim identity markers (e.g.’pardah’, ‘fez’) or too liberal by their own community if not. How can they manage to retain their Muslim identity without hampering their social existence? How can they resist attempts of vilification from either end?

What necessitates the emulation of the non-Islamic culture by them? What would be the probable alternative to the identity crises faced by them?

Why is language thought to be synonymous with religion? Why is there an attempt to universalize identity on the basis of language culture and religion?

Novelty of Study

Owing to India’s myriad diversity, the Muslim community is confronted with a plethora of issues in their absorption and retention of identity as Muslims. By far not much attention has been given to the predicament of Indian Muslims owing to their minority status. This study aims to draw global attention to the microcosm of an ethnic group and so as to address their plight in a humanitar- ian way. The proposed solution would be the adoption of Spivak’s idea of ‘Strategic Essentialism’[6] in order to resist the attempts of assimilation.

Methodology

For conducting an intensive study, the focus of study
has been pared down to a particular religious’ linguistic minority keeping in view the probable limitations and therefore, it is qualitative in its approach. With this end, an ethnographic study of contemporary human behavior since partition has been carried out to present the imbrications of identity with religion, nationality, and language. It objectively attempts to abbreviate the man-made polarities in society. Literature is applied as an alternative means to negotiate cultural appropriation. In this light seminal works by Begum Rokeya trying to liberate Muslim society from parochialism deserves mention.

Result and Discussion

The Xenophobia originating post-Partition in Bengal has aggravated in the past few decades owing to some scattered incidences of terror attacks with the consensus that Muslims are perpetrators of hatred and genocide. Thus Muslims are constantly wary of their identity as any traces of religious markers is treated with unjustified skepticism. Thus the onus rightly pointed out by Jaya Chatterjee, is laid entirely on Muslims to prove their allegiance and subservience to the nation at the expense of compromising with their Muslim identity[7]. The instances to be cited to substantiate the argument would be the debate concerning the imposition of pronouncing “Vande Mataram”( Mother, I bow to thee) which is incongruous to the Muslim faith of Monogamy.

Conclusion

The study will endeavor to bring about means of negotiation to mitigate problems faced in the discourse of identity. It analyzes the implications of cross-cultural ramifications in a nuanced way. Without offering a polemic against any particular ethnic community, this study aims to subvert notions of cultural specificity with the aegis of transnationalism[8]. Transnationalism seeks to offer a transcendental platform for the collaboration and dissemination of ideas and measures to be adopted by the Muslims across the globe to preserve and cherish their identity as Muslims.

References

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Nowadays, especially after the September 11 attacks, conversation about transnational Islamic ideology (Salafism) develop is often become a topic in the world. Actually, when the spread of this transnational Islamic ideology does start? In Indonesia the spread of this transnational Islamic ideology (Purist Salafism) has been around since the 1980s, in conjunction with the established of Islamic and Arabic College of Indonesia (LIPIA) in Jakarta. LIPIA is a college that get funding from Saudi Arabia. Through LIPIA, Saudi Arabia (government and salafi foundations) has been pouring scholarship assistance and assistance with the development of educational facilities and assistance with the construction of mosques and other social assistance to the Indonesian people. The LIPIA alumni, especially those who have continued learning in Saudi Arabia, has been spreading the transnational Islamic ideology massively to the Indonesian people through various roads, for example; educational institutions and radios and youtubes and social medias and others. The result, since the 1980s, the transnational Islamic ideology has been developing and reach its peak in the reform era (after the fall of Soeharto authoritarian regime, 1998).

The transnational Islamic ideology omit in Indonesia is Purist Salafism, not Haraki Salafism that want to set up an Islamic state nor Jihadist Salafism that take the path of violence. The Purist Salafism is followed the Islamic form of Saudi Arabian Wahhabism, although they confessed that they are back on al-Qur’an and hadith and al salaf al shalih scholars (the first three generations of Islam). The purpose of Purist Salafism Indonesia is purifed and rectify Islamic form that implemented in Indonesia (integrating Islam and local culture). According to Purist Salafism, integrating Islam and local culture like many found in In-
donesia is a heresy that must be purified.

Certainly, the purpose of Purist Salafism Indonesia crashed one of the largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, that is Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). First, because this Islamic organizations always practice Islam that compromise with local traditions and culture. One of NU’s principles is al ‘adah al muhakkamah (good tradition can be determined as juristic and al muhafadzah ala al qad-im al shalih wa al akhdz bi al jadid al aslah (maintain the good old teachings and contextualize it with the good new teachings). Second, because NU was at first stood up with destination for provided a representative organization that can leave to Saudi Arabia and influence the Wahhabist new ruler to retract demolition of the tomb of Prophet Muhammad and Waliyullah (holy persons) that Indonesian Muslims visit often.

Therefore, when the Purist Salafism is getting stronger in Indonesia, than immediately NU take an action to respond it. NU has popularized the idea of Islam Nusantara (Islamic Archipelago). This action has been beginning since muktamar (conference) NU 33rd August 1-5, 2015. The ideal purpose of the “Islam Nusantara” ideology want to reclarify that Islam in Indonesia is adopting local culture. The results of the adaptation appear “Islam Nusantara” that emphasizes on peacefulness and harmony and compassion that in fact the manifestation of the core of Islamic teachings itself.

While, the political purpose of the “Islam Nusantara” ideology—as Said Aqil (NU general chairman)—is to withstand Salafism dissemination in Indonesia. The employing of the term of “Islam Nusantara” apparently indeed deliberately in order to this ideology regarded as an indigenous ideology, while the other ideology (in this case, Purist Salafism) regarded as a foreign ideology, because “nusantara” (archipelago) has an ancient Indonesian name. Therefore, NU hope Indonesian people will consider that Purist Salafism as a foreign ideology and a negative ideology, so that ideology will fade away in Indonesian society, on top of that, if necessary, prohibited by the Indonesian government.

The circle of Purist Salafism in Indonesia know that “Islam Nusantara” discourse is a form of NU’s resistance to Purist Salafism ideology, so that they fight back too. They campaign that “Islam Nusantara” is a liberalism project and different from the Islamic of prophet Muhammad and perverted, via their radio and their educational institutions and their website and youtube and social media massively. Moreover, the Purist Salafism in Indonesia often named their ideology as ahlu al sunnah wa al jama’ah too, like a mainstream ideology in Indonesia, to attract sympathy.

This ideological dispute between transnational Islam of Purist Salafism and local Islam of “Islam Nusantara” is interesting and important to observation. How ideological dispute between transnational Islam of Purist Salafism and local Islam of “Islam Nusantara” is formed a Islamic discourse in Indonesia? Is it possible to reach an Islamic discourse consensus between them? Is it possible both of them can be the Ummah?

To answer that questions, I will use the discourse theory of Jurgen Habermas, German philosopher. According to Habermas, discourse is a communication where the participants no longer can use offhand those statements that has been received together in society, because in a discursive communication those participants must present rational reasons and reflective reasons. Discourse is not only an effort to result legitimate norms, but an effort to examine the truth of norms which considered hypothetically.

Furthermore, Habermas said that a discourse can reach a rational consensus if it has the quality of inclusive and egalitarian and free of dominance. But Is it possible to reach a consensus? Is not that those participants of discourse have brought own interests? According to Habermas, those interests are not something static or something isolated from other interests. The intersubjective contact has formed those interests. Thus, in a discourse will happen to crash of interests, but precisely through that crash the common interest or the consensus will be achieved.
Other than that, in this research, I will use several methods of data collection, such as literature review (journal article and book and website) and interview and mass media observation and social media observation. This research restricts the study only to ideological dispute between transnational Islam of Purist Salafism and local Islam of “Islam Nusantara” particularly between the Purist Salafism Saudi Arabia network and PBNU (the big administrator of NU) in Jakarta during 2015-2019.

References


This paper takes the ethnographic narratives of Moroccan pilgrims as a point of departure in discussing the pilgrimage experience through its capacity to address the senses and evoke emotions. These senses and emotions, this paper argues, are related to the spiritual experience of pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj/Umra) and are motivated by interactions with Muslim pilgrims belonging to diverse backgrounds and nationalities. The pilgrimage itself brings together Muslims representing the Ummah beyond differences that might exist within Muslim communities and national boundaries.

Building on theoretical perspectives of anthropology of emotions and the senses, this paper reflects on how the pilgrimage as a religious experience (in the narratives of Moroccan pilgrims) has the capacity to influence the body and the senses (DeChaine 2002). At the personal level, the paper argues, the use of senses in descriptions of the pilgrimage allows for continuous awareness and presence in the time and place of the pilgrimage for the individual pilgrims upon their return to Morocco. This transnational experience becomes part of the narratives that pilgrims tell family and friends upon return home. At the group level, the sharing the experience through the senses allows a production of religious sentiments and triggers stimulation of feelings and emotions of the audience. In this sense, sharing the experience is a cultural act that also influences people’s expectations of certain physical and emotional reactions during the pilgrimage. Both those who have performed the Hajj and future pilgrims, might -consciously or unconsciously - anticipate certain emotions related to the various rites during the pilgrimage. Further, what pilgrims experience, later becomes a point of reference in their everyday lives — moving beyond the five senses, and incorporating them ethnographically into analyses of everyday practices, experiences and communications (Howes 2003).

Through anthropological ethnographic narrative, this paper reflects on how pilgrims in Morocco expressed their experiences of the Hajj as sensational form. Through a narrative about the senses, pilgrims expressed their emotions during the pilgrimage, at the same time evoking, communicating, and reinforcing their emotions. The pilgrimage itself is an emotionally powerful experience because of its effect and the impact it could leave on the senses of both who performed the pilgrimage and the listeners of their narratives and stories.

In the Hajj and the Anthropological Study of Pilgrimage Marjo Buitelaar points the importance of understanding specific instances of Hajj performances within their wider historical and cultural contexts, each of them testifying to the Hajj as a changing tradition. In this sense, it is im-
important to take into consideration socio-cultural contextualization of the pilgrims in addition to the ‘affect’ and ‘awe’ perspectives in their narratives. Bodily responses as well as emotional experiences evoked during the pilgrimage are not separate to the meanings attributed to the pilgrimage experiences that have been structured by socio-cultural contexts. The role of sensational forms in the construction of religious subjectivities and communities is described by Meyer with the term ‘aesthetic formation.’ According to Meyer, aesthetic dimensions of religion are central in generating shared sensory experiences, which are not to be seen as mere expressions of a community’s beliefs and identity (as in Benedict Anderson’s notion of the ‘imagined community’) but actively involved in an on-going process of making religious subjectivities and communities.

“aesthetic formation” captures very well the formative impact of a shared aesthetics through which subjects are shaped by tuning their senses, inducing experiences, molding their bodies, and making sense (…) (Meyer 2009: 7).

As a religious experience, the sensual experience of the pilgrims can also be perceptible, visible, and audible, as well as providing a framework of emotions. The paper reflects on the narrative experiences of the Hajj through the senses of sight, soundscapes, smell, taste, and touch and reflects on how transnational relations throughout the Hajj become part of the sensory experience of pilgrims.

Case study: tasting the Ummah:

One example of the sensory aspects of the pilgrimage experience can be derived from the encounters that pilgrims had with other Muslims representing the diverse Muslim Ummah. For example, Moroccan pilgrims discussed the food that was available during the pilgrimage in Mecca which represented the international diversity of pilgrims. Since the meals were either provided in packages or prepared by pilgrims themselves, during the Hajj, comments on the food were limited to the linking or disliking of the food, its flavors, spices or amount. During the lesser pilgrimage, Umra, however, pilgrims have more time to explore food options as most meals should be arranged by the pilgrims themselves (depending on the package bought through travel agencies). Pilgrims performing Umra in Ramadan were specifically vocal about their experience as they often shared breaking their fast at the Grand Mosque of Mecca (or in Medina). Moroccan pilgrims expressed their enjoyment in spending Ramadan in Mecca. In addition to the spiritual aspect of the experience, they explicitly enjoyed sharing food with other pilgrims. In their narratives, Moroccan pilgrims speak about the meals they shared with Muslims from Egypt, Palestine, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Turkey among others. Pilgrims expressed how they sit to new groups of people; putting their food next to each other; enjoying conversations while everyone broke their fast. Pilgrims relished both the food and the interactions and in a way, they were, literally, tasting the Muslim Ummah.

The paper will further reflect on other aspects of the transnational connections of pilgrims in Mecca and how relationships with other Muslim communities become part of shaping the identity of Muslim pilgrims in Morocco.

References


Islamist movements across the globe have undergone tremendous transformations both at structural and functional levels, through the course of modern history. Viewed against the backdrop of secularism and democracy, they were often criticized for their ideology which is incompatible with many of these modern values, especially in the non-Muslim societies. The nucleus of most debates on these transformations focuses on whether the core ideology of these movements gets diluted/moderated with the passage of time, or if this projected ‘transformation’ is a mere peripheral strategy. Are the recent developments in the ‘Arab spring’ and the grant of voting rights for women in many Arab countries a reflection of change in the respective Islamist ideologies? Or are they merely a change in strategy? Against this backdrop of contrasting perspectives, this paper seeks to examine the relationship between the ideology and strategy in the activism of the Kerala (southernmost state of Indian subcontinent) unit of Jamaat-e-Islami (henceforth Jamaat) in the period between 1990 and 2018.

Jamaat was founded by Abul Ala Maududi, with the prime objective of establishing an Islamic state over the world, thereby denouncing Secular democracy in 1941. The root of the Maududian ideology is the perception that religion is the basis of life and it has upheld a public-private dichotomy in the issues of modernity-secularism, democracy, modern education, co-education etc. However, many of these standpoints have changed over the period of time.

Muslims form a significant proportion of population in Kerala (24.7% as per 2011 census), and the community has from the time of Independence given expression to its need for development and recognition both through its...
own political and social organizations like Indian Union Muslim League and also through mainstream political parties like Indian National Congress and even through the Communist parties. Unlike their counterparts in the other parts of the country, the Kerala Muslims have a better socio-economic index and are highly integrated in the local culture of the state. Hence, Kerala Muslims are peculiar in many ways.

Since the early 1990s, significant transformations marked the activism of Kerala unit of Jamaat and hence the study takes off from this period. Other than the conceptual transformation of the two postulates of Islamism: the blurring of the boundary between Islam and Jahiliyat and the dissolution of Islam as an organic whole (Ahmad 2010), the factors developed at the international, national and local levels play a vital role in the transformation of Kerala unit of Jamaat. It includes various Islamic scholars forum formed across the globe, the major shifts in the Middle East politics and the emergence of United States as a major power after the downfall of Soviet Union and ‘political Hindutva’ in India and subsequent identity and security crisis of Indian Muslims and vehement opposition to the ideology of Jamaat from the majority of Muslims. The emergence of a new section of leaders within the Jamaat who are educated at Islamic universities abroad and who are deeply influenced by those institutions played a significant role in the transformation of the Kerala Jamaat.

As this study attempts to ‘read’ the various translations of the transformation of the Kerala unit of Jamaat, it looks at the organization from a nuanced and critical framework. Primarily being a qualitative work, interdependent methods have been used in this study to analyze and interpret the data. To go beyond the predominant themes of the present Muslim politics in India like Babri masjid, ethnographic approach is mainly used in the study. Interviews (both structured and semi-structured) with leaders, activists and critics of Jamaat were conducted to draw primary data. Various Jamaat organizational and public functions were also attended as a part of participant observation. Various literature including pamphlets, articles, books, newspaper reports and online resources on and of Jamaat and its affiliated organs have also been used to collect data.

Analysis of data reveals that the new mode of Jamaat’s activism since the early 1990s is largely a strategy employed by the organization, and not a deviation from their core ideology. It is evident from the different case studies. For example, Jamaat’s changing standpoints on the question of gender. In spite of various programs that involves Muslim women both at state and local levels, the issue of gender equality has not come in to the main agenda of both the Jamaat and its women’s or girls’ wings. They are also reluctant to engage in the discussions on the Sharia laws of Islam. Even though Madhyamam weekly (publication by the Kerala unit of Jamaat) devoted one complete issue (15.03.2010) to women, it did not have a single article that narrates the condition of Muslim women in their family and in Islam itself. While the prominent non-Muslim feminist voices from the state get space, none of the Muslim feminist voice (who opposes the male centric Islam) finds a space in this women’s issue. Moreover, Prabhodanam and Aramam (Jamaat publication for women) have never introduced writers and the activists like Amina Wadud (United States), Laila Ahamd (Egypt), Mariam Rajavi (Iran) etc. who write and fight against male centric Islam. Hence it is very obvious that the transformation of the Kerala Jamaat’s views on the gender question is rather a strategy than the deviation from the ideology of the Jamaat. The reflections of Maududian thoughts are still evident on the Jamaat’s approach towards the question of gender.

This has also generated intense debates both within and outside Jamaat. Simultaneously, new strategic changes in the mode of activism dilute certain traditional standpoints of Jamaat – still, even this activism is translated to be a version of the core ideology. Hence, I argue that the Kerala unit of Jamaat put forwards a new model of Islamism in India. I will further argue that the ‘new’ activism contradicts the popular perception that ideology gets diluted when the policy and program of any movement undergoes change.
References


Abstract

Islamism which found a basis for discussion and improvement in the late 19th century has taken a back seat in the face of new circumstances emerging after the WWI. Following the WWII however, Islamism has taken yet another turns only to found a renewed zeal and mobility. Especially the Islamic societies that were either former colonies or came under repressive secular regimes became the scenes of this revival and mobility. This paper will examine how Turkey lately joined in this process after 1960’s. This interaction will be traced through translated Islamist works to Turkish. The effects of translated books on Turkish Islamism and its development process in those years in the context of the works of Sayyid Qutb, Abu’l Ala Mawdudi and Ali Shariati, the prominent Egyptian, Pakistani and Iranian Islamists, will be at the center of my paper’s scrutiny. This paper will look into the ideology and background of the people who translated Qutb’s, Mawdudi’s and Shariati’s works to Turkish as well as the mentality behind the selection of certain books, while omitting others. The content of these books will also be treated in the context of common themes, topics and discussions about Islamism that eventually shaped Turkish Islamism in that period. Finally, this study will look at the reception of translation mobility by the Turkish Islamist groups, including those who rejected and run campaigns against them.

Introduction

The beginning of the reshaping of global politics after World War II at the same time as the freeing of Islamic countries from colonial networks deepened the current intellectual crises the Islamic world had already been
in and moved it to a new stage. This situation brought together new pursuits in various regions of the Islamic world; thus, the reshaping of global Islamic thought began, and the rebuilding of the new generation was started by the Islamists. A similar process occurred in Turkey too, also with its own internal dynamics; Turkish Islamists entered new pursuits in order to understand, make sense of, and find solutions to the intellectual crisis they were found in, as well as to revive Islamic thought in this context. One of the most important initiatives resorted to in Turkey for facing, struggling with, and overcoming the current crises was the establishment of multidirectional yet new contacts with the Islamic world in order to have a more intellectual context, as well as to review, evaluate, and develop existing contacts within the framework of these new perspectives. These new pursuits naturally prepared the groundwork for a new revival of Islamism as well as its reconstruction discursively. One of the most fundamental factors revealing the new Islamism that had emerged in Turkey was recognizing, embracing, and conveying to Turkey the political and intellectual developments that existed in the world of Islam. Thus the considerations and actions of people in the position of ideologues, opinion leaders, religious men, and movement leaders who had become distinguished through their ideas and actions in the Islamic world during the period in which they lived attempted to be recognized and understood by Islamists; in this way, these acquired rights had been conveyed to Turkey by way of various channels through different intermediaries, institutions, and people. In addition, Islamic movements, organizations, foundations, and associations that showed activity in various regions of the Islamic geography would be followed closely, and their transnational experiences would prepare the groundwork for revealing a new Islamism and Islamic movement by being the model for Islamic revival in Turkey. Even though these transnational relations of Islamism showed itself in several different ways in Turkey, I would like to address and examine the process of these interactions more over the state of the translation movement in my presentation. This translation movement, which would have vital importance in the emergence of

the new Islamism in Turkey and in how it would gain specific characteristic qualities, appeared as an important matter through these aspects and offers significant opportunities for understanding the new Islamist discourse in Turkey.

An Overview of Translations

The translation movement that I focus on in this study and that would significantly determine the language and agenda of the Islamist discourse in Turkey started at the very beginning of the 1960s and continued until the 1990s. As many as 450 works belonging to dozens of different Islamist thinkers and men of ideas and movements in this process, where the new global Islamist thought was transferred to Turkey, were translated into Turkish. Nearly 250 people with very different backgrounds from one another and almost none of whom were professional translators took part in this translation process. Additionally, as many as 100 publishing houses that had printed and published these translated works played an active role in this process. In a short period of about almost 40 years, when considering the opportunities and conditions of that period, no doubt these figures are important as much as they cannot be underestimated. However, this matter is worth examining on its own as well as the translators, publishers, and people and institutions that took part in the translations in the context of patronage relations; in fact, I am attempting to incline to some of these issues in my doctoral dissertation. Here I would like to focus on the representational power of three great names for addressing the orientation of the translation movement and how it was operated: Abdul A’la Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, and Ali Shariati. While choosing these names, aside from their great representative strengths, I also wanted to draw attention to various basins. Now, before moving on to these three names, I think showing the meanings that have been loaded on the factors that pushed the current Islamic circles and Islamists in Turkey to translate and on the translations is important.
Abdul A’la Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, and Ali Shariati are names that would awaken an effect through their ideas not just in Turkey but in the entire Islamic geography. Among these names, Maududi is the one whose works would be translated the most into Turkish. Maududi was not only known as a good author, translator, Qur’an commentator, and theoretician; alongside these, he had spent a part of his life in prison for political reasons and had come to the fore as an activist and name that established Jamaat-e Islami, one of South Asia’s largest Islamic movements. This situation allowed him to be modeled and also followed in the Islamic world as both an intellectual and a man of action. Men of ideas, ideologists, and theoreticians from various regions of the Islamic world followed and were impacted by what Maududi wrote on topics such as Islamic economy, war law, male-female relations, Islamic state, international relations, Islamic sciences, and social life.

The number of works that he penned during his life and that were accepted is 100, and more than half of these were translated into Turkish from 1960-1980. Some of these works naturally saw more intense interest in Turkey. At the head of these is Maududi’s book, Four Terms; although being a small volume, it had great impact on the Islamic community at that time in Turkey. In this book, Maududi bent over the concepts of God-Lord-Religion and worship, which he saw as the building blocks of Islamic thought and questioned how these concepts were misunderstood by Muslims in the contemporary period. The works of Maududi that were translated into Turkish which markedly affected the political imagination of Turkey’s Islamism were works that drew his attention to the many political, legal, and social aspects of Islam and addressed its relevance and applicability in the contemporary period. In his works, Maududi attempted to show what types of answers and solutions the Islamic religion produced in the face of social issues, in particular political and economic improvements. An important section of the post-colonial Islamic world’s entering a decolonization process in the second half of the 20th century made the need for solutions of this type even more evident; authors such as Maududi also played important roles in this process with their works. One important work that Maududi took to pen in this context is the book İslam’da Hükümet (Governance in Islam), which shows Islam to examine political and administrative aspects and how these ideals would lead to discussions on the pursuit of current political management. Maududi claimed in his preface to the book that he had worked for 25 years on these issues and arrived at the point that, anymore, the plan on how Governance in Islam could practically and applicably be had been drawn. This voluminous work of Maududi was translated into Turkish as İslam’da Hükümet, and the book has had dozens of different prints at various times. In parallel again with the same pursuits, the books İslam’da Devlet Nizamı (Governmental Order in Islam), İslam’da Hayat Nimazı (Islamic Way of Life), İslam’da Ahlak Nizamı (Moral Order in Islam), and İslam’da Siyaset Nizamı (Political Order in Islam) were also introduced to Turkish readers by being translated in the same years. All these works show the new pursuit of order and struggle to establish order to have been inherent in the period of Islamist thought and indicate the normative aspect of the discussions that were made for this within the period of Islamic thought. In one aspect, his practical Islamic solutions on issues the Islamic world was facing also are seen as a basic method that was referenced for protection from the crises the Islamic world had at the time. For these reasons, Maududi’s translations in Turkey too, as in other regions, would have an important function in forming the agenda of the new Islamic discourse and, because of this, would also face intense demand from the Islamists in Turkey.

Another name that had an effect of this size at this period of the Islamic world, particularly in the intellectual sense, is Sayyid Qutb. The works of Sayyid Qutb, who was one of the most important theorists of 20th-century Islamic thought, were translated for different regions of the Islamic geography at similar periods and travelled from hand to hand within the Islamic communities of these regions. Sayyid Qutb’s first work was translated into Turkish
in 1962, and like Maududi’s works, the translations made by Sayyid Qutb in the 1960s and 1970s continued at an intense pace. In a process that continues to this day, Sayyid Qutb’s books have continued being translated by different translators and been repeatedly reprinted by different publishers. Sayyid Qutb, like Maududi, did not copyright many of his works, yet certain works of his in particular have seen the duty of being cornerstones in the formation of the new Islamic discourse. For example, Qutb’s book Social Justice in Islam earned a new perspective in the leftist-socialism debates that intellectually influenced the Islamic world of the time and managed to channel discussions to a new area by developing Islamic perspectives directed particularly at socialism’s economic emphases. Thus this book was the first work of Qutb to be translated into Turkish and had a very important and decisive impact on the adventure of Islamic thought in Turkey. This impact showed itself in the political conjuncture of the Cold War, which the Islamic community also faced at that time in Turkey, and in the polarization of capitalism and socialism. This book had significant impacts at this phase in the crisis of Islamic thought, which had remained in the dilemma of right and left that the new political conjuncture had formed. With the translation of this book, the new Islamists could find a unique answer produced from Islam’s own sources against the attractant wave that had also affected their own leftist-socialist thoughts; the new Islamists had obtained the power and opportunity to resist this atmosphere that had held them clamped. Milestones, which we can see to be Sayyid Qutb’s magnum opus, would become one of his masterpieces by determining the discourse of the global Islamist awakening that had been on the rise since the second half of the 20th century. The book was translated into Turkish in 1966 immediately after Sayyid Qutb was hung. The first time the book would be translated into Turkish, Hilâl Dergisi, a Turkish journal, would announce to its readers, “The book that drove its author to be executed.” However, Sayyid Qutb’s book would not be as positively received in Turkey as his first translated book Social Justice in Islam. Official authorities would apply a group of restrictions at first regarding the circulation of the book. Despite these prohibitions and barriers, the book Milestone had become quite popular since the first day it had been translated, especially within the Islamic community in Turkey, and this would also allow the book to be reprinted several times. That the book has up to now been translated by 11 different translators and printed repeatedly by 12 different publishers also shows the book’s impact within Islamist thought in Turkey. Milestones would be the last book penned by Sayyid Qutb and would also be shown as the justification for his execution during his trial. When considering that Sayyid Qutb’s own world of thought was shaped with respect to stages, one can see the book Milestones as a last-stage product that had come in Sayyid Qutb’s own adventure of thought. Within the Islamists in Turkey, they would learn for the first time from Sayyid Qutb’s book the need for the society they lived in to be above “ignorance” and to have a “pioneering generation” to be saved from this situation. Alongside these, the works of Sayyid Qutb would have very distinct and significant impacts on the ideals of Islamists in Turkey on the legal acquis that needed to be acquired and the methods that needed to be followed while heading toward the process of Islamic revival. The concepts that Sayyid Qutb would bring to Islamism in Turkey would not be limited to only social justice, ignorance/ignorant society and the leading generation, or Islamic revival. Some other concepts that Qutb particularly emphasized in his various works would begin to be discussed and mentioned in Islamism in Turkey together with Qutb’s works. Concepts and discussions such as tawheed, monition, jihad, social responsibility, council, shura (consultation), the laws of Allah, manhaj (the path of Islam), and the sovereignty of Allah would create specific terminology that Qutb would bring in this sense to Islamist thought in Turkey.

The name I would lastly refer to at this stage is Ali Shariati, whose works were translated into Turkish at a later period than Maududi or Qutb. Ali Shariati not only inherited the new Islamist discourse and experience that arose in Iran but later passed it on as a historical process to other Islamic geographies. Despite the late articulation, the experience of Iranian Islamism would have a great impact
within global Islamist thought. The Iranian Revolution inevitably turned the attention of various thought basins in the Islamic world to Iran, and how a specific part/aspect of the accumulation of new Islamist thought had arrived at an Islamic revolution in practice was followed with curiosity. The experience of Turkey has also been an extension of this process. The Islamists in Turkey closely followed the revolution experienced in Iran from its beginning, and have attempted to analyze and understand the background of the idea that prepared the revolution. The name of Ali Shariati comes to the fore within this pursuit, and the new Islamists in Turkey also saw Ali Shariati as the ideology of revolution and began to turn to Turkey with these motives. Ali Shariati, whose books had been translated from different languages in the beginning, later began to translate also from Persian into Turkish. One point that needs to be noted here is that, unlike Sayyid Qutb and Maududi, all of Ali Shariati’s works have been completely translated into Turkish. Within these works are some that have had significant impacts with Islamist thought in Turkey. At the head of these comes Shariati’s book, The Four Prisons of Man. In this book, Shariati examines in detail how humans as the ego are inhibited and restricted by four different elements. These elements are the conditions that nature brings (nature), the things that history forces upon humans (history), the society one lives within, and lastly, the human’s own ego. Another work of Ali Shariati that awoke great impact in Turkey and that is one of his cornerstones in the world of ideas is his book titled Religion Vs. Religion. Ali Shariati addressed the slogan “Religion is the opiate of the masses” in this book and attempted to arrive at a proper conclusion by criticizing this in terms of Islam. This book holds an important place in terms of forming the base of discussions that were conducted on conceptualizations such as “true religion” and “true Islam” within Islamist discourse in Turkey. Apart from this, this work seriously criticized tradition and more specifically traditional religious understanding. By asking the reader if the religion they believe in and live is the real religion or if one has been sentenced to a distorted understanding of religion, this work additionally attempts to highlight aspects of the Islamic religion regarding action, movement, and even rebellion. Although Shariati is not seen as an Islamist by some in Turkey, his ideas in addition to his life, actions, and style, left deep impacts on Islamism in Turkey. Mentioning his name together with the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the revolutionary language of his discourses slightly strengthened the aspect of Islamism in Turkey aimed at action and, even more, strengthened rejectionist understanding. In addition, the Islamic religion turned into a more revolutionary ideology within Islamic thought in Turkey through Shariati’s impact. In this respect, Shariati completed the impacts in Turkey of Islamist figures such as Maududi and Qutb, whose works had been translated into Turkish before him, through his specific aspects and carried their discourses to a different layer by making them sharper. On the other hand, Shariati having been educated in the West and his often-multi-faceted handling and processing of the West in his works has positioned him at a slightly different place within the Islamist tradition. Characteristics such as his intellectual identity, partial possession of sections belonging to different ideological backgrounds, and his choice of Western thought as his main reference source have made him the carrier of issues that would emerge distinctly in the Islamist discourse after the 1990s and at the same made him the preparer of the new Islamist discourse and language. To say another way, Ali Shariati also served as a bridge between the two different Islamist discourses that would dominate the two different eras.
Workshop VIII

04 August 2019 – Sunday / 14:00 – 17:00

Grand Hall

Chair: Taha Eğri

Rasoul Zarchini
Strengthening Iran’s Link with the Islamic Ummah: Barriers and Solutions

Mohammadjavad Heydariandolatabadi
Establishment of the Union of Islamic Countries; From Legal Paradigm to Policy Reality

Mushtaq Ahmad Wani
The Role of Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Rebuilding the Ummah: Challenges and Prospects

Khushbakht Qaiser
The Phenomenon of Globalization and the Aspirations of Muslim Ummah

Amnah Khalid Rashid
Transnational Islam: Is Digital Ummah Possible?

Ehsan Amini Baghbaderani
Globalization of Transnational Religious and Civilization Reserves; a Strategy towards Islamic Ummah Case
Study: Study of Arbaeen Congregation as a Transnational Phenomenon
Strengthening Iran’s Link with the Islamic Ummah: Barriers and Solutions

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Keywords: Iran, Islamic Ummah, Shia, Nationalism, Secularism, Sectarianism, Salafism, Akhbarism, Culture, Nowruz.

Strengthening Iran’s Link with the Islamic Ummah: Barriers and Solutions

Ever since the victory of the Islamic armies over Sassanid Empire in 651 AD, Iran has always been considered an essential part of great Islamic Ummah, and many Muslim jurisprudents, mystics, scholars and literate have raised from these lands so that practically the Islamic Ummah is not conceivable without Iran. This situation changed dramatically with the emergence of Shiite Safavid rule in 1502. During a short period of time, the Shiite minority of Iran, previously restricted to some small cities in Northern and central Iran, such as Qom, Kashan, Rey, Sabzevar, and Lahijan, became the majority. Iran becoming a Shi’a state, radically changed the political and military relations of the Muslim states of the region.

Shia Iran’s fracture from other Muslim nations is considered a major issue in the formation of a united Islamic Ummah, and any attempt in this matter, without solving this issue will not lead to any answer. Therefore, this research seeks to answer the question: “What are the barriers to and strategies for strengthening the bond between Shiite Iranians and the Unified Islamic Ummah”? To answer this question, you have to pay attention to these three facts in Iranian society.

1. Reza Shah Pahlavi declared the dissolution of the Turkmen-Shiite Qajar dynasty in 1926 and took the throne as the first non-tribal ruler in Iranian History and founder of the modern nation-state of Iran. Reza Shah’s visit to Ataturk in 1934 initiated nationalist, secular, and modernist reforms. At this time, the gap created during the constitutional era between nationality and religion was intensified to the point where the Islamic Revolution of Iran could
be considered as the result of this gap. Even after that, since the beginning of the Iranian war with the Saddam Hussein, the support of the Arab countries of the region from the dictator of Iraq and the rise of anti-Arab passions in the country and the increasing of Iran’s economic problems during the post-war period, we have witnessed a further increase in secular-nationalist beliefs (reduction of Islam to Arab religion, prioritizing the national interest over the interests of the Muslim world, etc.) amongst the largely non-religious masses in Iran.

2. With the overthrow of the monarchy and the formation of an Islamic government in 1979, the left-wing forces (Dr. Ali Shariati (1933-1975)) began to marginalize, and Ayatollah Khomeini, as the leader of the Islamic Revolution, became the main proponent of Islamist thought among the Iranian community. Ayatollah Khomeini and his associates have always been spearheading the struggle to liberate Palestine, fight against the greatest enemies of Islam, the Soviet Union and the United States, and the need to unite the Islamic world against global arrogance. With the death of Ayatollah Khomeini (1989) and the election of Ayatollah Khamenei as the new leader of the Islamic Republic, the order to establish the Supreme Council of Islamic Approaches was issued in Tehran (1990). In this era, we witness the confiscation of Islamic unity through the rule of sovereignty. The governmentalization of the idea of Islamic unity and the efforts of religious leaders close to the government to theorize about the necessity of rebuilding the “Islamic Unified Muslim Ummah” made the ideological and intellectual ideal of Islamic unity (not the matter of much attention to the religious body of the Iranian society), became a political instrument and the government became its main trustee. In result, the destiny and the acceptance of Islamic unity in Iran and the region became synonymous with the effectiveness of the Islamic Republic and its treatment with other Islamic states (for example, the situation of the International Quds Day in Islamic countries).

3. The expansion of Salafism in the Islamic world and the emergence of radical Islamic groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, the increasing number of Persian-Wahhabi sat-ellite channels, the fear of Shiites of Iran from spreading the Salafism among the growing Sunni population of Iran and the dissatisfaction of the religious body of Iran’s society from The Islamic Republic (criticizing the way of Governing the country and their promoting of slogans such as the unity of Shiite and Sunni) has led to greater acceptance of Akhbari thoughts and sectarian approaches in Iranian society. In fact, in front of the entity that identifies the Shiite as Safavid, Magus, followers of Ibn Saba the Jew and the sole cause for the interval of Islam and Muslims, the Shia who has no place among the Islamic Ummah, identities are formed to fight these accusations, even if this fight means exclusion of Shared features between Shiite and the Sunnis.

According to the ideas of Olivier Roy, the proponents of the idea of pure religion (Sunni Salafism and Shi'a Akhbaries), with the rejection of the existing culture of the host society, the elimination of existing borders, and the emphasis on the strict implementation of the Shari’a (the exclusion of other Islamic life styles), are considered the main enemies and the largest Obstacles to the formation of the Islamic Ummah. History has shown that part of the Sunni and Shi’i clergy have been the main contributors to the intensification and deepening of religious opposition, and we have never witnessed the prevalence of co-existence and brotherhood among Muslims only by dialogue among religious elite, since religious brotherhood forms at the community and among the masses of the people And not at the level of the clerics and religious elites, secondly, this is the requirement of the clerical class to emphasize on religious differentiation as much as possible. In other words, the Ummah, as a cultural issue, will be born from the culture of Muslims, not from the Islamic Caliphate, Salafi Islam or Shi’ism.

In short, secular nationalism (carrying anti-Arab ideas and reduction of Islam to Arab religion) as an alternative to Islamism, the formation of a religious government by Shi’ite clerics and the rule of Islamic ideology, the spread of Persian language propagation of Salafi Islam and the prevalence of Shiite sectarianism (Akhbari) between the Iranian religious body, respectively are considered the
main obstacles to the further consolidation of the Iranian Shiite connection with the Islamic Ummah.

Finally, this paper responds to the question of “ways to strengthen Shiite Iranians with the Islamic Ummah”, by suggesting the acceptance of diverse and culturally based readings of Islam and use of Islamic cultural capacities to increase empathy, coexistence, and sense of belonging among Muslims. Iran has also linked a large part of the Muslim world (India, Central Asia, and Turkey) through the rich Persian literature culture (Mevlana, Khayyam, Rudaki, Shahriar). The celebration of Nowruz (common among Sunni and Shiites) is very prominent among the Muslim peoples of the region. The diverse Iranian people have the ability to increase communication and linkages between neighboring countries. Persian language as an influential language from Sind to Marmara, the cultural and linguistic interrelationships of 30 million Turks in the Azerbaijan of Iran with Turks of Central Asian countries, Caucasus and Turkey, Arabs of Iran with Arabs of the region, Baluchis with Baluchis of Pakistan and so on. These cultural capacities can even bring together Muslim immigrants in non-Muslim countries.

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Establishment of the Union of Islamic Countries; From Legal Paradigm to Policy Reality

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Keywords: Islamic Unity, Ummah, Islamic State, Union, Feasibility, Dispute Resolution, Islamic Law, Islamic political, Comparative Study, Islamic Countries.

In the context of the present world, with which many nations have gathered together with different customs, religions and customs, the element of unity among nations is of great importance; what is more clearly the enemy when it intends to the first goal is to crush the alliance and create dissension in the hearts of the people of that society, which many examples of these divisions in the past and present times confirm this word. The Islamic world, with about 50 countries, is a very good platform to succeed in uniting, cohering and empowering nations and governments to form a trans-national and determinant power for the creation of peace, stability, and pure Islamic justice. The European countries also set up the European Union, which was originally founded in 1957 under the name of the “European Economic Community”, and then the member states tried to develop and expand relations, which resulted in the establishment of The European Union was founded in 1991, which now has 28 member states; while, unfortunately, despite the existence of a multiplicity of demographic factors, the Islamic State has, unfortunately, managed to establish such a union with the widening of the European Union’s relations (customs union, common currency, No need for visas, common agricultural policy and trade, etc.). The purpose of this study is to establish the legal unions of the Islamic states, so that, thanks to the Lord, I am a step towards the expansion of the alliance among the Islamic societies that today needs more than anything else. Meanwhile, considering that most Muslims are Sunni brothers, we have tried to find a comparative study of Sunnis resources in order to achieve a comprehensive and practical result in the establishment of an alliance of Islamic countries.
The Muslim alliance has long been the great cause of Islamic societies. Although it is impossible today and in the absence of the Imam of Time (aj) to achieve the unity of the Islamic nation, the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in the contemporary period, he renewed the hope of creating unity among the Muslims and as a light to the body of the Islamic societies. Whose fruit was the formation of “Islamic awakening” with the modeling of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. As noted, the establishment of the European Union could also be a model for other Muslim societies, and that Muslims around the world would have to throw a thought that, in no religion than Islam, and in no book more than the Qur’an, it is about the need for unity and seclusion. Do not go from hypocrisy, stop divorcing and malice, and try brotherhood for unity and empathy. Of course, efforts have been made by Islamic governments such as Organization of the Islamic Cooperation to establish the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, initially initiated by the Organization of the Islamic Conference, but Certainly, you should not suffer so much and try to stop, because Allah Almighty states in verse 11 of Mobarakheh Rā’ād: “Allah does not believe in us, but we do not even believe in us.” Prior to this, valuable research has been carried out by law scholars and other scholars on the need for unity among Islamic societies, but there has been no discussion of the establishment of a legal union of Islamic countries, and, despite this, there has not been a comprehensive comparative study in this regard. Whereas, given that Sunni brothers make up a large number of Muslims, the result of the research is not practical or practical in the absence of consideration of the implementation of Sunni jurisprudence. In this research, we have tried to provide a comprehensive and practical solution to the advent of unity and the establishment of an alliance of Islamic countries by comparative study of Imams and Sunni jurisprudence.

This article seeks to answer the question of whether it is possible to provide areas of unity and sympathy among Muslims through the establishment of an alliance of Islamic countries in the era of the absence of Hojat (aj), which still does not achieve the achievement of the Islamic Ummah. Did you. Of course, it is clear that in order to achieve this, there are many obstacles to the way of Islamic societies, which will be elaborated in the text of the study, but it is an art that Muslims are trying hard to resist these obstacles by working hard and believing in God. And achieve the supreme goal of unity and empathy. It is hoped that this research can take a small step towards expanding Muslim alliances and, of course, the establishment of an alliance of Islamic countries, and will contribute to the advancement of inalienable rights. At the end pay attention to this topic that This research seeks to provide a comparative analysis of the dispute settlement in Iran and Islamic countries. And the purpose of this article is to look at the differences and similarities in the settlement of differences between Islamic countries and to decide which country is better in this regard and which country is more complete and comprehensive. This study examines a number of countries in Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and all countries use their system of arbitration, which is due to the expertise, accuracy and speed of judging judicial review. The method is all the same, but there are also differences based on the length of the research they are dealing with.

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The Holy Quran.
The Role of Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Rebuilding the Ummah: Challenges and Prospects

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Keywords: Ummah, Muslim World, Islamic Community, Disintegration, Unity, Coordination, Challenges, Organization, Revival, Power, International System.

Set up in the background of Quds arsenal, Organization of Islamic Cooperation was established in the year 1969 in the Moroccan city of Rabat to create unity in the Muslim World. The concept of Ummah was established by the Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him as told by Almighty Allah in Qur’an at different places. This notion of Ummah is at the heart of the political thought of Islam reflecting oneness based on the unity of God. But because of the fall of Khilafat in 1923 in the present Turkey and the colonization of the Muslim world with the subsequent formation of nation-states, the notion of ummah was also weakened politically. This resulted in adopting secularism by the Muslim countries and following the western models of polity, economy, science and technology in addition to the adoption of Western culture. The organization represents 57 countries of the Muslim world with the aim of establishing unity, solidarity and brotherhood. OIC is the only international religio-political organization in the world and that too the largest intergovernmental organization after the United Nations Organization, representing every Muslim on the face of this earth. Because the political unity of Ummah was destroyed in 1923 with the fall of Ottoman Empire, Muslims around the world have been desperately searching for rebuilding the lost sense of unity and oneness so necessary for the fellow-feeling and faith of Muslims. Muslims are but one body as the Hadees says, “The similitude of believers in regard to mutual love, affection, fellow-feeling is that of one body; when any limb of it aches, the whole-body aches, because of sleeplessness and fever”.

The reason detre of OIC, i.e, Palestine has been the top priority of the organization; the greatest ever achievement has been getting Observer Member Status for Pal-
estine in UNO and getting Zionism declared as racist ideology. The Al-Quds Committee is specially looking into the issue of Quds.

Similarly, the issue of Kashmir has been of special importance; there is a Kashmir Contact Group on Kashmir comprising of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Aerbaijan, Niger and Pakistan. OIC has been passing resolutions on the Issue of Kashmir, condemning the human rights violations and defending the right of the people of Kashmir to fight against the Indian aggression. But unfortunately these resolutions do not have any impact on India, nor does India accept that a fact-finding mission will investigate the human rights violations in Indian-occupied Kashmir. Other issues of importance have been Burmese Muslims, Bosnian Muslims, etc. Apart from the resolution of conflicts, OIC is also involved in establishing peace and security in Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Sudan etc. Additionally, OIC is also involved in dispelling the myths and misconceptions about Islam as well as combating the menace of Islamophobia and extremism.

But because of the internal conflicts between the member states of the organization and the international nature of politics of the day, this notion of Ummah has not yet been realized in full potential and the Muslims are still in search of an active role of the OIC. The real-politic of the day is based on the national interest of nation-states, thus challenging the interests of the Ummah. Because most of the Muslim states are weak in their influence in the international system, they rely on the bigger powers for fulfilling their national interests. Because of their dependency on bigger powers, they cannot work properly and independently in OIC. But Islamic Ummah at least theoretically is a borderless notion and reality, above and over any ethnicity and language, and based on just faith. Muslims everywhere are brothers in faith which is actually stronger than brothers in blood.

Despite its weaknesses and shortcomings, the organization is still the hope for the future prospects of Muslims. The extensive structure and functions of the organization are similar to UNO, it is involved in economic, political, religious and cultural activities integrating the Ummah and dispelling the misconceptions about the Muslims and Islam besides working for the humanitarian aspect.

The paper will highlight the role of OIC in rebuilding and strengthening the notion of ummah because of its contribution in political, economic, religious, cultural role in uniting the Muslims of the world based on the Oneness of God and Belief of Prophet Muhammad.

OIC is representing more than 1.8 billion Muslims of the world and their aspirations are attached with the organization. It spreads over three continents and is a unifying factor for the Muslims of the world. Based on the aims of its formation OIC is involved in cooperation between Muslim countries in terms of cultural, political, economic, scientific issues. Besides that, the issue of Islamophobia is a burning issue for the OIC.

But because of the fall of Khilafat in 1923 in the present Turkey and the colonization of the Muslim world with the subsequent formation of nation-states, the notion of ummah was also weakened politically. This resulted in adopting secularism by the Muslim countries and following the western models of polity, economy, science and technology in addition to the adoption of Western culture. Realists consider nation-states as the most powerful actors in international politics because of the anarchic nature of the international system. States are the highest decision-making bodies, so every state must serve its national interests before everything else. But neo-liberals consider organizations as the platforms for cooperation and interdependency, thus contributing to the peace and security of the world. Organizations are formed on the basis of common agenda; OIC being an intergovernmental religio-political organization is in the best position to serve the Muslim peoples everywhere owing to it being based on faith, having huge resources and facing huge youth budge. Besides, it can also vouch for a consensus on the issues of the Muslim states represented in the UNO.

References


Abstract

In the milieu of globalization, localization and their effects on Islam, one of the essential aspects in it is the cultural specifications of Muslim Ummah. It has become an essential feature of Muslims to preserve their identity and to uphold their culture and civilizations. Throughout the history of Ummah, it was evident that the original educational institutions have played an important role in safeguarding their very existence and resisting any attempt to annihilate it. It is also relevant to mention here that the in the time of complicated international changes there are several new phenomena have surrounded us as Ummah. These occurrences and changes have made us encounter various challenges in almost all walks of life. The phenomenon of globalization has gained a lot of importance in recent times due to abundant influences on culture, economy and politics of Muslim countries and Ummah. Islam by no means is in conflict with globalization or it does not emphasis on the localization of its ideas, principles and civilizations. However, the characteristics of globalization differs from the current colloquial aspect of it from the point of view of Islam. If we review the contents of religious texts and cultural influences, it is observed that undeniably Islam is a global religion and it has always strived to become a universally acceptable and adaptable religion. Islam has also got influenced by the globalization and have managed to establish a global society and globally accepted governments while uplifting the aspect of individuality of the spirit of Islam.

In many Muslim states, the idea behind globalization and negating localization is not welcomed the way it should be. The ambitions of the supporters of free financial
trade, businesses and free flow of information is seen with two altering lenses by the Muslim Ummah. These lenses are insecurity and suspicion related to the aspirations of western world. Muslim Ummah is benefited with enormous natural resources and the suspicion is merely there in terms of undue of illegal exploitation of those resources. If we look through the lenses of insecurity, we can gauge that it erupts from the fall of Islamic civilization and due to an elongated era of unproductivity. Islam was dominant over the west unlike other civilizations, however it would not be incorrect to suggest that this stagnation, which has prolonged, is the biggest impediment in the development of Muslim Ummah. Muslim States are struggling to address which this new age new phenomenon poses, and this makes them an easy target as they are exposed to threats from all contending parties of the world. Whether they are the super powers or states under their influence. This and all stated above has resulted in the downfall of the spirit of unity amongst the Muslin Ummah while affecting deeply the life of citizens and the development process as a whole. Cultural challenges, economic challenges, socio-political challenges, lack of development and the ideology of Islam is what the Muslim Ummah has to face. Islam is an enlightened religion and we have to propagate the same. We should not forget that the states normally express the choices they make and the policies which are translated through their conduct in terms of governance and the same leads to the outlining of governance mechanisms.

Research Questions

This paper will attempt to find out the answers of certain confusions and misunderstandings attached with the phenomenon of globalization and the aspirations of Muslim Ummah in terms of localization of Islamic ideology and its effects. However, some of the research questions are as follows;

What are the challenges which will be faced by the Muslim Ummah if they embrace liberalization and globalisation in their societies?

Whether the underdeveloped Islamic states can reap the benefit of globalization and excessive information and increased communication? Whereby they are fighting for the basic necessities.

Muslim Ummah is very conscious of the cultural dimension of globalization. Do they need to work for strengthening the concept of localization of Islam?

Can clarifying the difference between globalization and localization of Islam help in the development of Muslim Ummah?

Research Methodology

Previously the researcher adopted the OSCOLA Methodology and also familiar with APA format. On the other hand, researcher is also familiar with Harvard and blue book citation referencing methods. The material for the paper can also be accessed through internet however some material is available in the library of the institutes where the researcher teaches law and also in the main library of the High court Lahore.

Aims Of The Research

With this paper the researcher intends to achieve an understanding of the looming challenges of globalization on the spirit of Islam. It is apparent that the phenomenon of globalization marginalizes the idea of localization of Islam and Unity of Muslim Ummah, however it cannot be denied that globalization targets the contraction of the slits which separates different communities. With this paper the researcher will highlight the exchanging benefits of globalization in all aspects of life such as social, economic, scientific and political to the extent of governance. Moreover, this paper will focus on utilizing the skills which developed Islamic states have acquired in order to surmount the challenges into doable efforts which will nurture work, encourage the policy makers and achieve the level of thinking within the framework of Islamic solidarity and cooperation. The researcher also aims to provide extensive research in the subject of localization of Islamic principles and challenges which globalization poses.
References


Transnational Islam: Is Digital Ummah Possible?

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Keywords: Digital Society, Waqf Blockchain, Transnational Islam, Muslim Ummah, Technology Adoption.

Introduction

The measure of economic competitiveness in contemporary global society is seen through the widespread use of information and technology in a society. Experiences from developed nations show, the access to information technology can lead to better, faster and efficient life and so considered a factor of economic prosperity. More nations are going digital to remain competitive and adopting the double-edged technology to connect society, businesses, processes and citizen’s lives online to build information societies. A wide range of new studies have sprung up to understand the impact of technology in organizing, managing society and emerging new trends of human interactions. This article will explore the dominant secularist debate on the decline of religious practices and beliefs with greater technological modernization in transnational societies. Rather it is observed, religious leaders across religions have enthusiastically supported the adoption of technology into an overall program of religious recruitment, teaching, mobilization, and encouraged its use. The article will examine the concept of information society and Muslim ummah because digitalization of society has a complex relationship between information, power and governmentality. Thirdly, it will inquire the possibility of a technologically connected Muslim ummah in practicing Islamic belief and practices such as the use case of managing waqf on blockchain. It sets about considering the conceptual ideas and background to digitalization of society.

Concepts Considered

In examining the challenges of transnational Islam, it is firstly important to recognize the diversity of Islamic
faith within its belief and practices as well as externally in terms of differences of geographical nation state, culture, socioeconomic and political policies of migration, assimilation, multiculturalism etc to define a Muslim as one who believes in the Oneness of Allah (SWT) and Prophet Muhammad as His messenger. Transnationalism broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions that link people and institutions across nations intertwined by ties and relationship increasing shrunk by technology. These relationships at times of commonness or differences form distinct grouping online that can further be segregated based on common culture, religion, interest, ethnic origin that play out in social space influencing their community and society at large. The Muslim transnational communities often develop multiple local and global allergenics (Appaduri, 1996; Cohen 1996; Featherstone 2002; Clack 2009) that cannot be contained within borders because Islam is more of a way of life that is a lived experience and deeply embedded in followers’ lives forming a brotherhood.

The managing of diversity in transnational societies need to be understood in the context of nation state as being a recent creation of the 20th century separating people and technology being borderless connecting people across borders. The challenges of transnational Islam are therefore like challenges in forming an ummah and not necessarily antagonistic. Ummah is broadly understood to mean a common identity, a membership to an alliance of twin principles of divine unity and prophet Muhammad apostleship as the role model (uswat al hasnah). A knowledge-based community where revelation to the prophet changed the direction (qiblah) of daily prayers from Jerusalem to Mecca to signify the beginning of new identity. The Quran describes the new community Ummah as Ummat e wassat or justly balanced community. The three qualities mentioned of this community are all knowledge based; the commitment to enrichment of common good (al maruf), zero tolerance to all bad and evil (Al munkar) and faith in god (tu minuna bi’llah). Therefore, Muslim ummah was created to be a knowledge community that serves as a model for the rest of mankind.

The concept of information society theoretically is traced to Bell’s post-industrial theory. This theory explains the end of an industrial capitalist era and the arrival of a “service” or “leisure” era in society which is usually characterized by a labor force moving away from agriculture or manufacturing to services sector like trade, finance, transport, health, recreation, research, education, and government. The key highlight of this revolution would be the importance of information as a defining resource of the new post-industrial phase, as a raw material, just as farming and cropping in agrarian societies and mass production of products for industrial societies was seen. Bell predicted the key tool of this society would be technology which is translated to be the computer and the growth of social frameworks. Alvin Toffler terms this as a “third” concept, which describes an information society as the third “wave” post-industrial (second) and agricultural (first) waves of civilization development. To him, knowledge will become the central resource in this new form of economy – a single word broadly encompassing data, information, images, symbols, culture, ideology, and values – is actionable knowledge. It therefore becomes important to understand the identity of this information society in philosophy or ideology that will determines the power structure and governmentality in society.

Background

Since the 1960s, the idea of an information society became significant when it paralleled with the development and spread of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). The terms “information” and “communication” have become synonymous with great ideas that capture the transformation of industrial to virtual or digital society. Experience from developed nations like the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom showed that access to information technology can indeed lead to better life. Information Technology constituted economic prosperity and could be a way to increase the competitiveness of the people and become a major player in development arenas. It therefore, becomes a metaphor in the “modernist worldview” and “development approach.”
Later this idea of development was adopted by more countries in Europe, Russia and Japan, India, Malaysia etc. These ideas were translated by policy makers at the G-8 group of nations in 1995 which concluded that, “progress in information technologies and communication is changing the way we live: how we work and do business, how we educate our children, study and do research, train ourselves, and how we are entertained. The information society is not only affecting the way people interact, but it is also requiring the traditional organizational structures to be more flexible, more participatory and more decentralized.”

These changes will be based on telecommunications which will determine changes in the economic and social environments, like character of work and occupations that will shorten labor time and diminish the numbers of production workers. Hence, some sectors of industries will become automated raise unemployment, forcing people to adopt and learn new skills. It will also change the way knowledge is created and retrieved, in the new economy, knowledge and information will be treated as commodities replacing labor and other sources of capital. Hence in information society, knowledge will be the new source of power and economy in defining postmodern society. The knowledge economy is heavily dependent on modern global communications for networking in a wide array of sectors, example financial investment, banking and insurance, telecommunication and media etc. Therefore, the rise of knowledge economy is dependent on widespread computer literacy, a large well-educated professional and managerial middle-class in jobs related to information, like programmers, software engineers, teachers, researchers, financial analysts, media and technology experts. Computing skills and training are essential requirement through higher education to bringing structural changes in the workforce and society associated resulting in socio-economic development.

References


Information Society retrieved from http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/Information-Society
Nowadays, by reviewing the confrontation of societies with modernity and the western world, we can trace some dissimilarities. Some countries and societies adopted a passive approach. However, some others that have old and rich religious and civilization reserves have a more active and resistant approach to modernity.

The Islamic world has special religious and civilization reserves and by recognizing those reserves and capacities that have the potential of becoming transnational, it can strengthen them, and provide the opportunity of forming an Islamic Ummah. In this way, an alternative approach to modernity is formed that will be so efficient and flourishing.

This paper investigates the classification of the societies’ confrontations with modernity by using library method and citations, and it aims to answer the question that in spite of the challenges, what are the opportunities and approaches of Islamic world for forming an Islamic Ummah as an alternative approach to modernity? Recognizing the capacities and religious and civilization reserves of the Islamic world that have the potential of becoming transnational and strengthening and applying them develop a strategy that leads to increased soft power of the Islamic world and formation of the Islamic Ummah.

By its intellectual foundation and main ideology called modernity and by using new information and communication technologies, the western world tries to expand western culture as global culture, western capitalism as global economy, and its power and dominance as global policy through the concept of globalization. The phenomenon of globalization is actually a new invasion in economic, cultural, and political arenas subsequent to

**Keywords:** Globalization, Western World, Modernity, Soft Power, Religion and Civilization, Transnational, Islam, Ummah, Arbaeen, Civilization Reserves.
modernization that is referred to as the late modernity by Giddens.

Societies have not confronted modernity in the same way. Some societies have immediately become passive face-to-face with modernity and some others have had an active and resistant approach. By a close look, we will realize that the societies that have been passive do not have an old and rich culture and civilization and maybe they had had a more primitive life before modernity. However, the other group of societies that have an old and rich culture and civilization strongly resist modernity or in better words, a form of modernity. Resistance in these societies can be observed in at least two forms. First, violence against the symbols of globalization that has emerged in the form of terrorism such as ISIS; it is the main challenge of the Islamic world for forming the Islamic Ummah. The other form is taking advantage of religious and civilization reserves for proposing an alternative. This effort for taking advantage of religious, cultural, and civilization reserves is actually meant to form a new pole against the apparently global pole of the west. The effort makes these reserves transnational, increases soft power of the Islamic world, and leads to the formation of the Islamic Ummah.

In answering the question that how much the globalization potential and capacity of Islam as a set of divine rules and orders is, some Islamic scholars believe that Islam has attributes which suggest that this religion has a high capacity of globalization. The most important attributes can be mentioned as follows:

Islamic principles and values have a global nature.

Islam considers the world and humans as a unit and from this viewpoint it seeks social justice for all the human societies.

In Islam, ethnic, lingual, and religious varieties are approved and accepted in their supreme form.

The audience of Islam is transnational, trans-ethnic, and meta-time. So, nowadays followers of this religion can be found in almost all the continents of the world.

The central signifier of Islamic discourse in transnational environment is the concept of the Islamic Ummah. As the Islamic world countries are based on Islam and have an old and rich geographical location, history, identity, and culture, they have the possibility of using these religious and cultural reserves and making them transnational to accelerate the formation of the Islamic Ummah. By looking at the Ottoman-Safavid history as an example of Islamic civilization, we can see that wherever civilization and religious capacities have been used for transnational goals in Islamic societies, these societies have been successful. The reserves that can be expanded in transnational environments have various properties. These properties include being peace-oriented, justice-oriented, increased cooperation between the nations, and the possibility of calling other nations for globalization, having a strong intellectual and rational background, increased popular and intercultural relationships, etc.

The other civilization and religious reserve that has had a great potential of becoming transnational is Arbaeen congregation. Arbaeen congregation that had been mainly done by Iraqi people in the past and had been faced with challenges due to governmental prohibitions, has become one of the transnational rites nowadays. Actually, this rite is no longer limited to Iraqi people and other societies also participate in it, although the Iraqis' share has been significantly more than others so far. However, it seems that the role of other societies is increasingly growing both in participation and hosting. This is due to transnational and philanthropic features such as peace-orientation, justice-orientation, modesty, and cooperation in performing and managing this great congregation and march. People from non-Iraqi societies participating in Arbaeen congregation gradually feel a sense of belonging to this congregation. The participants' perception suggests the fading of political and arbitrary borders. Actually, time and place have become contracted by Arbaeen.

In the present research, when explaining the Arbaeen phenomenon becoming transnational, the researcher concentrates on the question that why does Arbaeen
have the capacity of becoming like that? By using the answer of this question, the researcher aims at recognizing other religious, civilization, and historical capacities of the Islamic world that have the potential of becoming transnational and introduces them in order to address the strategies of the formation of the Islamic Ummah by a specific process and mechanism.

References


Worksop IX

04 August 2019 – Sunday / 14:00 – 17:00
Terrace Hall

Chair: Süleyman Güder

Mohammad Shahadat Hossain
Suppressive Strategies of the Chinese Government against Muslims: Minority Protection Regime and Response from Muslim World

Arnold Andres Sanchez Calderon
The Construction of the Ummah in Colombia - South America

Ibrahim Suberu
Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs and the Quest for Unity of Muslim Ummah in Nigeria

Ahmed Kulanic
The Core Elements of the Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks: Attitudes, Perceptions, and Practices

Riaz Ahmad Saeed
Transnational Islam in Pakistan: A Case Study of Rohingya Muslims

Nia Deliana
The Ummah and Ethical Policy: Aceh in the Wake of Dutch Civilizing Mission (1898-1942)

Abdul Jaleel Parappu Kadavath Matra
Longing for ‘Umma’ in non-Muslim Peripheries of the Indian Ocean: Sayyid Fadl and Khilafat Movement in South India
Islam reached and observed in Chinese society for more than 1400 years ago after the demise of the Prophet Mohammad (s.a.w.) or even before as the Quranic story about Zu-al-Qarnain, who was the emperor of the world visited the east, shows that perhaps Prophet Zu-al-Qarnain visited China in a point of time and found several groups of human being. According to the China Muslims’ traditional legendary accounts, Islam was brought by an embassy leaded by the companion of the prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.) known as Sa’id ibn Abi Waqqas following the order of the third Caliph Uthman (r.t.a.) in 651 AD. The envoy was received by the Tang emperor Gaozong and ordered the construction of the Memorial mosque in Canton, the first mosque in the country, in memory of the prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.) in China. Currently China is the most populous country in the world with approximately 1.42 billion people. According to the China Family Panel Studies survey 2017, out of the total population Muslim representing only 0.45% to 1.8% containing Muslim minority in China. In China there are 55 officially recognized minority groups and out of them 10 groups is predominantly Muslim. These groups are Hui, Uyghur, Kazakh, Dongxiang, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Salar, Tajik, Bonan, Tatar and Tibetan. Muslims live predominantly in the areas that border Central Asia, Tibet and Mongolia, i.e. Xinjiang, Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai, which is known as the “Quran Belt”.

However, the Government of China adopted several strategies against the growth of Muslim in China under different name and title of the project such as health check, training center, skill development, re-education program and so on. Nevertheless, the by virtue of international media and several reports of the international organization it appears that all those activities of Chinese Government are nor for the development of the Muslim minorities rather than one kind of ethnic cleansing. In addition, reports shows that China established more than hundred big detention center in different places in Chi-

Keywords: Islam in China, Muslim Minority, Suppression, Detention Center, Torture, Force Disappearance, Forced Labor, Chinese Hegemony, Freedom of Religion, Human Rights.
na. It has been observed that in last few decades China increases its oppressive measures against its minority population especially against the Uyghur Muslim population as this group of Muslims demanded autonomy to protect them. In recent years China become more aggressive to crackdown against Muslims, imposed forced disappearance, pulling-off and other kinds of means and methods to control the Muslims including young boys and girls. Plenty of incidences are occurred where a Chinese Muslim come to his country after abating higher education in abroad, disappeared from the airport for ever. That clearly expresses the intention and desires of the Chinese Government to eliminate the Muslim Population from china.

The current study deals with three main problems around the suppression against Muslim minority groups in China especially against Uyghur Muslims. As the researcher stated in brief in the above that the Chinese Government has adopted multifarious strategies under different title claiming that these programs have taken for the development of the Muslim population and other sort of justification. Apparently, through these programs and projects Government justifies their own black action plan of which very little torture and suppressive means and methods have come to the electronic and print media because of excessive control and embargoes on social media and others in China. In addition, International media as well as international human rights organizations also paying a little attention to address this ethnic cleansing in China. Neither, United Nations nor any big player of international powers politics shows enough concern about such state designed marginalization of Muslim population. As a result, the degree of oppression and silent ethnic cleansing by the Chinese authority remain always in dark. Therefore, rest of the world does not able to feel that there is an ethnic cleansing is going on against Muslim minorities in China in a systematic action plan of the Government. Thus, this study tries to explain the ways and means that have been exercise by the authority of China.

Secondly, the Government of China ratify six UN human rights treaties such as Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). In addition, China signed on International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1998, it has yet to ratify it. By the ratification of these treaties Government of China is under an obligation to protect the human rights of its own nationals. However, the reality shows different scenario such as massive discrimination, suppressive measures, physical and mental torture and other kinds of repression against minority Muslims residing in different parts of China. Government violates its international obligation in keeping and promoting human rights of the citizen of China itself. In this research, researcher examines the available protection regimes both national and international level that creates an obligation on China which has been violating every day in China against Muslim populations.

Finally, the study analysis the ambiguous position of Muslim world and negligible responses to the crisis. Muslim world is almost silent to raise this issue in the discussion, conference, in the United Nations general meetings and other forums for addressing the situation of Chinese Muslims. Absence of voice is demoralizing the hope of Chinese Muslims to get escape from the Chinese prisons and their minimum human rights. Muslim organizations are also failed to address the issue adequately. As a result, China, without having any protest from anywhere about their brutal activities against Muslims, intensifying its ethnic cleansing by establishing big detention centers across the country. The current study investigates the position of Muslim world in this regard and responsibilities toward Chinese brothers and sisters.

The researcher analysis the three possible answers under three research questions, such as first of all what are the strategies including ways and means and meth-
ods of suppression by the Government of China against Minority Muslims? Secondly, what are the international and national minority protection regime as well as human rights treaties that are violating by the Chinese authority? Thirdly, what is the position of Muslim Countries and organizations in responding the Muslims in China? However, the objectives of this study are firstly, to identify the ways and means of oppression against Muslim minorities in China. Secondly, to analyse the violation of minority as well as human rights regime. Finally, to investigate position of Muslim Countries and organizations in responding the Muslims in China.

This is purely a doctrinal research and adopts qualitative method of study. The researcher consults relevant articles, news, reports on oppressive activities of the Government of China. The study further, consults with relevant international conventions and treaties ratified and not ratified by the China. It also receives other sources of online material to achieve the objective of the study.

References


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The Quranic message has the characteristic of universality in time, space and “recipients.” From this concept of universality is meant the creation of the Ummah community as part of a process that integrates civil society through the common religious belief “Islam”, as well as other religious communities that under the protection of a Muslim authority coexist in harmony.

On the other hand, the concept of “Ummah” must be understood, from the spiritual point of view as a special bond of brotherhood that generates a common identity based exclusively on the religious aspect, and that transcends socio-political, ethno-racial barriers and other characteristics of the human being, focusing only on the believer’s relationship with Allah.

With the passage of time and the appearance of geopolitical and economic ambitions, the universal concept of the umma was lost. Mainly due to the emergence of borders within the Islamic empire, I made the identity not only based on the fact of sharing a common religion, but also the origin - since the author does not know if you can speak of nationality in times before the appearance of the “nation-state” - which determined a special treatment or feeling of closeness, fraternity and identity with other people.

On the other hand and despite the advent of globalization, classical thoughts and attitudes such as “Asabiyya” or social solidarity, explained by the Muqaddimah by Ibn Khaldun (1978), seem almost non-existent in modern Muslim communities in particular towards communities beyond national borders, and it is nothing more than a

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**Keywords:** Islam, Community Building, Latin America, Islamophobia, Islamic Ummah, Colombia, Converted Muslims, Social Integration, International Cooperation, Inter-Religious Dialogue.
mere logistical support that in no way helps to find solutions to the different problems that come from being Muslim outside the Islamic countries, particularly after the unfortunate events that occurred on September 11, 2001.

**Theoretical framework**

The Islamic community in Latin America and Colombia.

Historically Islam reached the new continent as soon as Christopher Columbus came across America. Residual Muslim population that after the Spanish reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula, lived in the cities of Al Andalus, were transferred to the new continent as part of the component of slaves necessary for the settlement of European explorers. Likewise, many of the African slaves who worked in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies professed Islam as faith. Currently in the American territory are some vestiges that demonstrate the presence of Muslims, as colonial churches whose altars were built in the direction of the Qibla, as well as official documents describing revolts organized by African-American Muslims (2014).

In Colombia it is possible to trace the arrival of Islam until the beginning of the 20th century, through different migratory waves of Arabs (mainly Syrians and Lebanese) coming from what was the Ottoman Turkish empire, who settled mainly on the north coast of the country. Likewise, after the expulsion of the Palestinians from their lands, a large community was established in the capital of Colombia, Bogotá (2015).

As part of the effort to maintain their cultural and religious identity, the first Islamic association was established in the 1970s, whose community was composed mainly of Arabs, as indicated at the beginning was to maintain cultural roots within a group small merchants in the center of Bogotá, and important issues were left aside such as the task of propagating Islam as a “Dawah” religion, and also religious education, since there was not at that time people trained to perform these tasks (2010).

It was not until 2011 when the Al-Qurtubi Study Center was founded when Islamic education in Colombia was finally formalized, through different courses that strengthened knowledge in Aqeedah, Fiqh, Quranic Arabic and other aspects of faith. However, despite the formalization of various aspects necessary for the construction of community and strengthening of it, this emerging community faces different challenges.

**Discussion**

Due to this phenomenon, the need to raise awareness in fully established Muslim communities is imperative, seeking to generate commitments that promote assistance and cooperation, for the consolidation and construction of Muslim communities in remote places (such as Latin America), and that allow the brothers and sisters who integrate these communities the free exercise of the faith, as well as the enjoyment of basic rights as a Muslim in terms of equity with the rest of the society with which they live.

It is the author’s interest to share with the reader of this article the different facets and characteristics of the Muslim community in Colombia - South America, having as sample diverse experiences of the Al Qúrtubi Islamic Studies Center of Bogotá, and the different challenges that he has faced since its creation in subjects such as representation and participation in front of the Colombian State, exercise of fundamental rights, Islamophobia, discrimination in the economic and social field, as well as the barriers with which it finds itself as an organization or individually because of its religious practice.

Likewise with the purpose of generating a deep reflection on the general responsibility of the diverse communities worldwide in relation to the support of minority communities in non-Muslim countries, this article intends to make an approximation that allows to know at first hand the structure and organization of the Muslim community in Colombia, the perspectives and points of view of the members of these communities, the roles of a Muslim within Colombian society, the relationship between other communities of a civil or religious nature, and the projection that young people have about the future of
the Muslim community in Colombia.

**Conclusion**

Communities at Risk

Unlike other places in the world, Latin America represents a particular case for the study of Islamic communities, since in this region there are several phenomena that could risk the development of Islamic communities.

According to the Pew Research Institute, Latin America is the only region in the world where there is no increase in the number of Muslims in 2050, when Islam will be the religion with the largest number of followers around the world. On the other hand, although this region is predominantly Catholic, it has increased the number of parishioners in radical evangelical churches, which promote within their theology and eschatology, the ideal of Islam as a threat and generate hate speech against Muslims.

Likewise, the need to generate spaces of international cooperation that sustain the growth and strengthening of Muslim communities in religious, social, economic, cultural and representation aspects and participation in democratic spaces is imperative.

**References**


Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs and the Quest for Unity of Muslim Ummah in Nigeria.

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Keywords: Nigeria, Supreme, Council, Islamic, Affairs, Unity, Muslim, Ummah, Organization, NSCIA.

Abstract

The emergence of Islamic organizations during the Colonial era caused disunity among the Muslim Ummah in Nigeria. The quest to coordinate the affairs of these organizations and to unite the Muslim Ummah nationally under one umbrella led to the establishment of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) in 1973. This study therefore, examines the roles of NSCIA in addressing the challenges of disunity confronting the Muslim Ummah in Nigeria. Data were collected from oral interviews, questionnaires and secondary sources. A multidisciplinary approach was adopted using combination of historical, phenomenological and sociological methods of data analysis. The theoretical framework is built on the theory of Asabiyyah by Ibn Khaldun and theory of Structural Functionalism. The study discovered that the need to protect Islamic faith from colonial influence gave rise to the emergence of Islamic organizations in Nigeria. It is also discovered that Nigerian Muslims are divided along ethnicity, regional and organizational bases. The study shows that despite the establishment of NSCIA in 1973, to foster unity, there are still issues bothering on disunity among the Muslim Ummah in Nigeria. Perpetuation and northernization of the council’s leadership is discovered to be a factor responsible for the inefficiency of the Council to unite the Umma. This work recommends a review of the constitution of NSCIA for effectiveness. It also suggests rotation of its headship and that serious efforts should be made by the Council at cultivating the spirit of unity among Muslims.

Background to the study

Several centuries before the arrival of Colonial Masters
and before Nigeria emerged as a nation Islam had penetrated and well thrived in Nigeria. However, the presence of Colonial Masters had some negative effect on the Muslim Ummah in Nigeria. Muslims were apprehensive of the loss of their Islamic faith and identity. In other to checkmate the influence, a number of Islamic Organizations sprang up. The influence of Colonial administration propelled the establishment of different Islamic organizations with the aim of revitalizing the Islamic faith and identity (Ahmad, 2012).

The consequence effect of the uncontrolled influx of these splinter organizations was disunity among the Ummah in Nigeria during and after the colonial administration. Nigerian Muslims were disintegrated on the basis of organizations (Balogun, 1989). Hence, the quest to unify the activities of these organizations and to unite the Muslim ummah nationally led to the emergence of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs in 1973. However, despite the establishment of NSCIA, Muslims are still disunited along doctrinal, ethnicity and regional basis in addition to organizational basis. Therefore, there is urgent need to examine the activities, effectiveness and relevance of NSCIA in relation to the quest of unity among Muslims in Nigeria which is the task of this study.

**The Aims and Objectives**

The aim of this research is to examine the role of NSCIA in achieving the desired unity of Muslim Ummah in Nigeria while the objectives are to:

- trace the factors responsible for the establishment of different Islamic organisations in Nigeria and the subsequent emergence of NSCIA.
- examine the remote and the immediate causes of disunity among the Nigerian Muslim Ummah.
- examine the efforts and the challenges of NSCIA in the quest for unity of the Muslim Ummah in Nigeria.
- evaluate the activities of NSCIA and its relevance to the well-being of the Ummah in Nigeria and globally.

**Scope**

The study concerns Nigerian Muslims Ummah generally. The research was carried out in the two regions of the nation (i.e. North and South) covering the six geopolitical zones of the nation (Middle Belt, North East, North West, South East, South South, South West). Investigation covers a 31 states out of 36 states of the federation. Specifically, 16 states from the North 15 states from the South.

**The Significance**

This study will proffer solution to the challenges of Muslim Ummah in Nigeria as it bothers on the quest for unity.

The study will strengthen the unity among Muslims, nationally and globally.

By extension, it will foster unity and encourage peaceful co-existence of Muslims with the people of other faith generally.

The study creates a platform for a better understanding of the roles of NSCIA.

This study brings to the academic arena, a comprehensive account of the activities of NSCIA.

**The Theoretical Framework**

Theory of ‘Asabiyyah (Ibn Khaldun, 1333-1406): Ibn Khaldun uses the term ‘asabiyyah to describe the bond of cohesion among humans in a group forming community. The theory concerns social or group solidarity and it deals with the natural feeling among human beings, aimed particularly at helping and protecting group members when they are treated unjustly (Baali,1995, Asyiqin, 2014, Gabrieli, 1988).

Theory of Structural Functionalism (Emile Durkheim, 1858-1917): The Structural Functionalism is a theoretical understanding of society that posits that social systems are collective means to fill social needs. The theory sees society as a complex system whose parts work together to promote solidarity and stability. Therefore, this theory is adopted to illustrate how NSCIA (a social system) was
established to fulfill social needs of the ummah.

**Research methodology**

This area deals with the research design and procedures used in carrying out this study to enable the study achieves its set objectives. A multidisciplinary approach was adopted using a combination of historical, phenomenological and sociological methods of data analysis. The Historical approach is used to find out how NSCIA came to being her challenges, achievements and her relevance in the past and present to the Nigerian Muslim Ummah. Sociological approach is used to ascertain the level of interactions and the impact the NSCIA has made in the progress of the Ummah in Nigeria.

Both primary and secondary sources are adopted. Data from oral interview, questionnaires, published and unpublished works of various kinds will be utilized to aid us in the analysis. The study uses purposive sampling technique. The main objective of a purposive sample is to produce a sample that can be logically assumed to be representative of the total population.

**Research Question**

Kindly share your general knowledge about the activities of NSCIA in relation of the Unity of Muslim Ummah in Nigeria since its inception

Has the NSCIA been able to achieve the purpose for which it was established? If “Yes”, in what respect? And if “No”, kindly state your reasons

What are the challenges confronting Nigerian Muslims ummah presently?

What do you consider as the challenges confronting the NSCIA itself?

What do you consider as the prospects of Muslim Ummah in Nigerian?

What do you consider as the prospects of NSCIA?

**References**


The Core Elements of the Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks: Attitudes, Perceptions and Practices

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Keywords: Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks, Islamic Practice and Rituals, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Religion in Secular State, Bosnian Muslims, Islam and Secular State, Religious Practices, Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosniaks’ Practice, Bosniaks’ Religious Tradition.

Bosnia and Herzegovina in its more than a millennium written history has been a place or meeting point of different culture, traditions and religions. Due to its religious diversity, religion and religiosity played a dominant role within the Bosnian society as a whole representing one of the key cornerstones of Bosnian ethnic diversity. Majority of the authors agree upon the claim that Ottomans brought Islam in BiH. Therefore, the presence of Islam and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina backdates to the early fifteenth century and since then it is continuously present (Imamović, 1998). Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Ottoman period had a status of state religion that influenced over many aspects of social life and culture among Bosnian population. During the Ottoman times according to Ottoman censuses majority population in Bosnia and Herzegovina was Muslim (Handžić, 1940: 38), while due to the wars, and mostly migrations the first census organized by Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1989 Muslim were not majority anymore, but Orthodox-Christians (McCharty, 1996: 81). During the First and Second Yugoslavia Bosniaks were the largest group in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but still they were not majority in a state, due to different socio-political circumstances (Filandra, 1998:157). According to the last census (2013) Bosnia and Herzegovina has of 3.531.159 citizens out of whom 50.11% are Bosniaks or around 1.8 million (while in confessional sense 50.7% declared as followers of Islam), according to which Bosniaks again became majority in Bosnia and Herzegovina (FZS: Census, 2016).

Bosnian Muslims during a long history starting from the Ottoman times and spread of Islam in BiH, through the rule of Austro-Hungarian empire and migrations, First and Second Yugoslavia and religious suppression have
been developing their identity, culture and tradition that has been representing and defining its uniqueness among world Muslims cultures and traditions. As the consequence of the last aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina i.e. last Bosnian war (1992-1995) for the first time in history Bosnian Muslims or Bosniaks have migrated westward and even religious and devote Muslims preferred western countries than those with Muslim majority population including Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia (Emir-hafizović et al., 2013). Therefore, it has been justifiably argued that Bosniak or Bosnian Muslims represent native or indigenous Muslim community in Europe that has its unique tradition, culture and understanding of the Islamic teaching while still belonging to the ummah as the collective world Muslim community (Karčić, 2008).

Recently there is a trend, under the influence of western terminology and understanding, of introducing the regional, geographic and cultural attributes of Islam aiming at narrowing the universality and localizing Islam. Therefore, the emergence of the terms such as: “European Islam”, “Turkish Islam”, “Saudi-Arabia Islam”, “African Islam”, etc. or in our case “Bosnian Islam”. This shift in defining and conceptualization of Islam or its narrowing was influenced by the anthropological definition, approach and understanding the religion as “public or folk religion” that aimed at capturing the practices, rites and rituals of a certain group of believers in certain geographic area or region. The anthropological approach to the religion, from Islamic normative perspective is unacceptable, because it implies the existence of different types of Islam that are in collision to the core principles of Islamic worldview. Thus some Bosnian religious scholars (Karčić, 2006; Alibasic, 2007) argue that a notion of “European Islam” or “Bosnian Islam” can only imply to the different practical (rites and rituals) aspects of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and does not mean imply the existence of “other type” of Islam.

Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBiH), as the official Islamic authority for Bosnian Muslims, never used this geo-cultural narrowing of Islam as the term in its official documents and unofficial statements (Karčić, 2006). Rather ICBiH, in order to avoid this typology of Islam, used the term “Islamic tradition of Bosniaks” (Article 3, Constitution of ICBiH, 2014) encompassing the culture/tradition (‘urf) as one of the sources of Islam. In addition, in its Constitution (article 3) ICBiH enlists the major sources of Islam and the major sources and practices that all ICBiH organizational units should comply with. In the context of the interpretation of Islam its rites, rituals and practices it states that ICBiH and all Bosnian Muslims should follow the Maturidi School of dogma (aqeedah) and Hanafi School of jurisprudence (fiqh) (article 7, Constitution ICBiH). Therefore, the major characteristics of Islamic tradition in Bosnia and Herzegovina that ICBiH emphasizes are: (1) Qur’an, Sunnah, (2) Maturidi’s aqeedah and Hanafi jurisprudence, (3) Islamic tradition of Bosniaks and (4) the “requirements of time-period”.

**Methodology and Data Collection**

The target group of this study is Bosniaks living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the results of 2013 Census, Bosnia and Herzegovina has population of 3.791.622 out of which 2.371.603 lives in entity FBiH while 1.362.991 lives in entity RS and 93.028 in Brčko Distric.

Furthermore, according to the same results percentage of Bosniaks that live in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 50.11% out of the total Bosnian population. Forced migrations as the outcome of last war and aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina and genocide on Bosniaks resulted that majority of Bosniak population lives in entity Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while their number in entity RS is around 14% out of the total population of that entity. Thus, due to that fact that our target group is Bosniak living in BiH sample will be made in that manner respecting the internal administration of the state. The sample size for this research is 600 respondents, calculated on the 1.769.592 total number of Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the margin of error ±4% and confidence level of 95%. The sample size n and margin of error E are calculated using following formulas:
x=Z(c/100)2r(100-r)
n=N x/((N-1)E2 + x)
E=Sqrt[(N - n)x/n(N-1)]

Where N is the population size, r is fraction of responses and z(c/100) is the critical value for the confidence level c, using normal distribution. Demographic factors that will be considered in this study are: age, sex, education level, income, marital status, occupation, family size, and size of residence town. Mutual relationships between those variables themselves will be tested by using t-test, ANOVA test, chi-square test and linear correlation/regression method.

The data were collected using the specifically design instrument focusing on core elements of recorded religious practices of Bosniaks as the part of larger Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks scale. The total number of participants in a survey was 677 that provide us with the significant data for the analysis, understanding and defining core elements of Islamic tradition of Bosniaks that is still practiced besides the universal teachings/postulates of Muslims worldwide.

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This study elaborates the impacts, issues and activities of Rohingya Muslims in Pakistan with reference to transnational Islam. In contemporary, transnationalism and transitional Islam have become one of the most famous studies and terms in the academic sphere. “The term ‘transnationalism’ was originally connected to immigration cohorts, but today the concept has been expanded to include a whole array of activities across borders. The term ‘transnationalism’ broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of modern nation-states”. (Yilmaz: 2010) Many studies and reports are available on impacts, issues and crises of transnationalism and transitional Islam. One of the most important issues is the crisis of Rohingya people, who are compelled to leave Burma and find refuge in Bangladesh, Pakistan and India. When we try to find out about history of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, “the Rohingya are an ethnic minority in Myanmar, which originates from the Indian sub-continent. For several centuries they have been living predominantly in Rakhine. They are predominately Muslim”. (Tahir M A: 1963) The Rohingya are not officially recognized by the government as citizens and for decades, Myanmar’s Buddhist majority has been accused of subjecting them to discrimination and violence. They have rich history of hundreds of years in the state of Burma. According to historians, Islam reached in Burma in 7th CE through Arab traders. “After acceptance of Islam from majority of the native people of Arakan, the first government was established by a Muslim ruler Sheikh Abdullah in 825 CE. It is an important fact that the Buddhist was reached and settled in Arakan after Muslims. Arrival of Buddhism into Arakan, as stated earlier, started in around 8th century of Christian era” (Harvey GE, 1925).
In 8th century, under the Hindu revivalist leader, Shankar Acharya, Buddhists in India were persecuted in large-scale. In Magadah, old Bihar of India, Buddhists were so ruthlessly oppressed by chauvinist Hindus and rival Mahayana sect of Buddhists that large numbers of Hinayana Buddhists were compelled to flee eastward, and ultimately found shelter in Arakan. In 10th CE, the Arakan was conquered by a historic Bodh king, Ano Radha, but the separate identity of Muslims still remained in the country. It’s also a fact that after Anu Radha, the relationship between Muslims and Buddhists had not been pleasant since 13th CE. Muslims ruled over Arakan, Rakhine and Rohingya for nearly 500 years. After that, the relationship between Muslims and Myanmar government had not been satisfactory and smooth. In fact, we can say that the relationship had become worse to the extent of enemies due to some religious, tribal and political reasons after British conquered Burma in 1826. According to the British census of 1931, the Muslim population in Burma was 27%. The educational trend in Muslim population was very good and most of the Muslims were employees of British government in Burma. During the great economic crises of 1930-1938 in Burma, Muslim community was badly targeted and tortured by Buddhist inhabitants of Burma. In 1942, during World War II, Japan attacked Burma and a number of Muslim traders were compelled to migrate to India. After the war, in 1945, the local Muslim politicians succeeded to establish a political party named as Muslim congress of Arakan. Even two Muslim leaders were the members of British government of that time in Burma from Burma Muslim Congress.

After separation of India, the Muslim Congress demanded his affiliation with Pakistan but the local parliament did not accept it. “In 1948, the ‘Union of Burma’ was established by the permission of British government. Arakan state with a majority of Muslims became part of Burma in 1948 after an army coup. Arakan is now a part of the Union of Burma (renamed Myanmar) but in the past, it was an independent state. In ancient times, Arakan was divided into two kingdoms, south Arakan or Sandoway and north Arakan or Arakan proper” (Archna Parashar, 2018). The two parts were united into one in the last quarter of the 13th century and this position of Arakan lasted till 1785 AD. A Bodh monk Munden was leader of Buddhist religious politics in Burma against British government.

In 1966, the Muslim population in Burma was 3 Million. After the establishment of Union of Burma and occupation of Arakan by Burma Army, the situation of Arakani Muslims was really bad in this country. Thousands of Muslims (including women and children) were killed. Hundreds of Rohingya Muslim women were looted and raped by Burma Army and millions of Rohingya Muslims were compelled to get refuge in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. “Millions of Rohingya Muslims are living in Pakistan and they are influencing Pakistani economic, political, social and religious narrative of Pakistan since 1948. According to varied Pakistani government sources and the Arakan Historical Society, there are some of 300,000 Rohingya refugees residing in Pakistan. All of them have made a perilous journey across Bangladesh and India and have settled in Karachi. The Rohingya Muslims in Karachi have now obtained Pakistani citizenship. Most of the population of Rohingya Muslims live in Karachi. (https://www.reuters.com)

In Pakistan, they have many issues; for example, they have no proper citizenship because Pakistan considers them Bengali and Bangladesh considers them Burma citizens. It is also questioned why the United Nations, international community, and especially, Muslims states are silent on this burning human issue? Only some Muslim states, like Pakistan, Turkey, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, are taking interest in this core human issue. The Burma government is brutally killing the innocent elders, women and children. There are also many reported cases of women being raped and children being burnt during this tragedy from Burma forces. (https://www.hrw.org) It is a violation of Human rights and UN charter in this age of globalization. This study perceives that they have no proper education system, no proper job and economic system, no health and care services. In simple words, they are in very poor condition and they are shuddering in most of the areas of Pakistan and Bangladesh. There
is a need to provide them citizenship and other human rights in the county. They also need legal and constitutional protection in Pakistan. They should be allowed to participate in national politics for solution and service of their community. In this study, analytical, historical and descriptive research methodology is adopted with mix method approach. Moreover, modern research tools, for example, Interviews, Surveys and Questioners to scholars and public will also be used to get current data regarding the issue.

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https://www.reuters.com/article/


https://www.hrw.org/


The war between Dutch and Aceh that commenced openly since 1873 had always been driven by the interest in the economy and Europe-civilizing the natives. For centuries, Aceh had been independently acted as the sole producers and sellers of pepper, beetle nut, and other forest products. In the 1820s, it was the major supplier, providing half of the world needs of pepper. European trading companies over pepper trade from this area increasingly displayed in the 19th century. It was for the economic rivalry between the Dutch and the English, Aceh was turned into a buffer state held protectorate under the British since the agreement signed between Stamford Raffles and Sultan Jauhar al-Alam in 1811, followed with another treaty between the Dutch and England in 1824 but was finally turned off through another treaty between the latter in 1871. However, within this period, the Dutch managed to take control of numerous significant key port cities which were under the Sultanate of Aceh. Kuala Batu, Susoh and Singkell fell under the Dutch immediately after the cities were wrecked for a second time by the American naval on the disputed case of Piracy in 1839. In 1850s Siak, another independent and longtime vassal of Aceh was subdued through a trade contract which demanded the natives to recognized Dutch control.

European achievements in the 19th century which involved new inventions in navalry such as steamship and the opening of Suez Canal, new military weaponry and sciences combined with colonial traders narratives on their contacts and imagination on the natives in Sumatra or other areas in Southeast Asia led to justification of the
needs to ‘introduce’ civilization into the natives. Due to their imagining uncivilized character of the natives, the rulers need to be brought into submissions by military due, especially in its decision towards Aceh.

Not only politicizing the trend of civilized uncivilized natives, the Dutch also used the fear of the other European empires, especially the British in the Strait Settlement on the interference of the Ottoman in Aceh, if it left un-emergency to be subdued. Aceh was indeed revived its old ties with the Ottoman in the 19th century only for demanding the latter to protect its vassal from the invasive Dutch. The latest Aceh emissary to Ottoman was a the year before the official announcement of the war by the Dutch in 1873.

The war occurred beyond the expecting lasting for a painful 40 years claimed to drain the Dutch finance condition. Until the 1890s the Dutch had been inconsistently applied its system of rule from civil to military rule within concentratie linie, due to numbers of unpredictable resistance of the Acehnese. It was only in 1891, a man known as Snouck Christiaan Hurgronje sent to Aceh to observe and expected to be able to bring solution on the matter of subduing the natives. Hurgronje mingled within Acehnese as Abdul Ghaffar, a convert who had traveled to hajj and well versed in Arabic, understood Islamic law pretty well. Within such qualification, he was accepted as friends by both the commoners and passive rebels, from whom he gained significant information including key figures, crucial social and political identities of the natives and was brought to understand the route of the safety of the rebels. Staying for 9 months had indeed contributed significantly to the progress of Dutch colonialism in Aceh. After his return to Batavia and was chosen as adviser of native affairs, he established a short declaration which included ethical policy and prohibition of international contact with the native rulers. This policy had become a crucial challenge that not only saw as the reason for an increasing number of rebels residing with the Dutch but the process of dying down relations with other Muslim countries with Aceh.

Addressed Questions

The proposal is intended to provide a study on the issue stated above. This study would be tailored through questions 1). What was Aceh War to the Ummah? 2). Why did the Dutch run ethical policy after 20 years of a civil and military government in Aceh? 3). Did Ethical Policy replace the political favor with another Muslim world?

Why it is Significant

The conduct of this research is significant considering the existing gap in the scholarly works. This is expected to be contributive to the field where the study of ‘civilizing’- later on, known more in the context of imperialism and euro-centrism established not only in Aceh but also other colonized state in Asia and Africa.

This paper would be an attempt against historical amnesia which seems becomes more crucial after numerous recent events involving discourse of white supremacist, nationalism, and other types of similar ideologies are finding its old lovers and resulted in hundreds of tragic deaths.

Existing Literature

There are indeed limited works of literature discussing the inter-connective identity of Muslim in Aceh and its relations with the civilizing mission of the native during the colonial period. Ethical policy with becoming a distinct program of the Dutch was later on referred to as Euro-centrism served under imperialism interest was only come to attention after the release of Edwards Said work on Orientalism earliest as paper in 1960. Scholars in South East Asia were not alienated from looking more deeply into the existing Eurocentric narratives on Indigenous identities. decades before Edward Said’s well-contested magnum opus, the Orientalism (1978) sparked heated debate, numerous other native scholars preceded his steps including Jose Rizal’s to the Filipino (1896), Armijn Pane’s Indonesia di Asia Selatan: Sejarah Indonesia Sampai +1600 (1951) and Soedjatmoekoe’s an Approach to Indonesian History: Towards an open Future (1960), Syed Hussein al Attas’s The Myth of the Lazy Natives, Syed Farid al Attas’ Alternative Discourse in Asia Social Sciences: A Response to Euro-centrism (2006). Meanwhile, Dutch
scholars began to re-center their attention perceiving in the sway of the trending debate. Among the most highlighted works were Corneulis Jacob van Leur’s Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History (1955) and Elsbeth Lochter Scholten’s Dutch Expansion in the Indonesian Archipelago Around 1900 and the Imperialism Debate (1994).

**Methodology**

The subject analysis is constructed through Qualitative methodology. The writer used numerous primary sources and secondary ones are chosen among works authored by Dutch colonial officers, Dutch civil servants, Colonial traders, Private traders, and numerous native writer works such as Hikayat Prang Gompeuni, Manuscripts, and many more.

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The proposed paper tries to assess historically the social imagination of the concept of ‘Umma’ by the Muslim society of Malabar that accommodated the particular non-Muslim political context ruled by Hindu Zamorins in South India. The Khilafat movement in South India, which was pitted against the British empire that wanted to overthrow the Ottoman Caliphate, was in many aspects, a culmination of series of anti-British empire struggles that took place under the leadership of Hadrami Sayyids such as Sayyid Fadl (1824-1900) and his father Sayyid Alawi (d. 1844) in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Born to an Arab Hadrami father and Malabari women in Malabar of South India, Sayyid Fadl succeeded in diverse scholarly and political careers: from the anti-British political leader in Malabar, a religious scholar in Mecca and the Governor in Dhofar to the Ottoman advisor to Sultan Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876-1909) in Istanbul. This paper attempts to delineate historically how Fadl’s writings in Istanbul and Hejaz had illuminated ideas of an imagined society of ‘Umma’ in a non-Muslim political region far from the central Arab lands of Islam. Given the vehement scholarly appeals in the study of Muslim communities to turn the locus away from the Arab Middle East to much neglected far peripheral regions of Muslim societies (Ahmad 2016), this study also promises to evaluate within the lights of historical instances the Islamic concept of ‘Umma’ as it is conceived in the peripheral non-Islamic regions of the Indian Ocean that lay far flung from the heartland Arab centres.

Unlike its counterpart regions in the north, the southwestern of coasts of India has an amicable expansion of Islam through Arab maritime trade routes whose story has been celebrated in the anonymous work entitled as Qissa Shakrawti Fermal. Despite being the honourable
delegates of the deceased Malabari king in Malabar, Cheraman Perumal, the missionary who preached Islam did not seek a political share with king’s successors. Rather, they became complacent with the non-Muslim ruler who supported Muslims in their religious and missionary activities (al-Ma‘nbari 1931). Although Malabar had retained rampant economic and religious contacts with the Muslim political powers in Arabia, such as the Rasulids in Yemen, Timurids of Persia and Fatimids in Cairo (al-Khazraj 1911), the question of Caliphate and the idea of ‘Umma’ was not politically conspicuous until the Portuguese fleet threatened the peaceful trade of Calicut and Muslims of the city were undergone selective inhuman cruelty in the name of religion by the Portuguese. Faced with a strong existential crisis in the wake of the Portuguese attack on Calicut, the Muslims in the city beseeched Ottoman Sultan to help their Hindu Zamorin ruler in their joint attack against the Portuguese. The formation of such an ‘Umma’ imagery, emerged in the non-Muslim political context, formed divergent developments in the anti-colonial struggles of later centuries, which were strengthened in the nineteenth century under the Hadrami Sayyid leaders such as Sayyid Alawi and Sayyid Fadl.

After his exile from Malabar by the British colonial authority, Sayyid Fadl (later in Turkey he was called as Fadl Pasha) spent a very dynamic scholarly life in Hejaz, teaching and writing about religious, political and Sufi subjects. With his trans-regional identity of Arab Sayyid, he managed to ascend the governorship of Dhofar and later was selected as the Ottoman advisor to the Sultan, who drafted plans to unify Muslim communities of all territories under the Caliphate. Although Sufism and religious subjects matter greatly in most of his seventeen works, the political conceptualization of Umma, Islamic governmentality, civilian and political etiquettes are detailed in many of the works which were printed in Istanbul. Despite scholarly writings that promote pan-Islamic Umma concepts and elevation of Alawi Tariqa and Sayyid lineage, Fadl Pasha utilized his trans-regional Hadrami Alawi networks and political influence as well as the charisma he left in Malabar to promote Caliphate interests in India, which made the colonial officials in the region too anxious to bar Fadl’s descendants from returning permanently to the region. However, the ideas transcended the colonial official surveillance and the Khilafat movement that broke out in the northern regions of India to restore the Caliphate authority got its momentum in the region in South India where Fadl had been exiled. This paper intends to trace such trans-regional dynamics of the concept of ‘Umma’ and pan-Islamic ideas preached from the empire’s citadels in Istanbul to lay masses in non-Muslim contexts of Malabar. This will help to see the gradual transformation of the concept of Umma and its pan-Islamic apparatus in the particular context of India where the movement was politically supported by the Hindu leaders of the Congress party such as Mahatma Gandhi.

The Khilafat movement, which was conceptualized around the concept of Umma, had its own indigenous articulations by the local scholars such as Ali Musliyar, Pareekutty Musliyar and Variyan Kunnahmad Haji. Taking together Fadl’s scholarly writings and articulations of local scholars regarding the ‘Umma’ and Caliphate concepts and examining the subsequent historical events in Malabar would open wider windows in understanding the concept of Umma within the non-Muslim context such as South India. As case studies, I would like to examine mainly two works of Fadl Pasha; Idah Asrar al-Alawiyya and al-Tariq al-Hanifiyya, which blend the claims of sacred lineage with political charisma and claim the Ottoman empire as true heirs of Caliphate. At the same time, I will utilize the works in Malayalam and Arabic Malayalam such as Muhimmat al-Mu`mineen, written by Malabari scholars who were at the forefront of the movement. Besides the abundant foreign office records, although provide antagonist view of Muslim movements, would be helpful in delineating more clear picture regarding the movement. Blending all these materials together with the view of an Ottoman scholar emerged from Malabar and conceptualizations expressed by the local scholars supported by non-Muslim political authorities in the ongoing freedom struggle will provide not only novel dimensions of the concept of Umma in non-Muslim contexts but also interesting nuances of the trans-regional historical expansion of pan-Islamic thoughts transcending the colonial sur-
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